The stealth normalization of U.S.-China relations

National Interest, The, Fall, 2003 by David M. Lampton

   Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is
   doomed to fail. If China becomes an economic
   powerhouse it will almost certainly translate
   its economic might into military might
   and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia.
   Whether China is democratic or deeply
   enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic
   and autarkic will have little effect on its
   behavior, because democracies care about
   security as much as non-democracies do, and
   hegemony is the best way for any state to
   guarantee its own survival. (1)

Popular opinion in both countries reflected such sentiments. Survey data collected by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in March 1999 indicated that "keeping close watch on China as [a] world power", was the "top priority" for 52 percent of respondents. That same year, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations reported that 56 percent of American foreign policy "leaders" regarded China as a "critical threat." As for Beijing, in May 1995, China Youth Daily found that 87.1 percent of PRC respondents believed that the United States "was the country 'least friendly' to China." Subsequent events, such as the accidental 1999 bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade and the April 2001 collision of U.S. and PRC military aircraft near Hainan Island, only further darkened popular Chinese images of the United States--and vice versa. Popular sentiment created what Daniel Yankelovich calls the "boundaries of the permissible" for political leaders in both societies--vaguely-defined limits that politicians are loath to cross. In the United States--at least until 9/11--it was safer to paint China in dark hues, to stress China as a threat rather than a future strategic partner.

The post-9/11 circumstance: George W. Bush came into office talking about China as a "competitor" and asserting that he would do "whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself." After September 11, however, American priorities and threat perceptions changed--the sense of challenge from China declined as dangers from other quarters mounted. The Pew Research Center charted a 13 percent decline (by January 2003) in the number of respondents concerned about keeping a "close watch" on China. As Americans became more preoccupied with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, President Bush convincingly re-established a sense of hierarchy among U.S. foreign policy goals--with "security" as the touchstone--that could discipline his own fractious administration (to some extent), Congress and the domestic interest groups that previously had pulled Washington's China policy from pillar to post. Beijing, in turn, perceived a window of opportunity to pursue its goals for domestic development without excessive threat from the United States. The United States increasingly had other, more compelling security problems, ranging from Al-Qaeda's global network, to Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and North Korea.

Having seen the second plane hit the South Tower of the World Trade Center live on CNN on September 11, then-President Jiang Zemin quickly seized the opportunity to make contact with President Bush. Like Russia's Vladimir Putin, Jiang saw in the tragedy a chance to improve cooperation with Washington. Since 9/11, Beijing has supported UN anti-terror resolutions (including an affirmative vote for UN Resolution 1441 in November 2002 concerning Iraq), encouraged Pakistan's President Musharraf to cooperate with Washington on the war in Afghanistan, pledged $150 million (though less has been delivered) to the rebuilding effort in Afghanistan, and provided tactically significant information helpful to the U.S. war effort there. Moreover, Beijing has not been disruptive despite its concerns regarding the growing U.S. ground presence in Central Asia and Japan's broadening security role--a role dramatically expanded in July 2003 when the Japanese Diet voted to send forces to assist in Iraq's reconstruction. Finally, months prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Jiang let Bush know that China would not exercise its veto in the UN Security Council, regardless of its public rhetoric.