Determinants of faculty voting behavior in union representation elections: a multivariate model

Journal of Management, Spring, 1993 by Masoud Hemmasi, Lee A. Graf

Faculty unions (e.g., AAUP, AFT) have a long organizational history, yet faculty collective bargaining in higher education is a relatively recent phenomenon. The first collective bargaining agreements in institutions of higher education were reached in the late 1960s (Cameron, 1982). Between 1969 and 1979, the number of institutions with unionized faculties increased from only 24 to 227 (Garbarino, 1980). Most election activity of this decade occurred in the mid-seventies, with 1975 as the peak year. Also, 1973-1975 marked the period in which for the first time new collective bargaining agreements in private institutions exceeded those in public universities (Garbarino, 1980).

The prospects for growth of unionism in the private sector, however, were dimmed as a result of the Supreme Court's 1980 Yeshiva decision (Garbarino, 1980). This decision upheld the right of Yeshiva University administration to refuse entering into negotiations with the faculty collective bargaining agent on the grounds that the faculty in this private institution enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and exercised significant influence over university affairs. As such, they were considered as managerial personnel, and, therefore, not protected by the National Labor Relations Act. This milestone decision cast a shadow over faculty unionization in private universities and, with little chance for reversal of this decision, the impact "remains substantial" (Douglas & Or, 1990). By the beginning of 1990, 65 bargaining agreements were in place in the private sector (approximately the same number as in 1979), in contrast to public sector contracts which grew from 270 to 384 over the same period (Douglas & Or, 1990: 110).

Despite the dampening effect of Yeshiva on faculty unionization, by the beginning of 1990, 922 public and 85 private U.S. college campuses were organized. This represented approximately 35 percent (217,398) of the 600,000 or so full-time faculty in this country (Douglas & Or, 1990: 108-114). This also signified a significant jump from 25-30 percent of university faculty who, in 1979, were reported to be covered by collective bargaining contracts (Cameron, 1982).

Based on the above statistics and longitudinal studies tracking changes in the content of faculty union contracts (see Williams & Zirkel, 1989, for a review of such literature), the collegiate governance system appears to be giving way to the process of collective bargaining for determining wages and conditions of employment. This increased role of unions on college campuses, in fact, may be a response to an eroding faculty governance system (Raelin, 1989). Whatever the cause, the resulting changes have provided the impetus for the emerging body of collegiate collective bargaining literature. The preponderance of existing studies on the subject has dealt with such issues as faculty union structure (Bognanno & Suntrup, 1975), extent of faculty unionization (Aussieker & Garbarino, 1973; Garbarino, 1980), faculty unionism and organizational performance (Benson, 1973; Cameron, 1982), faculty satisfaction with unions (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1984), faculty attitudes toward unionization (Bigoness, 1978; McShane, 1986), and administrators' attitudes toward faculty unionization (Odewahn & Spritzer, 1976). Several studies also have examined factors associated with faculty union voting behavior and election outcomes (e.g., Dworkin & Lee, 1985; Hammer & Berman, 1981; Zalesny, 1985). However, most investigations of employee unionization, both in university and in other settings, are criticized for lacking explicit theoretical frameworks. Many only "provide(ing) post hoc theoretical explanations for the empirical relationships they uncover" (Heneman & Sandver, 1983: 552). Critics indicate (Hammer & Berman, 1981; Zalesny, 1985) that sometimes, even when conceptual models are employed, only a relatively small set of variables representing the unionization process are included as facilitators or inhibitors of unionization (e.g., Dworkin & Lee, 1985; Lawler & Walker, 1980; Raelin, 1989; Walker & Lawler, 1979). As a consequence, existing predictive models of collective bargaining election outcomes, may be less accurate than they could be. In addition, "our understanding of the context surrounding successful or unsuccessful faculty unionization drives lacks the sophistication that the complexity of the issue requires" (Zalesny, 1985: 244). Therefore, further studies of union voting incorporating a more comprehensive set of correlates, correlates which are grounded in sound theory, are needed.

In this study, the authors take Hammer and Berman's (1981) view that investigations of faculty unionism should adopt research models that incorporate a more comprehensive set of relevant correlates of voting behavior. Such models should represent more complete conceptualizations of the unionization process and offer fuller explanations of the factors and dynamics that contribute to an election's outcome. The call for more inclusive studies is entirely consistent with the actual extension, over the past two decades, of faculty unions' sphere of contractual influence. Today's contracts extend beyond the "bread and butter" issues (e.g., pay and benefits) and often incorporate provisions covering personnel, governance, and academic issues (Williams & Zirkel, 1989). The above shifts, Williams and Zirkel (1989) argue, reflect new and more diverse concerns that prompt faculty to vote prounion and organize to bargain collectively.