Letters

National Interest, The, Summer, 2002

Most promising is the prospect of a new security architecture for the region that could be built now, to be implemented either before or after an overall political settlement is achieved. At its heart should be an expanding Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the military arena. A new security arrangement could create the needed impetus to move forward on the political, economic, legal, and social dimensions of the Cyprus problem. By eliminating the offensive military capabilities on both sides on the island; equalizing Greek and Turkish mainland units in Cyprus at brigade level, replacing UNFIGYP, the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus, with a European or NATO-like unit; and putting all forces in Cyprus under a single commander from a NATO country--conditions could be created in which the regular Turkish Army units could be withdrawn from the island. Disbanding the Greek Cypriot National Guard would allow the security focus to shift to expanded police protection of all Cypriots, which would assume greater importanc e in the post-settlement phase.

My compliments to The National Interest and Messrs. Barkey and Gordon for focusing on the Cyprus crisis before it happens. I hope the article is widely read, understood, and that it has a positive affect on the future of the eastern Mediterranean.

COL. STEPHEN R.

NORTON, USA (RET.)

Senior Policy Advisor, Western Policy Center, and former U.S. Defense Attache to Cyprus

God and Mammon:

Daniel Pipes' "God and Mammon--Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" Winter 2001/02) presents such persuasive authority in favor of a "yes" answer to the question, that one is left somewhat puzzled at his own "no." Much of the problem may be due to his failure to distinguish between leaders and followers: for any mass base of followers to arise, the answer to the question whether poverty is a necessary, or at least customary, antecedent is almost assuredly "yes", and without such a mass base, there is likely to be only a Baader-Meinhof Gang or an Aum Shinrikyo, rather than a movement with real staying power.

Surely the author would see this, if he reflected upon the implications of his own statement: "Like fascism and Marxism-Leninism in their heydays, militant Islam attracts highly competent, motivated, and ambitious individuals." As leaders, perhaps so, but Mao would have gotten nowhere without his army of impoverished tenant-farmer followers, to whom he promised (a promise ultimately betrayed) ownership of the land. The same was true of Ho Chi Minh and of Castro. Nor were the Nazis anything more than a fringe party receiving less than 3 percent of the total vote in 1928. This skyrocketed to 33 percent by l932--enough to put them in power--directly as a result of the mass following created by the Great Depression.

Pipes' own favorable quotation of Martin Kramer gets it pretty much right: "Islam is particularly useful to these people [as the vehicle of counter-elites], in part because by its careful manipulation, it is possible to recruit a following among the poor, who make valuable foot-soldiers" (emphasis mine).