How to nation-build: ten lessons from Afghanistan

National Interest, The, Summer, 2005 by Zalmay Khalilzad

FOR THREE and a half years, the United States has been engaged with the Afghan people in an ambitious program of state-building. Afghans have a strong sense of national identity, despite their ethnic diversity. The key task has been to establish a legitimate political process and rebuild state institutions. As the president's special envoy and as ambassador to Afghanistan during the past 17 months, I have seen that a nation wracked by a quarter century of occupation and internal conflict can lay the foundation upon which a democratic society can be constructed.

This success was not expected. Many observers too readily accepted caricatures of Afghanistan as an ungovernable tribal society whose instability could only be managed, not resolved. They said that a society with high levels of illiteracy and ethnic and sectarian cleavages could not become democratic. Some went so far as to characterize Afghan society, wrongly, as given to extremism and hostile to modernity. In their view, if democracy was ever to come to Afghanistan, it could only be at a much later time in its development.

Why have we seen this success? While the circumstances of every country are unique and Afghanistan cannot serve as a simplistic template for other countries, there are a number of factors that have contributed to success. First, the president's initiative to push forward the frontiers of freedom politically--and to support those in the Greater Middle East who seek to transform the region--is premised on the belief that the ideals of democracy, popular sovereignty, individual rights and the rule of law are universal. The experience of Afghanistan validates this view.

Second, Afghanistan is succeeding because the United States has pursued an enlightened, hands-on approach that responded to the deep aspirations of the Afghan people for normalcy, development and democracy. We recognized this yearning of the people and worked with it to make political progress. To do so, the United States conducted itself as a liberator, not an occupier. We maintained an appropriate military footprint; pursued an approach that balanced and integrated the use of our political, economic and military instruments of power; worked closely with local leaders with genuine roots in the society on a joint political-military-economic strategy; adopted a flexible multilateral approach supported by a robust U.S. program; and shaped the conduct of neighbors and did not accept the existence of sanctuaries for the armed opposition.

Even as we continue to help Afghanistan, it is useful to consider ten specific lessons that help explain what has worked so far.

1) Any effort to build the post-war order must be based on a fundamental understanding of the aspirations or political center of gravity of a newly liberated society and must be implemented by civilian and military leaders who know how to align the United States with those goals.

AFTER THE fall of the Taliban, the Afghan people had a profound wish to rejoin the world community and embrace democratization and modernity. They based this aspiration on aspects of their self-identity and recent history. Afghans' self-conception is of citizens of a nation that once gave rise to great empires based not just on the strength of their armies, but also on the quality of their culture, learning and arts. With respect to the modern period, many view the fifty years before the communist coup in April 1978 as a golden age, one in which they enjoyed peace, made slow but steady material progress, and saw their country take steps toward instituting a constitutional monarchy with real powers in Parliament. For Afghans, this is a narrative that they wish to resume.

The test for U.S. policy in Afghanistan, as in any other post-conflict setting, is how quickly and solidly we can help the people and their leaders build a political order that is legitimate by their terms and based on their traditions and history.

2) If U.S. military forces are used to effect regime change or are deployed to stabilize a country after a regime has been toppled by internal forces, it is vital for the United States to position itself as an ally, not a conqueror or occupier, and to ensure that indigenous leaders take ownership of the new order.

IN AFGHANISTAN, we won the war in coalition with Afghans. American power and Afghan forces were both essential to this victory. The fact that the Afghans played a key role in their own liberation gave them a sense of dignity and ownership of their destiny. Afghans in the north and the south were active participants in, not passive recipients of, the actions needed to free their country from an extremist and terrorist regime.

At the same time, the United States and the international community supported a political process to create an interim regime to be installed in Kabul immediately after the military victory. This was the first step in creating a legitimate government that would be accepted by the Afghan people. The process is well known. Even before the first air strikes took place, the United States was in talks with various Afghan groups about the shape of this process. It culminated in the Bonn Conference, where the major anti-Taliban political groups came together under UN auspices and agreed to an interim government that was sworn in just over two weeks later in Kabul. The Bonn Agreement also set in motion the process to hold the Emergency Loya Jirga to legitimize the interim government, the Constitutional Loya Jirga to adopt a new governing charter, and national elections to select a president and a parliament. This roadmap gave the Afghan people confidence that this staged process would lead to an ever more representative government.