The CIA vindicated: the Soviet collapse was predicted

National Interest, The, Fall, 1995 by Bruce D. Berkowitz, Jeffrey T. Richelson

In any case, it is clear that the Bush administration chose to stand by Gorbachev in spite of the intelligence that argued his future was limited, not because U.S. intelligence suggested that this was a safe course to take. If a failure occurred, it was not an intelligence failure but a policy failure, and it may not have even been that. The administration had three powerful reasons for deciding to continue its support of Gorbachev, despite the intelligence at hand that suggested his position was precarious.

First, the Gorbachev regime had supported or acquiesced in many U.S. objectives -- the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, withdrawal from Afghanistan, nuclear and conventional arms control, and, most significantly in 1991, the U.S.-led effort to liberate Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm. So even if Gorbachev could not hold power for much longer, there was a good argument to be made for backing him and working with his government while the opportunity was there. Not surprisingly, then, some administration officials say that they were indeed aware of the intelligence reporting that indicated Gorbachev was likely to fall, and that their response was to get as much as possible for the United States "before the window closed." These objectives included completion of strategic and conventional arms agreements, detailed agreement over German reunification, and final dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. They believed that if they could reach such agreements with Gorbachev, they would be "locked in" and accepted even if a harder-line government replaced him.

Second, administration officials did not believe that they had anyone better to support, even if it seemed that Gorbachev was doomed. Yeltsin had made an unfavorable impression on administration officials during his September 1989, visit to the United States. They did not believe that he was committed to democratization, and considered him personally unstable.

Moreover, administration officials did not believe that they had an effective means for supporting anyone other than Gorbachev even if they had chosen to do so. As Scowcroft put it, "Some of the analysts kept saying that we should `move towards Yeltsin,' but I didn't know what that meant." Officials were also concerned that the very process of seeking alternatives to Gorbachev would have the effect of undermining him, possibly hastening his fall and leading him to become less cooperative. Robert Blackwell, the National Intelligence Officer responsible for the Soviet Union at the time, recalls that the feeling in the administration was, "if you undermine Gorbachev, you won't get Yeltsin; you'll get a successful coup."

Third, U.S. officials believed that they could influence events. That is, the intelligence may have said that, as things stood, Gorbachev would fall, but U.S. leaders were in a position to influence the conditions on which these assessments were based. The intelligence community's estimate was based on its evaluation of nationalistic sentiment and the willingness of hardliners to take risks. It was at least plausible that these attitudes could be shaped or moderated.