An axis of democracy? The uncertain future of Israeli-Indian relations

National Interest, The, Summer, 2005 by Rajan Menon, Swati Pandey

THE TRANSFORMATION in the relationship between India and Israel, from one that was at best cool and correct to one that is now hailed as a strategic alignment is among the striking changes in the post-Cold War landscape. This shift has been widely praised, particularly by Israeli, Indian and American commentators. They believe that its potential significance extends well beyond the dense network of transactions that has developed between the two sides, and out across the entire region of South Asia and the Greater Middle East.

But the emerging relationship between the two countries has been followed by so much anticipation and excitement as to border on irrational exuberance. While it is true that India and Israel have indeed begun a new chapter in their history, it may not have the far-reaching consequences that many expect. Regardless, it is critical to come to a realistic understanding of the vital interests that will pull the two countries together--and those that will push them apart.

As recently as a decade ago, there was little optimism about an Indo-Israeli duet. Despite the commonplace proposition that democracies do not fight other democracies, it scarcely follows that democracies are also invariably well disposed toward each other. They are often not, and for several decades Exhibit A was the frosty relationship between two democracies born but a year apart, India and Israel.

Not until 1992, following the end of the Cold War, did India even grant Israel full diplomatic recognition. But that step set the stage for a flurry of transactions that rapidly recast their entire relationship. Almost every year thereafter, the two countries have signed mutual agreements: a cultural pact encouraging educational and other exchanges in 1993; an agricultural cooperation agreement that same year; telecommunications, trade and economic cooperation agreements in 1994, including the accordance of most favored nation status by both parties; a mutual promise in 1996 to promote and protect foreign investments; and a plan to avoid double taxation, practice custom cooperation and collaborate further on agriculture and technology.

Before, leaders from the two sides were rarely seen with one another. Now there is a cavalcade of high-level visits. In 1996, Israeli President Ezer Weizman became the first Israeli president to visit India. National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra began making regular trips to Israel beginning in 1998, laying the groundwork for expanded cooperation in the military and intelligence sphere. In 2000, Home Minister L. K. Advani traveled to Israel with the heads of India's intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies, and he was followed in July by Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. They were the highest-ranking Indian officials ever to visit Israel. While the new trajectory was often ascribed to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) coalition, the left-leaning Congress Party, which took power in May 2004, has not changed course. If anything, it has accelerated the pace of strategic cooperation with Israel.

Arms and More

IT IS IN the area of national security--not trade and cultural exchanges--that the most dramatic and consequential transactions have occurred. Following the Soviet Union's implosion, India decided to replace its Soviet-dominated arsenal by diversifying its purchases. It began to see Israel, a major producer of modern weaponry, as an important potential supplier. Israel soon won many contracts to further India's military modernization. During the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, Israel rapidly dispatched to India a variety of weapons systems. All three branches of the Indian armed forces now rely on Israeli military technology, particularly aircraft and radars.

Israel has sold India two major weapons systems of particular importance. The first is Elta Electronics' Green Pine phased-array radar delivered in mid-2000, a key component of the controversial Arrow Ballistic Missile Defense system, which can detect incoming missiles from hundreds of kilometers away. Because the radar was developed without U.S. technology, Israel was able to sell it without U.S. permission. The second major deal, worth $1.1 billion, was the Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System, which India plans to integrate with its Russian Il-76 heavy transport aircraft. This was a different matter altogether, because it was developed with U.S. technology, and Washington had blocked Israel's planned sale of the system to China in 1998. But after some debate, the United States, which was developing a new appreciation of India's strategic worth, approved Israel's sale of the Phalcon to India in 2003.

Such arms deals bring obvious advantages to both sides. India gains access to critical high-tech weaponry that weighs the military balance with Pakistan in its favor. And co-production agreements with Israel further India's long-standing goal to create a robust, indigenous complex of defense industries with the ultimate aim of reaching near self-sufficiency. Quite apart from the money generated by Indian military purchases, the orders create economies of scale, which is important to Israel given its small armed forces.