Globalization and American Power

National Interest, The, Spring, 2000 by Kenneth N. Waltz

America continues to garrison much of the world and to look for ways of keeping troops in foreign countries rather than withdrawing them, as one might have expected it to do at the Cold War's end. [12] The 1992 draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance advocated "discouraging the advanced industrialized nations from ... even aspiring to a larger global or regional role." The United States may at times seek help from others, but not too much help, lest it lose its leading position in one part of the world or another. The document, when it was leaked, provoked criticism. In response, emphasis was placed on its being only a draft, but its tenets continue to guide American policy.

Discontent in the Caboose

IN A SYSTEM of balanced states, the domination by one or some of them has in the past been prevented by the reaction of others acting as counterweights. The states of Europe held each other in balance through the first three hundred years of the modern state system. In the following fifty years, the United States and the Soviet Union checked each other, each protecting its sphere and attempting to manage affairs within it. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been alone in the world; no state or combination of states provides an effective counterweight.

What are the implications for international politics? The more interdependent the system, the more a surrogate for government is needed. Some Americans believe that the United States provides this service and that, because of its moderation, other states will continue to appreciate, or at least to accept, its managerial role. Benign hegemony is, however, something of a contradiction in terms. "One reads about the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States", a British diplomat has remarked. "Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism."

American leaders seem to believe that America's pre-eminent position will last indefinitely. The United States would then remain the dominant power without rivals rising to challenge it, a position without precedent in modern history. When Americans speak of preserving the balance in East Asia through our military presence, the Chinese understandably take this to mean that we intend to maintain the strategic hegemony we now enjoy in the absence of a balance of power. When China makes steady though modest efforts to improve the quality of its inferior forces, we see a future threat to our and others' interests. Whatever worries the United States has in East Asia and whatever threats it feels, Japan experiences them earlier, feels them more severely, and reacts to them. China then worries as Japan improves its airlift and sealift capabilities and as the United States bolsters its forces in Korea. The actions and reactions of China, Japan and Korea, with or without American participation, are creating a new bal ance of power in East Asia, which is becoming part of the new balance of power in the world.

In the Cold War, the United States won a decisive victory. Victory in war, however, often breeds lasting enmities. Magnanimity in victory is rare. Winners of wars, facing few impediments to the exercise of their wills, often act in ways that create future enemies. Thus Germany, by taking Alsace and most of Lorraine from France in 1871, earned its lasting enmity; and the Allies' harsh treatment of Germany after World War I produced a similar effect. In contrast, Bismarck persuaded the Kaiser not to march his armies along the road to Vienna after the great victory at Koniggratz in 1866. In the Treaty of Prague, Prussia took no Austrian territory. Thus Austria, having become Austria-Hungary, was available as an alliance partner for Germany in 1879.