A Democracy With Fangs And Claws And Its Effects On Egyptian Political Culture - Statistical Data Included

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Summer, 2001 by Joshua A. Stacher

INTRODUCTION

SINCE HOSNI MUBARAK BECAME Egyptian president in October 1981 numerous critics, observers, and governments amongst others have been insistent on calling for further democracy in Egypt while denouncing the 'slow pace' at which this has proceeded. However, the President has alluded to his fear of democratizing too quickly. In April 1987, Mubarak stated, "we are providing doses of democracy in proportion to our ability to absorb them. We are forging ahead but we need time for our democracy to fully develop." [1] This appears to indicate that an 'overdose' would likely be harmful to Egyptian stability. Moreover, this statement implies that the Egyptian people are the key factor determining the amount of democracy to be injected into society. Judging from the substantial political deliberalization the country witnessed in the 1990s, [2] it would appear that Egyptian citizens are judged as still unprepared for democracy.

Such perceptions are reinforced by the views of citizens as reflected a week before Mubarak's fourth successful presidential referendum in September, 1999. Adli Ayyad a 67-year-old jewelry shop owner, for example, stated, "I'll say 'yes' to Mubarak because nobody has done as much as he has. I want him to carry on. He is an excellent president. I don't mind having him as president for life." [3] As this comment indicates, political culture in Egypt does not appear to be particularly conducive to democracy.

The main argument in this article, however, is that far from having an "anti-democratic" political culture, there appears to be a prevalence of an apathetic political culture in Egypt. This, as will be illustrated, is more a consequence of the anti-democratic nature of the institutions, actors, and intellectual political culture that formally profess a desire for democracy, than a consequence of the nature of mass political culture in contemporary Egypt.

DEMOCRACY AND CULTURAL COMPATIBILITY

Democracy and cultural compatibility have provided an ocean of information and points of view. The reasons for this are cited by many distinguished academics in their works. Nazih N. Ayubi, for example, states, "Democracy is simply not a form of government; it is also a cultural and intellectual tradition." [4] Sami Zubaida asserts that the explanation is easier, but is also rooted in a cultural context -- one that does not pit Arabs against the West. Rather, Zubaida notes that it is possible to see several different patterns that all differ from Western state development in parts of the world such as Latin American, Asia, and the Middle East. He states, "It is quite clear that the implementation of Western models of the modern nation state in the Middle East, as well as in any other parts of the world, have led to very different patterns of formation, different from the West and different from each other. They are for the most part modern nation states, in terms of organization, administration and rule, but they are not modern Western states." [5] While the endless debate continues on whether Western liberal democracy is culturally specific or universal, Zubaida's point of view appears persuasive. In short, it is possible to institute Western democracy in non-Western culture. Its adaptation within a non-Western culture however, and the unique form it may take does not necessarily mean that it is non-democratic.

While it seems easier to place Islam and Arabs into the "undemocratic" camp because of "historical or religious roots", the bridge that divides people and governments from being democratic or non-democratic is perhaps not that distinct. Indeed, one can argue that people are not innately or culturally democratic or non-democratic because, in fact, democracy is a learned behavior. As Diamond states, "Just as Latin American countries overcame what was once thought to be their indelibly authoritarian Catholic heritage, Asia cannot be condemned to authoritarian rule by their Confucian or Buddhists cultures, or Middle Eastern countries by the predominance of Islam." [6] In relation to the Middle East, Elbaki Hermassi, in a paper presented in 1991, argued that neither Islam nor Arab cultural patterns are inherently hostile to liberalism and democracy and that democratic norms may be gaining importance as a source of political legitimacy in the Arab world. [7] Instead, he maintains that the major obstacle Arab gover nments must overcome is the legacy of colonialism. [8] The fact that Islam is one of the world's largest and most complex belief systems and contains multiple and contradictory political messages, partly a consequence of interpretation, seems to discredit those who flatly perceive Islam as 'undemocratic.' [9]

Nevertheless few topics appear to have proven as controversial as Arab political culture. Underdeveloped and misused by our predecessors as a concept, it has largely been dismissed because of its inherent flaws. Some of these flaws include flagrant overgeneralizations, Orientalism, ethnocentrism, and a reductionist approach that leads to stereotyping an entire people. [10] In fact, the approach is so detested by some, such as Lisa Anderson, who finds that "political culture analysis can be very seductive, particularly to policy-makers looking for short, neat explanations of the complexities they face but, at least as it is currently done, it is unusually susceptible to distortion and bias." [11] Instead, she argues that it is necessary to know more of institutional basis, political economy, state-society relations, governmental policy and "a host of other things" before the gravity of political attitudes is considered. [12] On this basis, it is best to turn to what constitutes political culture.