That magic moment

National Interest, The, Winter, 2004 by Eric Chenoweth

Francis Fukuyama's critique of Charles Krauthammer's doctrine of a unipolar America ("The Neoconservative Moment", Summer 2004), properly scolds Krauthammer for ignoring clearly unfortunate "facts on the ground." For Krauthammer does not just skip over inconvenient facts, he mistakes his judgement for fact--most importantly, the judgement that our transatlantic allies no longer count for much. But does the current "coalition of the willing" (wherein American forces take nearly all the burden) really equal a coherent NATO force willing to take action against radical Islamism? Might it not have been better to take Lord Robertson and NATO up on their pledge after 9/11 to stand with the U.S. against terrorism? It was the imprudence of the current foreign policy, consonant with the democratic realism put forward by Krauthammer, that has placed America in the current position of temporal alliances having no common (or lasting) values, when a different diplomatic and ideological approach could have strengthened America's efforts.

The neoconservative argument that I knew during the Cold War was a moral one that reaffirmed the inherent rightness of upholding freedom against totalitarianism. Clearly, the neoconservative argument has gone way off course in trading sound policies of containment using democratic alliances for a doctrine of pre-emption that insisted on war in Iraq. But let this cold warrior state the case plainly: Pre-emption leads nations to unnecessary and therefore immoral wars and the harmful consequences such wars bring, including ruptured alliances and the consequent reduced influence of the United States in world affairs.

That there were no weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq, that there are now a thousand American fatalities (and untold numbers of Iraqis), that traditional alliances with nations possessing real military strength have been broken, that there is a breakdown in civil order in Iraq--nothing can dissuade the purveyors of pre-emption that Iraq was a wrong course to take. Thus, Krauthammer's attempts to put limits on democratic idealism begs the question: Where does such reasoning end when it begins with an unnecessary war?

There is no doubt America is the sole superpower. But there is also no doubt that America will not be able to prosecute the War on Terror alone or with ad hoc alliances. Even our current "coalition of the willing" is a bow to this reality that the superpower cannot be the sole policeman. But if America's new foreign policy has alienated such sturdy democratic allies as France and Germany (because, as Fukuyama points out, we have simply lost the capacity to listen), one cannot hope that the perpetuation of that foreign policy will create sturdy (and equally powerful) new ones. Instead, America's allies will have the color of dictatorships like Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, and our antagonists that of a greater number of NATO members and democracies. This is neither prudent nor moral foreign policymaking.

ERIC CHENOWETH

Washington, DC