Moving towards the apex: recent developments in military jurisdiction

(117.) Id. at *15-19.

(118.) Id. at *19 (emphasis added).

(119.) See, e.g., United States v. Solorio, 483 U.S. 435 (1987); United States v. Cline, 29 M.J. 83 (C.M.A. 1989) (finding subject matter jurisdiction where the accused was a reservist on active duty at the time of the offense); United States v. Chodara, 29 M.J. 943 (A.C.M.R. 1990) (setting aside findings where the government failed to establish that the accused used drugs while on active duty).

(120.) United States v. Morse, 55 M.J. 473 (2001).

(121.) 56 M.J. 843 (A.F. Ct. Crim App. 2002).

(122.) Id. at 844-45.

(123.) Id. at 845.

(124.) Id. The accused claimed that the Air Force did not have in personam jurisdiction over her marijuana use. Id. This is simply incorrect as the issue is one of subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.

(125.) Phillips, 56 M.J. at 845 (quoting UCMJ art. 2(a)(1) (2002)).

(126.) Id. at 846-47 (citing UCMJ art. 2(c)).

(127.) Id. Later in the opinion, the court notes that when she accepted the optional travel day, thc accused flied for and received full military pay and allowances for that day, including a Reserve point for retirement purposes. Id. at 846-47.

(128.) Id. at 846.

(129.) UCMJ art. 2(c).

(130.) Phillips, 56 M.J. at 846. The court determined that the accused had three options: (1) travel to the base on 11 July and simply claim her mileage; (2) travel to the base on 12 July, the day her training was to begin; or (3) accept the authorized travel day, claiming travel reimbursement and full pay and allowances. The accused elected the third option. Id.

(131.) Id. at 847. The dissent disagrees with the majority that traveling to the base qualifies as "performing military duties." Id. at 848 (Pecinovsky, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

(132.) 29 M.J. 83 (C.M.A. 1989) (finding that jurisdiction over reservists begins at one minute past midnight on the day the orders require the reservist to report for active duty).

(133.) Phillips, 56 M.J. at 847. Congress amended Articles 2 and 3 in 1986 to provide for greater military jurisdiction over reservists. The House Armed Services Committee stated in its report that the changes "would conform the UCMJ to the total-force policy by subjecting members of the reserve components in Federal status to the same disciplinary standards as their regular component counterparts." Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152 (1998) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 718, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1986)).

(134.) See United States v. Phillips, 57 M.J. 428 (2002) (order granting review). The CAAF affirmed the case as this article was going to print. See United States v. Phillips, 58 M.J. 217 (2003).

(135.) See Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, [section] 512, 116 Stat. 2458, 2537 (2002) (codified at 32 U.S.C.S. [section] 326 (LEXIS 2003)).

(136.) See UCMJ arts. 18-20 (2002).

(137.) See id. art. 2(a)(3) (stating that members of the Reserve Component are subject to the UCMJ "while on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States[,] only when in Federal service").