Economic reform and Tunisia's hegemonic party: the end of the administrative elite - Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in North Africa

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Spring, 1998 by Stephen J. King

During a period of accelerated economic liberalization, from 1986 until today, Tunisia's hegemonic party abandoned its representation of a broad segment of society and became a vehicle representing the interests of the rural bourgeoisie and urban manufacturers, many of whom had been rural notables. In addition, an increasingly globalized economy and stagnant state-led growth strategies within Tunisia led to constraints on state autonomy as international forces pressed for increased market reforms. An Islamist movement serves as the strongest organized resistance to the hegemonic party.

In the four decades since Tunisian independence in 1956, a single political party, under different names and leaders, has monopolized the political system. I interpret Tunisia's state party historically as a political movement led by an administrative elite(1) that was capable of resisting social forces both domestically and internationally in the sense that state policy reflected their needs and preferences. These state authorities had a strong influence on socioeconomic change in post-independence Tunisia. The administrative elite is defined here as the provincial elites, especially those from the Sahel, who in the 1930s took over national leadership in Tunisia from the traditional elites in urban areas. The new administrative elite, mostly embodied in the Neo-Destour party, were characterized by their modern, usually French, education and a commitment to creating a modern economy with greater social equity. Their mission was to transform Tunisia economically, socially, and technologically. Among the administrative elite, there have been differences in strategies to attain an industrialized economy. They have tried both a state state-led growth strategy and liberal economic policies to reach their goal.

The administrative elites autonomy, however, has always been vulnerable to one powerful social group: the rural bourgeoisie. The post-independence policy process has frequently reflected the elite's vulnerability to the vested interests of the rural bourgeoisie. Until relatively recently, however, the administrative elite attempted to use their control, first of the nationalist movement and then of state patronage and state policy, to create an umbrella political organization that attempted to respond to all constituencies in Tunisia, while still formulating an overall development strategy according to their own ideologies and goals. Their actions led to a populist nationalist movement and a populist political party, the Neo-Destour. At independence, the administrative elite led by President Habib Bourguiba, took control of the political apparatus of the state. Party leaders and the bureaucratic establishment form the membership of the administrative elite.

The inability of a single party to represent all social groups in Tunisia even modestly well was apparent by the 1970s, but the current identity of the state party was solidified during the economic reform process between 1986 and 1996. The party's increasing link with the rural bourgeoisie and its urban offshoot as well as its ties to transnational capital ends the era of an administrative elite in Tunisia that was willing and able to challenge the interests of the most powerful social forces within and outside of the country. Any pretense of a populist party that represented all Tunisians has ended. In terms of the literature on Tunisian and North African politics, international political economy variables and class analysis probably deserve more attention than the earlier emphasis on political elites, regime types, and ideology.(2)

During economic reform, the state has remained authoritarian leaving few options in the formal political system for the abandoned constituencies of the once populist party. This dire political picture is partially alleviated by relatively strong overall economic growth rates during the structural adjustment era(3) and by the civil war in neighboring Algeria which the current regime uses to justify a frozen political system. The regime has banned the participation of the only opposition political party with significant public support, the Islamist Al-Nahda party, and smothers the development of any other significant political threat, while society continues to rapidly change politically and economically.(4)

To maintain political coherence and stability the regime appears to be relying on market reforms to produce rapid economic growth (with little regard to equity in the distribution of benefits), and has assumed an adversarial position against an Islamist movement through use of repression. While Tunisian state authorities fundamentally reorganize the distribution of economic and political assets in favor of more dominant social groups, no political parties representing the interests of the peasantry or labor have been allowed to develop.

THE NEO-DESTOUR AND MODERNIZATION THEORY

A generation of scholars, largely working within the modernization school, provided a base for an understanding of Tunisia's single (now hegemonic) party system. Modernization theory provided a liberal, pluralist interpretation of change. There was an optimism in this approach which in most versions predicted a nonviolent trajectory culminating in liberal democracy.(5) Developed partly as an alternative to Marxist approaches, political change was not tied to economic forces. Also very little was done to integrate the realms of domestic and international politics.