Couldn't be worse? Iraq after saddam

National Interest, The, Winter, 2001 by Ofra Bengio

THE MAIN working hypothesis, taken almost as an act of faith and embraced by many Western policymakers and pundits since the end of the Gulf War, is that the West's "Iraq problem"--and most of Iraq's problems, too--would be easily solved once President Saddam Hussein disappeared from the scene. Some observers have therefore couched the "Iraq problem" as one of biology--meaning not the threat of Iraqi biological weapons, but rather Saddam's mortality.

Not all delusional thinking is based on ignorance, but this example is. The contention that Saddam's removal through death or incapacitation would solve most of the difficulties at hand is flawed on at least two counts, one having to do with the past, the other with the future.

First, it ignores the far-reaching changes that Saddam and the Ba'athi regime have wrought in Iraqi society and political culture. The havoc wreaked upon Iraq's socioeconomic system will take years to heal. The total castration of the political system will not be easy to repair either, even in the very unlikely event that a liberal-democratic regime were to come to power in Baghdad. Finally, the mending of the fragmented Iraqi polity now divided between a rump state controlled by the Ba'ath and two fractious Kurdish administrations in the north, will not be a simple matter.

Even more importantly, the "biology" approach ignores Saddam's own plans and preparations for Iraq's future. Saddam is determined to ensure that his legacies and the system he has built are perpetuated after his departure from this life. In this regard, several questions are pertinent: Is Saddam Hussein walking in the footsteps of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Asad, as well as other leaders in this region, in preparing a "hereditary presidency"? If so, what would such a regime be like? In specific institutional terms, what would be the fate of the three pillars on which the regime has been based for the last 33 years: the Ba'ath Party, the security services and the army?

Putting the House in Order

FOR MANY years Saddam has refrained from dealing with the issue of succession, for, like other absolute rulers, he could not imagine his roost ruled by anyone else. However, in the last few years he has plunged into the subject head-on. It is true that Saddam has made some spectacular mistakes, but he has shown a real propensity for anticipating and preparing for any venture or eventuality he deems to be important--and securing the succession and his legacy is one of them. Among his most critical tasks, therefore, has been to purge potential threats and rivals from within his own family. He has taken this precautionary measure not only out of fear for his own rule, but also to prepare the groundwork for his heirs.

Initially, Saddam had elevated his relatives to the highest posts in the country in a nepotistic manner that would almost shame a monarchical regime. Over time, however, he has begun to eliminate them, one after the other, not only politically, but in some cases physically, as well. For example, Saddam ordered the murders of his two cousins and sons-in-law, Hussein Kamil and Saddam Kamil, who fled in 1995 to Jordan (together with Saddam's two daughters) and made the terrible mistake of returning to their deaths in 1996.

Suffice it to say that by 2001, the entire family network of brothers, cousins, sons-in-law and brothers-in-law, who had once held key posts in the Ba'ath and constituted an important pillar of support for the regime, was gone except for one person--Saddam's cousin, 'Ali Hasan al-Majid. Majid has demonstrated his unquestioned loyalty to Saddam in repeated brutal acts, from supervising the chemical attack on the Kurds (in Halabja in 1988), to coordinating the elimination of other family members (the Kamils in 1996). Majid appears to have been left "in reserve", possibly to aid Saddam's heir in consolidating power during the transitional period. (1)

Saddam's other important task has been to decide which of his two sons, 'Udayy or Qusayy, should be groomed as heir apparent. He has made no open declaration, but it is clear that, at least for the time being, he has chosen the younger son, Qusayy. His choice is not difficult to understand. 'Udayy has discredited himself by his unruly and literally murderous behavior, his sexual and other excesses, his inflated ego, and his unbridled ambitions--all this in addition to a physical disability which is the result of an attempt on his life in 1996. However, 'Udayy is not resigned to his father's decision. In the last two years a latent struggle for power has developed between 'Udayy, who views himself as the rightful heir apparent, and Qusayy--or, more precisely, between 'Udayy and his father, who is actively grooming his younger son to succeed him.

Saddam has tried to fob off 'Udayy with membership in the National Assembly, the rubber-stamp Iraqi parliament. This does not appear to have worked, however. Mimicking his father's tactics, 'Udayy has unleashed a propaganda campaign and promoted a personality cult via the print and broadcast media outlets under his control. (2) 'Udayy's message to his father, his brother, and the rest of the country is clear: he is entitled to rule Iraq after his father, not only because he is the elder of the two brothers, but also because he is more capable. He portrays himself not simply as a replica of his father, but as better than the original. 'Udayy is said to be smarter than his father (he has a doctorate); more pious (he grew a beard, and claims to know the Quran by heart; certainly, he quotes from it more lavishly than his father); and more popular (winning 99.99 percent of the vote in his election in 2000 to the National Assembly, against the 99.96 percent his father received in the 1995 presidential election). M ost importantly, he has portrayed himself as being more liberal, democratic and "clean" than his father. Attempting to appeal to the public over the heads of his father and brother, 'Udayy has intensified in the last two years his criticism of the work of different ministries, calling, for example, for corruption (and corrupt individuals) to be purged from the security and intelligence apparatus. He has pressed for the National Assembly to be granted real legislative powers, and for opening the political and economic systems to public participation. He also carefully calibrates his declarations for self-aggrandizement, even at his father's expense. In one of these, for example, he said: "Vie will not recognize Israel even if we are kept under an embargo for another hundred years." In another he called for the inclusion of Kuwait in the map of Iraq.