The CIA vindicated: the Soviet collapse was predicted

National Interest, The, Fall, 1995 by Bruce D. Berkowitz, Jeffrey T. Richelson

By attempting to estimate specific growth rates, the intelligence community diluted its main message, which was that the Soviet economy was stagnating and -- even more important -- that there were no apparent or available means for it to be reinvigorated. This basic message, which was accepted throughout the intelligence community and was repeated in official estimates over the course of several years, was right on the mark.

The "Tactical" Problem: Will Gorbachev

and the Soviet Union Survive?

As conditions in the Soviet Union continued to worsen, the main questions for the U.S. intelligence community were whether Gorbachev would be able to hold on to power, and whether the Soviet Union itself would break up. The United States had a major stake in both questions, and this is the real reason why the intelligence community is faulted for its performance in the final days of the Soviet Union.

By the late 1980s, U.S.-Soviet relations had improved significantly (as reflected by the signing of the INF treaty in December 1987) and Gorbachev was seen as being largely responsible. The Bush administration wanted to take these improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations even further. Under its policy of "moving beyond containment," the Soviet Union would be "integrated into the community of nations." While the Bush administration stopped short of referring to Gorbachev as an "ally," it did see him as a "strategic partner" in promoting stability in the world.(10 It was clear that U.S. leaders wanted Gorbachev to remain in power.

Critics claim that the intelligence community should have warned U.S. leaders that Gorbachev was in trouble. Such warnings, according to these critics, might have enabled the United States to aid Gorbachev, or hedge its bets by opening channels to other leaders. At a minimum, the United States could have avoided the stigma of having backed a loser and, as a result, undercut its credibility.

The record suggests, however, that the intelligence community, and particularly the CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis, were keenly aware that Gorbachev was playing with fire. The CIA grew even more pessimistic about Gorbachev's chances of political success throughout the first year of the Bush administration. In an April 1989 assessment, the cia noted that:

It will be very difficult for [Gorbachev] to

achieve his goals. In the extreme, his policies and

political power could be undermined and the

political stability of the Soviet system could be

fundamentally threatened.... anxiety, fear, and

anger [of the Soviet political elite] could still

crystallize in an attempted coup, legal removal of

Gorbachev, or even assassination.(11)

In a September 1989 assessment, the CIA examined the gambles Gorbachev was taking in the nationality, economic, and political areas, characterizing his policies as being based on "questionable premises and wishful thinking." It concluded that the "unrest that has punctuated Gorbachev's rule is not a transient phenomenon. Conditions are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to continuing crises and instability on a larger scale ...."