Cruise control: a case for missile defense

National Interest, The, Spring, 2002 by Michael O'Hanlon

THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have reshaped whole swaths of debate over U.S. foreign and national security policies. Certainly, the issue of homeland security is a case in point. In that context, it was inevitable that the various partisans and detractors of national missile defense, and those with contending views of how homeland security should be organized, would use the September 11 tragedy as evidence for their particular position. And they have. For example, those who have held the very idea of national missile defense to be a form of inanity--if not insanity--have argued that since no imaginable deployment of national missile defenses could have prevented the September 11 tragedy, this proves how bad an idea it is. This is a little like arguing that if a person has purchased homeowner's insurance, he or she has no need for auto or life or medical insurance. The dangers to the security of a nation are multiple, no less than the dangers to the security of individuals.

That said, it does not follow that all kinds of insurance policies are equally necessary or that all insurance products are equally wise and cost-effective investments. All such policies and products require study, for nations no less than for individuals. Many such studies are going forward. But while there are ongoing and fairly well-rehearsed debates afoot over homeland security organization and national missile defense, one area that has slipped through the cracks of public consciousness concerns defense against cruise missiles. The analysis that follows represents a study of the technical requirements and costs of a defense against cruise missiles.

A National Cruise Missile Defense

THE UNITED States today utterly lacks an effective cruise missile defense plan. But apart from the obvious post-September 11 concern about the hijacking of domestic flights, defending against cruise missiles has probably become the most challenging air defense problem for the United States in this era.

Groups such as the Rumsfeld Commission focused elsewhere but did note the possible threat of cruise missiles, including those launched from ships off U.S. coasts--and they were right to do so. Cruise missiles are prevalent around the world, with 75 countries owning a total of about 75,000. Most at present are antiship missiles, but a number of countries are working on converting some to land-attack variants. Cruise missiles are small and relatively easy to hide on ships or other vehicles that could approach U.S. territory before the missile was fired. They are hard to detect when launched or even as they approach their targets, not only because of their small size but also because of their modest infrared heat signature (especially by comparison with ballistic missiles) and their ability to fly low, using terrain for cover. (1)

Indeed, cruise missiles are small and inexpensive enough that it may not be beyond the means of terrorists to acquire them. Reconfiguring a standard cruise missile to carry a primitive nuclear warhead, likely to weigh half a ton or more, is probably beyond the abilities of terrorists, but outfitting a cruise missile with a dispensing mechanism for distributing chemical or biological agents or radiological materials may be feasible. In this sense, the cruise missile threat to the United States should be construed as one that could be posed by terrorists as well as other states seeking a means of coercion or deterrence.

To reliably protect the country against cruise missiles is admittedly a very difficult proposition, given the multiplicity of possible launch points, approach trajectories and targets. But a system of radars, perhaps held up by aerostat balloons, together with the existing network of U.S.-based fighter aircraft and a new series of surface-to-air missile sites, could provide at least some coverage of all of the nation's borders. That network might not provide leakproof defense in all cases, but it could stop most small attacks with high confidence and deny any attacker certainty that his cruise missiles would reach U.S. territory once fired.

Technologies are being developed that could perform some of these tasks. But the pace of research is too slow, with a target date of roughly 2010 for completing a master plan on cruise missile defense for overseas battlefields. (2) Cruise missile defense research efforts should grow to at least the cost of individual Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs--$200 to $300 million a year above current levels.

What would be involved in eventual deployment of a cruise missile defense, something that, owing to the nature of the threat, might have to be attempted in the course of this decade on roughly the same time frame as deployment of ballistic-missile defense? Given that the United States typically spent well over $10 billion a year on air defense during the early decades of the Cold War, when it worried seriously about the Soviet bomber force, the scale of the necessary effort could be substantial. (3) Large numbers of radars as well as widely-distributed interceptor missile bases would likely be needed to defend the vast perimeter of the United States, including non-continental states and possessions.