What do special instructions bring to the rules of engagement? Chaos or clarity

Air Force Law Review, Spring, 2004 by Paul E. Jeter

During the evening of 17 April 2002 near Kandahar, Afghanistan, soldiers from Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, were engaged in night live-fire training south of Kandahar at Tarnak Farms Range. While the Canadian soldiers were training, two U.S. F16 fighter aircraft were returning from a mission over Afghanistan. As they passed south of Kandahar, the flight lead noticed what he described as fireworks coming from an area a few miles south of Kandahar. Perceiving this as surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) directed at them, the flight asked permission from an Airborne Warning and Control System (A WACS) aircraft to obtain the coordinates of the site. While attempting to get the coordinates, the wingman requested permission to fire on the location with his 20mm cannon. A WACS told him to standby and later requested additional information on the SAFIRE along with directing him to hold fire. The wingman gave the information and immediately declared that he was "rolling in in self-defense." He then released a 500 pound laser-guided bomb that impacted on a Canadian firing position at the Tarnak Farms Range. Four Canadians were killed and eight wounded. All the wounded soldiers were immediately evacuated from the area for medical treatment. When the two F-16s landed, they were told they had released a bomb" on friendly forces. (2)

"This incident mark(ed) the third time that U.S. forces had been involved in friendly fire accidents during the conflict in Afghanistan." (3) Another cause for concern was that this friendly fire fatality refreshed memories of another tragedy that happened on 14 April 1994, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. "On that date, two United States Air Force F-15 fighter aircraft shot down two United States Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters in the skies over northern Iraq. (4) Why were Coalition forces in Afghanistan in the first place? In the wake of the accident, why are Coalition forces still today conducting military operations?

   On 11 September 2001, terrorists trained by the al-Qaeda
   organization hijacked four commercial airliners, crashing them
   into the two World Trade Center towers in New York City, the
   Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a field in Pennsylvania. On
   6 October 2001, the United States and several coalition partners
   launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), a military
   campaign designed to destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist network's
   main base of support in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime that
   had provided both a safe haven and substantial material support
   to al-Qaeda. (5)

On 17 September 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America was released to the public. The purpose was to reinforce the commitment and priorities of our nation as defined by our nation's leadership.

   Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and
   fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today,
   the task has changed dramatically.... Terrorists are organized
   to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern
   technologies against us. To defeat this threat we must make use
   of every tool in our arsenal-military power ... America will help
   nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And
   America will hold to account nations that are compromised by
   terror, including those who harbor terrorists-because the allies
   of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and
   countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorist to
   develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them
   sanctuary at every turn. (6)

America, before this articulation of our national objectives, was employing this policy in the international armed conflict appropriately named Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. This conflict was being prosecuted through a multinational effort led by America and several coalition palmers making it a combined operation. (7) With this combined operation, came the increase of America military operational activities and the potential for misfortune which was the case on 17 April 2002. On 7 June 2002, a Coalition Investigation Board (CIB) consisting of U.S. and Canadian personnel released their findings about the incident. (8)

   The Coalition Investigation Board found by clear and
   convincing evidence that the cause of the friendly fire incident
   on 17 April 2002 was the failure of [Major Harry Schmidt], the
   170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron Weapons Officer and the
   incident flight wingman, to exercise appropriate flight
   discipline. This resulted in a violation of the rules of
   engagement and the inappropriate use of lethal force. Under the
   circumstances, Major [Harry Schmidt] acted with reckless
   disregard for the foreseeable consequences of his actions,
   thereby endangering friendly forces in the Kandahar area. (9)

   The Board also found by clear and convincing evidence that an
   additional cause of the incident was the failure of [Major
   William Umbach], the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron
   Commander and the incident flight lead, to exercise appropriate
   in-flight leadership. This resulted in his wingman's violation of
   the rules of engagement and inappropriate use of lethal force.
   Under the circumstances, Major [William Umbach] acted with
   reckless disregard for the foreseeable consequences of his
   actions, thereby endangering friendly forces in the Kandahar
   area. (10)