Diary of a Disaster - Alaska Airlines Inc. Flight 261

Chief Executive, The, Oct, 2000 by Christopher SPRINGMANN, Jennifer PELLET

Throughout the past nine months, Alaska Air continually maintained a policy of open communications, readily supplying information as it became available, quickly countering misleading allegations with factual responses, and taking measures to address concerns raised. Will these efforts enable the airline to restore its tarnished image and overcome the traumas ahead-or will Alaska Airlines itself suffer the same fate as the passengers and crew on Flight 261? Kelly is betting on the former. "You bet we'll survive," he says. "And it won't be because we've dodged some bullets. We'll survive because of our unique pioneering culture."

Christopher Springmann is a speaker and author of The Creativity Culture. Jennifer Pellet is an executive editor at CE.

Jan 31

DAY 1: Flight 251 disappears off California's coast; CEO john Kelly flies to Los Angeles International Airport and addresses media at an on-site press conference.

Feb 1

DAY 2: Crash investigations launched. Newspapers report that a federal grand jury investigation of Alaska Air's maintenance and repair records had been under way prior to the crash.

Feb 3

DAY 4: Mourners gather on the shores of the Pacific Ocean to take part in memorial services for the passengers and crew of Flight 261. "I was drawn to the water," Kelly recalls later. "I had to touch it." Alaska Air retires flight number 261 in "honor of the 88 passengers and crew members who were lost."

Feb 10

DAY 11: The National Transportation Safety Board reports that Flight 261's stabilizer jackscrew, recovered from the ocean floor, shows signs of damage. Alaska Air announces plans to inspect the horizontal stabilizers in all of its MD-80 and MD-90 jetliners.

Mar 15

DAY 45: Sixty-four Alaska Air mechanics write a letter to Kelly and Bill Ayer, Alaska Air's president, complaining that "many amongst us have been pressured, threatened, and intimidated" to follow unauthorized maintenance procedures.

Mar 20

DAY 50: Kelly pledges to address the safety "problem" raised by Alaska mechanics. "It may be one of communication, it may be one of substance or style or whatever, we have to address that one way or another"

Apr 4

DAY 65: The FAA launches a "white glove" audit of Alaska Air's Oakland, CA-based maintenance facility, which is already under federal grand jury investigation.

May 25

DAY 116: After its investigation concludes that Alaska Air mechanics failed to property document repairs, the FAA threatens to strip Alaska Air of the authority to maintain its fleet. Local newspapers continue to trumpet story developments.

Jun 2

DAY 124: Kelly responds to the FAA results publicly, stating, "I'm pleased to say that many, if not all, of the findings the FAA outlined in its news report this morning were addressed by us over recent weeks as soon as they were raised by the FAA during its audit."

Jun 20

DAY 142: Alaska's second quarter Financials show operating expenses grew by 16.9 percent, while net income dropped to $8.8 million from $42.2 million in the second quarter of 1999. CFO Brad Tilden comments on the impact of costs related to the accident In an employee Web site Q&A. "Things like more frequent maintenance inspections mandated by the FAA and lost business from canceled flights and schedule reductions are not covered by insurance," he points out.