State Formation, Ideological Competition, and the Ecology of Israeli Workers' Cooperatives, 1920-1992 - Statistical Data Included

Administrative Science Quarterly,  March, 2000  by Paul Ingram,  Tal Simons

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RESULTS

Table 2 shows the results for the variables that test our hypotheses. All of the models include the control variables, coefficients for which appear in table A.1 in the Appendix. Model 1 includes the state and Merkaz variables and is a significant improvement over the baseline model including only the control variables ([[chi].sup.2] = 189.00, 3 d. f., p [less than] .01). Model 2 adds Likud government and the interaction between Likud government and Merkaz affiliation and improves on model 1 ([[chi].sup.2] = 15.52, 2 d. f., p [less than] .01). Model 3 adds the variables representing populations of rival and shared ideologies and improves on model 2 ([[chi].sup.2] 16.94, 3 d. f., p [less than] .01). Since model 3 contains all the variables that test our hypotheses and is an improvement over all previous models, we refer to it when describing the results.

The negative coefficient of Israeli state indicates that, as predicted by hypothesis 1, the failure rate of coops is lower when the state exists. The negative coefficient of Merkaz affiliation indicates that, as predicted by hypothesis 2, membership in the Histadrut lowers the failure rate. The coefficient of the interaction of Israeli state and Merkaz affiliation is positive. This indicates that the benefit of Merkaz affiliation is less when the state exists, consistent with hypothesis 3. The effect of order-generating organizations on coop failure is illustrated by figure 3, which compares the rate of failure for coops that are affiliated with the Merkaz to unaffiliated coops. From the creation of the Merkaz in 1928 until the creation of the state in 1948, Merkaz-affiliated coops experienced a substantially lower failure rate, approximately one-sixth that of nonaffiliated coops. The figure indicates a jump in the failure rate of Merkaz coops with the establishment of the state in 1948. At the same time, coo ps that are not affiliated with the Merkaz face a lower failure rate after 1948, benefiting from the inclusive institutional framework provided by the state. Merkaz-affiliated coops still enjoy a shield from failure post-1948 (the coefficient of Merkaz affiliation is larger than the coefficient of the state-Merkaz interaction, [[chi].sup.2] = 33.70, 1 d.f., p [less than] .01), but the failure gap between affiliated and nonaffiliated coops narrows in a striking way. Starting in 1978, as the anti-Histadrut Likud government gains power, the figure shows a higher failure rate for Merkaz-affiliated than for unaffiliated coops. The source of the jump in the Merkaz-affiliated failure rate is the positive coefficient for the interaction between Likud government and Merkaz affiliation. Statistically, Merkaz-affiliated and nonaffiliated failure rates are the same after 1978, as indicated by a chi-squared test showing that, together, the interactions of Israeli state and Likud government with Merkaz affiliation offset the m ain effect of Merkaz affiliation ([[chi].sup.2] = .62, 1 d.f., p [approx] .43).