The stealth normalization of U.S.-China relations

National Interest, The, Fall, 2003 by David M. Lampton

Beijing, however, is reticent to confront Washington directly. The guiding impulse for Chinese policy remains the 28 carefully selected characters that Deng Xiaoping uttered not long after June 4, 1989, as China faced pressure and sanctions from around the world: "adopt a sober perspective; maintain a stable posture; be composed; conserve your strength and conceal your resources; don't aspire to be the head; do something eventually." This is a China with which America can work productively. Nonetheless, Deng's formulation leaves U.S. policymakers worried both about passivity in the short run and assertiveness in the long run.

In these current circumstances, the United States and China can, and should, advance their mutual interests in five areas:

* North Korea's drive for nuclear weapons is the critical security concern in East Asia for the United States. It is a bell-wether issue that requires even greater Sino-American cooperation than the significant level already achieved. The PRC played a key role by bringing the United States and North Korea together in Beijing in April 2003 and by its subsequent efforts to do so again. As of this writing, a second round of talks has been scheduled for late-August in Beijing, this time involving not only the United States, the PRC and North Korea, but South Korea, Japan and Russia as well. Beijing has sought to prod both Washington and Pyongyang to talk and has encouraged North Korea to do so in a "multilateral" setting. Beijing has used a mix of diplomatic and economic inducements and sanctions in its dealings with Pyongyang, reflecting the PRC's increasing alarm at North Korea's behavior. If the Bush Administration can develop a strategy acceptable to South Korea that holds out the prospect of both inducements and sanctions for Kim Jong-il, it may well win more support from Beijing. However, if talks with North Korea fail to occur or fail to deflect Pyongyang from its present course, Washington will expect more muscular action from the PRC. This will be a genuine test of Sino-American relations.

* With respect to Taiwan and cross-Strait relations, Jiang Zemin hinted at the October 2002 Crawford summit that Beijing might remove some of its missiles from their threatening postures near Taiwan were the United States to show parallel restraint in its military links with Taipei. This suggestion has been reiterated to visiting Americans by several Chinese leaders. Without endorsing this vague proposal, it provides Washington an opening for a dialogue with Beijing that should be seized. Relieved of cross-Strait militarization, Washington, Beijing and Taipei could foster greater economic and cultural cooperation.

The chief concerns of U.S. policy under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, and the Shanghai Communique seven years earlier, have been the twin concepts of the level of tension in the Taiwan Strait and a "peaceful resolution" of the Taiwan issue. For the first time in the last 54 years, China's leaders have, in effect, offered to discuss their force dispositions in proximity to the island. The White House has been largely unresponsive. Although the administration obviously has other things on its mind, it must be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. Silence in the face of a possibly meaningful Chinese proposal certainly does not encourage Beijing's new leaders to assume risks on new initiatives.