Women and empowerment in the Arab world

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Fall, 2003 by Sherifa Zuhur

Women's and progressive political parties which support non-sectarianism were in favor of the proposed civil marriage, but opposition arose first in the Sunni religious establishment, spread to other religious officials and then was mirrored in Prime Minister Hariri's decision to postpone this decision, and finally even the Syrian President's stance that the issue was divisive and should be avoided.

Lebanon granted women the right to vote in 1953 and the delicate balance of the various confessional groups in the country is balanced by the sloganeering of the Taif accords that ended the Civil War which also call for the reduction of sectarianism (ta'ifiyya). Sectarianism has a bearing on this issue which could pertain to inter-religious marriages--precisely what the Sunni religious leaders sought to rein in as well as retaining their own control over matters of personal status.

Just next door in neighboring Syria, civil marriages are firmly legal, whereas religious marriages are insufficient in the eyes of the state. However the state ceremony and contract is nearly identical to that used in a religious marriage. Nadia El-Cheikh analyzed the responses of the Sunni, Shi'i, and communities and the women's groups to the proposed law. She explains that Sunni opposition to the measure grew after the wording was revealed. When the cabinet voted--21 in favor, six against and one abstention to the measure-which was after all, just "optional" in March 1998, the debate began in full. The Sunni Grand Mufti of Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, led a very strong attack on the proposed change, saying that it opposed the shari'a in that a Muslim woman was specifically forbidden from marrying a non-Muslim man. It outlawed polygamy, although the former point was highlighted rather than this particular change. Furthermore the new form of marriage would promote "secularism at the expense of the religious authorities and religious courts;" and "endanger the well-being of the family" (El Cheikh, 1999). Eventually other objections based on omissions of items that would pertain to Muslims under the law such as the length of the 'idda and so on were raised. Demonstrations, sit-ins and protests against the bill were convened in Tripoli, Sidon and elsewhere.

The Shi'i response was milder and more ambivalent to begin with, but the Sunni response began to include charges of apostasy for those who would submit to a civil procedure. Fadiallah and Shams al-Din came out against the measure, but Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament, voted for it. Indeed, the most progressive of the Shi'i clerics, Muhammad Hasan al-Amm, advisor to the Ja'afari court, held a forum with two Christian clerics in January 2000, upholding his previous overall approval of the position of civil marriage, and of the principle of secularization, although he acknowledged the doctrinal objections to intermarriage.

The Christian religious officials were at first hesitant, but later, some of the bishops published a document saying that the church denies the possibility of civil marriage, since marriage is a sacrament and those who married otherwise exist in a state of sin. The Maronite patriarch opposed the law from a religious standpoint but most of all because he was concerned by the Sunni opposition (Chahine, 1998). In the end, religious officials and their political patrons triumphed over the rather large numbers of the general public who continue to support the reform. Hardly anyone emphasized the matter of empowerment for women, who are in many ways restricted by religious marriages. Rather, opponents and proponents saw the proposed law as blow to sectarianism, ta'ifiyya (Zuhur, 2002).