The sources of Russian conduct

National Interest, The, Spring, 2004 by Nikolas K. Gvosdev

THE POLITICAL personality of Russian power today is the product both of ideology and circumstances. George Kennan's observations, made nearly sixty years ago, are just as valid today when considering Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Too often, outside observers have first created their image of Russia, and then located the appropriate facts and personalities to support their construction. To get Russia right, we must seek to understand it as it understands itself, not as we might wish it to be.

During the 1990s, we underestimated Russia's vices in order to maintain the fiction that a post-Soviet Russia under Boris Yeltsin was firmly on the path to Western-style liberal democracy and free-market economics. As Russia moved further away from its Soviet past, the assumption ran, so its interests would converge with those of the United States. The desire to anoint Russia as a liberal ally of the West covered over a multitude of sins, most notably the rampant corruption that continues to devastate the Russian economy.

Today, we underestimate Russia's virtues to depict the country as a neo-Stalinist, authoritarian dictatorship bent on subverting freedoms at home and recreating its empire abroad. Russia is no longer seen as a partner to be engaged, but an emerging threat that needs to be contained. Jackson Diehl of the Washington Post concludes that we are witnessing "the consolidation of KGB-style authoritarianism" in Russia, while Senator John McCain accuses President Putin of mounting a "creeping coup against the forces of democracy and market capitalism." Yet renewing the Cold War image of Russia as an evil empire precludes the development of a genuine partnership based on shared vital interests.

Both of these positions miss the numerous complexities of post-Soviet Russia. Contemporary Russia is a state that "completely mixes, functionally and territorially, important democratic and authoritarian characteristics." (1) It can desire close and meaningful relations with the West, particularly the United States, yet strive to maintain its influence, especially in its immediate Eurasian neighborhood. So, a realistic evaluation of what Putin and his regime stand for is needed--as is an explanation of why the course that is being set for Russia enjoys such overwhelming domestic support.

Stolypin, Not Stalin

IT IS DIFFICULT to summarize the set of ideological concepts that guide Putin and his team--"Putinism" remains a work in progress. Nevertheless, from the inception of his administration, he and his team have sought

   to replace the disorder of the Yeltsin period
   with order and stability. A primary component
   of Putin's policy of strengthening vertical
   power in Russia is the reeling in of the
   power of the oligarchs and local bosses. (2)

This platform has won Putin a great deal of support, especially among the emerging small business community, which looks to a strong central government for security against both the oligarchs and power-hungry local politicians.

And it is clear that Putin has no desire to create a democracy for democracy's sake, especially if the result is an economically weak, politically impotent entity. Russians have no interest in becoming another "El Salvador and Jamaica ... two excellent examples of relatively poor but inclusive societies with above-average social welfare" (3) but scant influence in the world.

Yet the rejuvenated Russian state the Putin team has in mind has more in common with the late-tsarist era conservative reformer Peter Stolypin (prime minister, 1906-11) than with Joseph Stalin. After the chaos unleashed by the 1905 Revolution, Stolypin emphasized political stability with an eye to promoting rapid economic growth. A dynamic market economy and modernized, efficient institutions would enable the Russian state to exercise power in the world, he argued, especially after the defeat of the Russo-Japanese war.

Stolypin, who as a regional governor freely employed harsh tactics to crush revolutionary unrest, nonetheless recognized that the command methods of the autocracy were not capable of generating the economic and social development Russia needed to advance. Some degree of political and economic pluralism was necessary and needed to be accommodated. Stolypin's most famous reform plan was to break up the traditional Russian peasant commune in favor of individually-owned farms, in an attempt to create a new middle class supportive of his policies. His manipulation of electoral laws kept many radical democratic elements out of the Third and Fourth Dumas but also transformed the fledgling legislature from a pulpit for revolutionary orators into a working parliament. Many Russians today believe that if Stolypin's reforms had not been interrupted by his assassination and the onset of World War I, he would have transformed the Russian Empire into a modern state with social and political institutions comparable to those found in Western societies.

It is not accidental that Stolypin's motto, "You want great upheavals, but we want a Great Russia", has been resurrected as a slogan of the United Russia party. I suspect that another Stolypin truism, "First establish order, then start the reforms" would resonate very strongly with the current Kremlin.