Rejecting Russia?

National Interest, The, Summer, 2005 by Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Dimitri K. Simes

DOESN'T THE United States already have enough problems to deal with in the world? Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi remain at large, our work in Afghanistan and Iraq remains incomplete, and North Korea and Iran are both poised to become nuclear powers. So why do so many think Russia's daily twists and turns are our biggest problem? One would think that in 2005 the danger of a nuclear terrorist attack or the economic damage that would be caused by a major energy crisis are far more pressing concerns for the United States than regular complaints, however justified, about Moscow's many faults. Are we still reacting with Cold War reflexes--rather than dealing squarely with the new threats that endanger American national security?

Of course, while Russia is not the Soviet superpower of old, it still remains the only country in the world capable of utterly destroying the United States. So if the country's vast nuclear arsenal is in the hands of a Mussolini-like dictator who is creating a fascist state and is bent on imperial expansion--in the characterization of a former senior U.S. government official--then this is indeed a worrying development. (1) But just one nuclear weapon, detonated in Washington or New York, would be enough to change America forever. And the people looking for just one warhead are likely to use it--at least more so than a country that has had thousands for decades.

Moreover, any serious discussion about Russia and U.S. foreign policy should be based on objective evaluations, not overblown and hysterical rhetoric. We have never been shy in providing frank and tough assessments of the domestic situation in Russia. We offered blunt criticisms of the failings of the Yeltsin Administration at a time when many, including some of those who are today among the harshest critics of Russia, were prepared to excuse many of the sins of the "reformers." (And we questioned Putin when he came to power, when others considered him a "reformer" too.) Putin's "managed pluralism" falls far short of the norms of Western liberal democracy, but to group Russia, a country that retains a number of pluralist, democratic features, together with tyrannical states like Zimbabwe or North Korea--or even more authoritarian states like Pakistan and China--is highly questionable.

Russia is clearly not quite an ally of the United States, but neither does it act as an adversary. There are many Russian foreign policy decisions that should be questioned and challenged, such as Moscow's interference in Ukraine's elections, but critics have a tendency to exaggerate Russia's misdeeds and to forget the past. For the last decade, we have taken Russia's benign acceptance of American initiatives for granted. Consider this: President Eisenhower refused to intervene in Hungary in 1956 for fear of triggering Armageddon. In contrast, Presidents Clinton and Bush could proceed with military operations against Yugoslavia and Iraq even over Russian objections, safe in the knowledge that Moscow would not intervene or even try seriously to sabotage American efforts. If extremist forces had really been in power in Russia, they would have done much more than complain to one another, issue diplomatic demarches and "agree to disagree" with Washington on a whole host of issues, from the intervention in Iraq to the "train-and-equip" program in Georgia.

Russia under the Putin Administration is far from a perfect partner to the United States, but in actuality this is true of very few nations--even among advanced post-industrial democracies. Relations between Moscow and Washington are characterized by a pragmatic approach on both sides to resolving issues and preventing disagreements from flaring up into full-scale crises. Also, Russia and the United States basically agree that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized and that Iran should not have a uranium-enrichment capability. And while the legacy of the Cold War has constrained cooperation between the two countries' intelligence services, there have been some notable counter-terrorism successes, such as the joint operation between the FBI and its Russian counterpart, the Federal Security Service (FSB), that flushed out terrorists seeking to acquire surface-to-air missiles to use against civilian airliners in U.S. airspace. Meanwhile, ambitious plans have been proposed that would see Russia in a position to supply up to 15 percent of America's natural gas needs within a decade.

Yet, even though Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that "There is an excellent relationship" between Presidents Bush and Putin and that the two leaders "feel that they can discuss anything", this personal relationship has not been translated into effective cooperation between the bureaucracies of the two countries. On the Russian side, in fact, officials just one level below Mr. Putin believe that the United States is not prepared to respect Russian sensitivities. The population at large shares this perspective; a recent opinion poll indicates that some 54 percent of Russians now see the United States as unfriendly to Russia. While this view may not be correct or fair, it nonetheless exists, and it hampers further cooperation. It also suggests that the alternative to a difficult partnership with Mr. Putin is not a better relationship with someone else--a point those calling for "regime change" in Moscow would do well to ponder.