Out of control: the crisis in civil-military relations

National Interest, The, Spring, 1994 by Richard H. Kohn

Almost forgotten in this great public imbroglio that same January is the fact that General Powell also issued a watered-down roles and missions report to the Congress after a public call for study and change by Senator Sam Nunn. Under Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman must periodically study the services (and report to Congress), and perhaps revise their relative roles and missions. These are enormously sensitive issues, for roles and missions mean money and forces. Apparently Powell was more willing to battle the new President over homosexuals and ignore the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee on roles and missions, rather than confront the service chiefs, for he allowed them to delete the most most meaningful proposals for change. As a result, at a time of presidential transition when civilian authority was vulnerable, General Powell was "in the face" of the two most powerful civilians in military affairs.

The implications of this behavior at the beginning of the Clinton administration were enormous. Defiance at the top led to resistance all down the line, and, even more troubling, to the ridicule and contempt expressed openly about the President across the officer corps and throughout a military already reeling from reductions, talk of a pay cut, and the general uncertainties of the end of the Cold War. The problem was both dramatized and aggravated by incidents like those described at the beginning of this article. By the spring of 1993, personal observations and contacts by scholars of civil-military relations, backed up by a wide selection of press reports, indicated that the civil-military relationship between a president and the uniformed military had become the most sour in American history--no commander-in-chief ever so disliked or so reviled, or spoken of with such contempt and dislike by the professional military, as Bill Clinton.

In fairness to General Powell, it could be argued that in each case he acted with pure motives to get the best policy outcome he could, in the best interest of the country at the time and in the circumstances. After all, if there is a policy vacuum and the Congress must conclude a budget for the armed forces, should not the Chairman step in? If the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the National Security Adviser abrogated their responsibilities to make foreign and national security policy, should not the Chairman offer one? In an intervention like the Gulf, should not the Chairman mediate between the civilians and military, provide proper advice, prevent what he believes are misleading and dangerous plans from percolating up the chain of command, and otherwise act in a manner to secure proper, usable policy guidance from above and innovative, winning strategies from below? Should not the American people have the benefit of the views of senior military officers in policy debates so that the appropriate military action can be considered and the public debate informed? Should not the new administration be informed of military views on admitting homosexuals, the implications of such a step, and an acceptable outcome produced even if the process gets a bit messy and embarrassing?