The rise and fall of post-trial - is it time for the legislature to give us all some clemency?

(102) See Boatner, 43 C.M.R. 216; Rivera, 42 C.M.R. 198.

(103) See Boatner, 43 C.M.R. 216; Rivera, 42 C.M.R. 198.

(104) See Boatner, 43 C.M.R. 216; Rivera, 42 C.M.R. 198.

(105) Boatner, 43 C.M.R. at 217 (citing generally United States v. Greenwalt, 20 C.M.R. 285 (C.M.A. 1955); United States v. Grice, 23 C.M.R. 390 (C.M.A. 1965); United States v. Johnson, 23 C.M.R. 397 (C.M.A. 1957); United States v. Fields, 25 C.M.R. 332 (C.M.A. 1958); United States v. Bennie, 27 C.M.R. 233 (C.M.A. 1959); United States v. Foti, 30 C.M.R. 303 (C.M.A. 1961); Collier v. United States, 42 C.M.R. 113 (C.M.A. 1970)).

(106) Id.

(107) See id. at 217-18.

(108) See id. at 218.

(109) See id. at 219.

(110) See id. at 219 (Darden, J., dissenting).

(111) Id. at 218 (citing United States v. Johnson, 23 C.M.R. 397 (C.M.A. 1957)).

(112) See id. at 219 (Darden, J., dissenting).

(113) Id. at 218 (citing United States v. Massey, 18 C.M.R. 138 (C.M.A. 1955); United States v. Smith, 36 C.M.R. 430 (C.M.A. 1966)).

(114) See id (citing United States v. Fields, 25 C.M.R. 332 (C.M.A. 1958); United States v. Foti, 30 C.M.R. 303 (C.M.A. 1961)).

(115) Dunlap v. Convening Authority, 48 C.M.R. 751, 754 (C.M.A. 1974).

(116) See United States v. Burton, 44 C.M.R. 166 (C.M.A. 1971).

(117) See Dunlap, 48 C.M.R. at 754.

(118) See id.

(119) United States v. Banks, 7 M.J. 92, 93 (C.M.A. 1979) (listing cases in which the convening authority delayed his final action).

(120) Id.; see UCMJ art. 67(b)(2) (2005) (providing the authority for the Judge Advocate General to order a case be sent to the court of appeals).

(121) See Banks, 7 M.J. at 92.

(122) Id. at 92-93 (quoting the issue that The Judge Advocate General certified for the COMAs' review).

(123) Id.

(124) Id. at 93-94 (citing United States v. Gray, 47 C.M.R. 484 (C.M.A. 1973)).

(125) See generally United States v. Diaz, 40 M.J. 335 (C.M.A. 1994).

(126) See id. at 340.

(127) The prejudice standard used in United States v. Gray, 47 C.M.R. 484 (C.M.A. 1973), was revived in United States v. Banks, 7 M.J. 92 (C.M.A. 1979). Since Banks, the standard was used in United States v. Jenkins, 38 M.J. 287 (C.M.A. 1993), United States v. Sowers, 24 M.J. 429, 430 (C.M.A. 1987) (summary disposition), and United States v. Shely, 16 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1983).

(128) United States v. Hudson, 46 M.J. 226, 228 (1997) (839 days from trial to action).

(129) United States v. Bell, 46 M.J. 351, 353 (1997) (737 days from trial until action); see infra App. B (depicting the post-trial process).

(130) Bell, 46 M.J. at 354.

(131) See United States v. Chatman, 46 M.J. 321 (1997).

(132) Id. at 323.

(133) See United States v. Leal, 44 M.J. 235, 237 (1996).

(134) Chatman, 46 M.J. at 323 (citing UCMJ art. 59(a) (1994)).

(135) Id. at 324 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).

(136) See United States v. Cook, 46 M.J. 37 (1997).

(137) See id.

(138) See id.

(139) See United States v. Wheelus, 49 M.J. 283 (1998).

(140) See Major Michael J. Hargis, The CAAF Drives On: New Developments in Post-Trial Processing, ARMY LAW., May 1999, at 63.