New directions in design: OEM designers discuss the risks and rewards of changing brand image

Automotive Industries, Dec, 2003 by Gary Witzenburg

Appearance is a powerful thing, specially in show business and the equally volatile and brutally competitive automobile business.

Quality, content, features, price, value and image are all extremely important, no question. But what was the last truly awful-looking car or truck that succeeded?

Designers of everything from cars to kitchen appliances will tell you that all other factors being roughly equal people will purchase the best-looking product. Or the one that looks best to them.

And therein lies the challenge designers face every day of their working lives: style is highly subjective and subject to change. People can tell you what appeals to them today, but there's no predicting what they'll like two, three or more years into the future.

Trendy fashions tend to age fairly quickly, while more conservative looks often have more "legs," Some designs start grow on people over time. Others do the opposite. At any point in time, passionate disagreements abound. "What looks great to one may be offensive to another. What turns your visual senses on may well rattle mine.

Betting the Ranch

Last month, we put you in the shoes of industry CEOs charged with righting a rapidly sinking ship. Now let's look inside the minds of design leaders whose responsibility is creating new automotive looks on which those CEOs will be willing to bet their ranches.

When and why does an automaker set off in a bold new design direction for a product line (Chrysler 300C and Dodge Magnum), a critically important brand (Cadillac) or an entire portfolio (BMW and Nissan/Infiniti)? How do they get it done, and how do the), deal with the huge risk involved in doing so?

History abounds with examples of dramatic new designs that helped save a marque or even an entire company. And plenty that didn't. And many more makers who couldn't or wouldn't take the risk and rode stale-looking products into extinction.

Envious of GM's multi-marque stable, Ford in 1958 tried inserting Edsel into the slender space between its Ford and Mercury brands--and failed miserably. There were many problems with this idea and its execution, but it didn't help the '58 Ecksel was (to most people' tastes) remarkably ugly, the '59 even worse, and the short-lived '60 model just a mildly offensive facelift of the '60 Ford.

Nearly three decades later, a struggling Ford bet the ranch on a series of radically different sedans and wagons the '86 Ford Taurus and Mercury Sable. They brought media under the tent early and began leaking photos a year in advance to let everyone get used to them well ahead of launch. Both were hugely successful, and Taurus was America's best--selling car until displaced by Honda's Accord following an unsuccessful redesign for 1996.

In the 1990s, Chrysler created an innovative "cab forward" proportion for front-drive cars that moved the company to a position of design leadership and helped generate the sales and profitability that made it an attractive take-over target for Mercedes-Benz.

Following a decade of financial struggles and conservative styling, GM showcased a quintet of concepts in 1999, including one--Cadillac's Evoq two-seat roadster--exciting enough to foreshadow that once-proud marque's future design direction, and another--Pontiac's Aztek--ugly enough to make Ford's ill-considered Edsel look appealing. GM showed great gumption by moving both to market (Evoq as XLR), though in Aztek's case it probably wished it hadn't.

For current perspective on the risky business of creating game-changing new vehicle designs, we checked in with (soon to retire) GM Design vice president Wayne Cherry, Chrysler Group Design senior vice president Trevor Creed, Nissan Design America (NDA) president Tom Semple and BMW AG design chief Chris Bangle.

When and Why?

When and why does a car company gamble its reputation, financial strength and perhaps even its very future on dramatic new design?

In some cases (Cadillac and Nissan/Infiniti), when they desperately need to. Their current product--due to years of neglect, risk-aversion and/or financial conservatism, is simply uncompetitive. Tastes have changed, competitors have innovated, and the market has left them behind. The alternative is a continued sales slide to oblivion.

In others, even when their current models' styling remains reasonably (Chrysler) or even strongly (BMW) competitive, when a product's life cycle timing calls for an update, senior management understands the potentially higher risk of low-risk evolutionary change, and they seek to lead the market, not follow it.

"Different companies have different circumstances, different rationales and reasons," says GM's Cherry. "We wanted to re-establish and re-energize Cadillac as a global luxury product."

Adds Chrysler's Creed: "The reason for a change may come about--as in the case of the LX (300C and Magnum) as a result of a change in direction such as from front-wheel drive to rear-wheel drive. The package is different, so you want to signal that change of direction in terms of the mechanicals and the intentions of the company."