Centrifugal Tendencies In The Algerian Civil War

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Summer, 2001 by Quintan Wiktorowicz

IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, after nearly a decade of violence, the civil war in Algeria is winding down. A unilateral cease-fire sponsored by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in 1997 and the regime's Civil Concord initiative, which promised amnesty or light sentences for rebels who surrendered by January 2000, created momentum for the cessation of political violence. The number of deaths attributed to the conflict has diminished substantially in the last few years, and there is renewed optimism about the prospects for rebuilding Algerian society.

Despite such remarkable progress toward peace, however, a number of Islamist groups are perpetuating a low-intensity conflict, raising the specter of intractable episodes of sporadic military engagements. The civil war has not exhausted itself, and questions persist as to whether the regime is capable of ending the violence. The possibility of a long, drawn out conflict is a sober reality for an Algerian public already saturated by the experience of atrocities and death.

The daunting task of forging a cessation of political violence is, at least in part, the legacy of a factionalized civil war. Unlike many revolutions or rebellions where opposition forces coordinate under a centralized command capable of negotiating a comprehensive cease-fire, the armed Islamist opposition was never a coherent, unified movement. Instead, it was characterized by a nebulous, loose affiliation of autonomous groupings, each with its own leadership, strategies, tactics, and religious dogma. Although the Islamists faced a common enemy, there were profound differences over interpretations of Islamic doctrine regarding the purpose of the struggle and the religious permissibility of particular actions and tactics in warfare. [1]

These differences created centrifugal pressures toward internecine conflict that factionalized the movement into disparate groups. Ideological fissures among Islamists engendered pressure for a polycephelous armed movement with autonomous and often contradictory elements, rendering peace-making a Hercu-lean task. Throughout the civil war, Islamist groups proliferated as disagreements prompted spin-off movements. Despite the AIS cease-fire and the surrender of a number of Islamists, schisms within the movement remain and a number of armed groups still operate. The centrifugal tendencies in the civil war continue to induce low levels of Islamist violence that may prolong the "agony of Algeria" for some time to come. [2]

TENDENCIES IN THE ARMED MOVEMENT

In Algeria, despite attempts to unify Islamists under a common organizational umbrella, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), they have never represented a coherent movement. [3] Rather, the organization of the Islamists is characterized by a nebulous network of myriad groups, followings, and religious orientations, best described as an assortment of tendencies or ideological clusters. While they may share the goal of creating an Islamic state and society, there are divergent views over religious practice, strategy, and tactics. These differences inform internal schisms that underlie the structure of the movement. The term "tendency" is used here to connote the absence of rigid distinctions among variegated groupings. While individuals "tend" toward particular perspectives, categorization may not capture the fluidity of orientation, since individuals often move from one cluster to another, whether motivated by personal, pragmatic, or religious considerations.

In Algeria, there are two dominant tendencies in the Islamist movement. The first articulates an Islamic nationalist perspective that emphasizes political considerations defined by a complex national milieu. Frequently termed "Algerianist" (djaza 'ara), these Islamists are not driven exclusively by religious conviction. Instead, they consider the realities of political context and a rational calculus of what will benefit society and the polity. [4] For Algerianists, strengthening the nation may require compromise and cooperation with non-Islamist forces. This tendency is dominated by a politically experienced, pragmatic, intellectual core, represented by figures such as Abassi Madani, president and speaker of the FIS. [5]

Through most of the civil war, this accommodationist stance articulated a discourse of jihad frequently couched in symbols of democracy and human rights. The struggle was depicted as a war against an authoritarian regime that bypassed democratic procedures, canceling the electoral process in January 1992 as the FIS was positioned to control parliament. Jihad was viewed as a religiously justified rebellion to reinstate the electoral results and gain access to institutions of governance. Although the regime consistently refused to negotiate with the FIS, the Algerianists sought reincorporation into the political system. [6]

The second tendency is represented by the Salafis, a global movement driven by a desire for religious purification. [7] The purpose of the movement is not pragmatic, national politics; it is explicitly religious and ideological. Salafis believe that over centuries of religious practice, certain innovations were introduced to the religion through Sufism and other popular customs. As a result, society is following a deviant variant of Islam, in contradistinction to sirat al-mustaqim, the "straight path" of God. Salafis seek to reinstitute practices that capture the purity of Islam, as understood by the salaf (early companions of the Prophet) and revealed in the Quran and Sunna (path or example of the Prophet Mohammed). [8]