Does Iraq matter?

National Interest, The, Spring, 2004 by Morton I. Abramowitz

DEPUTY Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and once high-flying Democratic presidential hopeful Howard Dean do not see eye to eye on the virtues of the Iraq War, but they and other leading Democrats and Republicans agree on the same key policy position: Now that we are in Iraq we must "stay the course." If we get out without leaving a reasonably stable and democratic Iraq, it will have catastrophic consequences for American policy in Iraq and the region and generally undermine American credibility around the world.

The Bush Administration and some Democrats have also argued that American success in creating a democratic Iraq will have an enormous payoff, that it will transform the Middle East's political scene, and even contribute significantly to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. In his recent State of the Union address Bush put it eloquently: "We will finish the historic work of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, so those nations can light the way for others and help transform a troubled part of the world." On this proposition, however, there are qualms. Can Iraq create a stable, reasonably democratic system in any short-term period that can endure? Can even a lengthy American presence ultimately help produce such an Iraq? Would the creation of a reasonably democratic Iraq have the bountiful benefits the Bush Administration foresees? All these are debatable.

Both of these basic propositions--that leaving is catastrophic and succeeding would transform the region--are usually asserted with vehemence, as if somehow they are intrinsically true, but they are rarely examined. That the dismaying political edifice the Middle East now presents is likely to destruct if the United States leaves an unstable Iraq seems farfetched. The region, however, can be expected to change significantly in the generational commitment the Administration has asserted is necessary for bringing democracy to the Middle East, but not necessarily because of the U.S. overthrow of Saddam and a continuing American military presence in Iraq.

Certainly, staying and being successful is far better than leaving and failing. Producing a decent Iraq would be a great achievement worth enormous sustained effort, while failure would have serious consequences. But the unfamiliar, difficult situation in Iraq and our declining ability to influence events needs sober assessment, perhaps a premature but certainly unwelcome endeavor. Indeed, it can be argued that staying indefinitely in Iraq in such difficult circumstances can lead both to greater costs and greater embarrassment to the United States. A great nation has the capacity to pursue ambitious objectives but also to reconsider the costs involved in the pursuit of those objectives as well as to handle adversity and take compensating measures to reduce the consequences of adversity. The central issues revolve around, first, the costs and benefits of staying or leaving Iraq early and, second, weighing the uncertainties of the consequences under any option. That is hard to do under any circumstance, particularly domestic political ones, when we are already deeply involved in pursuing tough, desirable objectives.

In dealing with the first assumption, it is not easy to define what "not staying the course" means. For some there is a powerful moral factor involved: We took over the country by force, and it is our responsibility to leave it in decent shape however long it takes. Only one Democratic presidential aspirant-Dennis Kucinich--urges immediate withdrawal and turning Iraq completely over to the UN. Indeed the U.S. military is not leaving imminently and there is so far no serious domestic or Iraqi demand for that, although that could change quickly. At the same time, the United States keeps making changes in policy that shorten the time-frame for American rule. It is closing down the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and turning power over to the Iraqis on June 30, 2004, much sooner than originally planned, while establishing a huge embassy to help manage our affairs and hopefully keep some grip on the rudder.

The ways of producing a new Iraqi provisional government are also in flux and the subject of intense debates in Iraq and Washington. Military and civilian officials have become less effusive about ambitious political goals for the new Iraq. What constitutes progress in Iraq now seems to be a moving target. These changes flow less from success and more to the realization of our lack of control in Iraq and the need for greater flexibility. Some ungenerously call it a barely disguised tactic of cutting and running before the November 2004 presidential election.

SO, PRACTICALLY speaking, not staying the course would be the announcement of a decision to remove all U.S. forces within twelve months, leaving Iraq's own military and police forces to cope with any remaining insurgency (U.S. force levels are headed down in any event). A preliminary arrangement is scheduled to be concluded in March 2004 between the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). This will determine the support of coalition forces to the political process. In July 2004, when a provisional Iraqi government assumes sovereignty, coalition forces will cease to be occupiers but will continue to help to provide security as "invited guests." This proposed timetable, of course, tells us little about what might be done in the interim until withdrawal, particularly if the insurgency were to worsen.