Full spectrum dominance

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Summer, 2005 by Brock L. Bevan

Stephen C. Pelletiere. America's Oil Wars. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). 208 pp. Hardcover, $34.95.

William Engdahl. A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order, (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, [1992] 2004). 312 pp. Hardcover, $24.95.

IRAQ, ON THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY (March 2005) of the United States led invasion and subsequent occupation, endures perpetual violence and a lack of normalization of life. Though the United States argued that Iraq had possessed so-called "weapons of mass-destruction" and had colluded with "terrorists" in the run-up to the invasion (that was neither declared a war by the United States Congress nor sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council), both allegations have proven to be false. (1) Pretenses for the invasion have shifted in the wake of the original casus belli deteriorating: the real reason for the invasion -ex posto facto- was to bring enlightenment in the form of "democracy" to the Iraqi people (and the Arab world) through preemptive war. (2)

Stephen C. Pelletiere, former senior political analyst at the CIA on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and professor of National Security Affairs at the United States Army War College from 1998 to 2000, argues that the ultimate occupation of Iraq from 2003 up to the present was a result of Saddam Hussein's attempt in the late 1980s and early 1990s to solidify the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). For Pelletiere "... the individual who was able to marshal the resources of so great (and powerful) an institution, and keep its members in line, would have been someone with whom to reckon." (3)

The peculiar instability that was prevalent in the Persian Gulf region prior to 1988-1989 allowed the United States to execute its version of a global racket. It involved allowing instability to flourish in order to create a reason for the autocrats in the Persian Gulf to exchange their "petro-dollars" for United States-made armaments. That these armaments were often of no use to the states buying them made no difference. Pelletiere contends that the "historic juncture" that occurred in the late 1980s "imperiled America's position in the Gulf." The concurrence of events that was the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Iraqi defeat of Iran in their near decade-long war, and the consolidation of OPEC with high-absorber states in control of policy posed a challenge to the hegemony of the United States in the region and (as a result of the geopolitical significance of petroleum) in the world.

Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, challenged the hegemony that the United States exercised in the region by invading Kuwait in 1990. The problem for the United States was manifold, starting with the threat that a strong Iraq would pose to the Washington's allies in the region; continuing onto the elevated position of power Baghdad would sustain with Kuwait integrated into the state; and ending with the additional prestige Iraq would have over petroleum resources on a global level. Iraq, once cornered by the shenanigans of the George H. W. Bush administration, attempted to accommodate Washington's dictates while saving face, but to no avail. (4) Iraq's mistake turned out to be the perfect opportunity to enact a modified version of plans developed under former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in the 1970s to seize oilfields in the Persian Gulf from weak sheikdoms such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. (5)

As a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States justified a military ground presence in Saudi Arabia. According to the story pushed by Washington, iraq posed a threat to the integrity of the Saudi Arabian kingdom, or at least the continued dynastic power of the al-Saud family. Thus, the al-Saud family gained "protection" from the United States but paid for it in terms of the cost of the war against Iraq in 1990-1991 as well as in terms of lost legitimacy. As Pelletiere says "... the decision to stay on [after the conclusion of the conflict in 1991] infuriated some elements of Saudi society, and instances of sabotage against the Americans began to proliferate." (6)

Whereas Pelletiere roots his analysis on the specificity of Iraq and its particular history in terms of leadership under Saddam Hussein, William Engdahl emphasizes the global dimension to the conflict. Engdahl is trained as an economist and writes for various financial publications on issues of energy, politics, and economics. In his A Century of War: Anglo-American Politics and the New Worm Order, the reader is exposed to the long history of petroleum and how the change from coal as the major fuel altered the world. (7) Engdahl states "War in Iraq was about the very basis of America's 'national security,' of future American power. America's role as the sole hegemon was the unspoken reason for the war ..." (8) In making that statement Engdahl highlights the international monetary system that has been in place since the end of Second World War.