Tactical level PSYOP and MILDEC information operations: how to smartly and lawfully prime the battlefield

Army Lawyer, July, 2007 by Joshua E. Kastenberg

Doctrine and Definitions: Joint Doctrine

While departmental and service regulations, directives and instructions as referenced below detail the legal and regulatory regime in all IO operations, joint and service doctrine detail generically how an IO campaign may be waged. On 13 February 2006, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, was published by the Joint Staff after service review. As is the case with any joint doctrine, it provides guidance and a common lexicon to the services in fulfilling the "organize, train, [and] equip" inherent in service responsibilities. (10) Importantly, the doctrine states up front that "IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review." (11) However, doctrine is not law and it does not have the force of law or regulation. Rather, military doctrine has a prominent role in determining how military operations are planned and conducted. Doctrine is a statement of how we organize and employ our forces to fight. The principles contained within doctrine are authoritative but not directive; that is, doctrine is designed to be flexible enough for the commander to conduct operations and missions as a situation changes and to organize forces to best meet the adversary's forces.

Generally, PSYOP and MILDEC are concerned with influencing others, while other types of information dissemination (e.g., public affairs) are concerned with conveying truthful information. (12) One fundamental difference between the two is that PSYOP is primarily a U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) responsibility. That is, the commander of USSOCOM assigns PSYOP forces to a geographic combatant command, but maintains administrative (and operational) control over those forces. (13) As is often the case, effective PSYOP and MILDEC often intermingle factual and deceptive statements. (14) Psychological operations are defined as "operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ... behavior...." (15) Military deception is described as being "those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces' mission." (16)

Joint Publication 3-13 notes that the JA is a critical member of any IO planning cell. (17) The doctrine further details the type of legal considerations encountered in any IO campaign. The law of armed conflict (LOAC) is at the forefront of tactical level IO. However, there are other issues such as using non-military assets and personnel to conduct IO operations. For instance, U.S. law prevents the use of military PSYOP on U.S. citizens. (18) Additionally, host nation laws might limit the nature of PSYOP and MILDEC operations.

Joint Publication 3-53, Psychological Operations, is the specific doctrine for joint PSYOP operations. (19) It reaffirms the importance of such operations at the tactical level of conflict. Moreover, it stresses that the authority to conduct tactical level PSYOP rests with the tactical area commander. Even at the tactical level, PSYOP may be employed to strengthen relations between U.S. and allied forces, influence local populations, and counter enemy propaganda. Much of PSYOP is passive, but at the tactical level can be a critical tool to prevent open armed conflict as well as to protect non-combatant populations. (20) This joint doctrine provides an additional difference between PSYOP and MILDEC. While PSYOP is generally targeted toward a defined population (e.g., an insurgent group), MILDEC is targeted toward specific individuals. (21)