Religious vilification: confused policy, unsound principle and unfortunate law

University of Queensland Law Journal, Dec, 2007 by Rex Tauati Ahdar

   Epithets and more elaborate slurs that reflect stereotypes about
   race, ethnic group, religion, sexual preference, and gender may
   cause continuing hostility and psychological damage. They may
   injure the status and prospects of members of groups that are often
   abused; they may contribute to structural subordination; they may
   substantially silence segments of the population; they may
   undermine the aspiration of equality in diversity. (18)

So far as the harm from vilification, both racial and religious, is concerned, the Preamble to the Victorian Act refers to vilifying conduct as 'contrary to democratic values.' Those denigrated, the Preamble contends, experience a diminution in 'their dignity, sense of self-worth and belonging to the community' which dulls their incentive 'to contribute to, or fully participate in, all social, political, economic and cultural aspects of society as equals, thus reducing the benefit that diversity brings to the community.' Multicultural societies require everyone to play their part and if one group is subjected to vitriolic criticism and shrinks back, the ideal of the harmonious multicultural nation cannot be realised. A British Government MP during the debates on what was to become the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 expounded some other reasons:

   Although the Government does not believe that incitement to
   religious hatred is commonplace, it does exist and where it exists
   it has a disproportionate and corrosive effect on communities,
   creating barriers between different groups and encouraging mistrust
   and suspicion. At an individual level this can lead to fear and
   intimidation and a sense of isolation. It can also indirectly lead
   to discrimination, abuse, harassment and ultimately crimes of
   violence against members of communities. (19)

The 'fear and intimidation' individuals may experience could lead them to curtail the practice of their faith. As the European Court of Human Rights noted, the manner in which some religious criticism and opposition is expressed may call for state action: 'Indeed, in extreme cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them.' (20) The key word here is 'extreme', for earlier in the same paragraph the Court also said:

   Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their
   religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a
   religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be
   exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial
   by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by
   others of doctrines hostile to their faith. (21)

It is certainly plausible to believe that vilifying conduct can build up walls of resentment and mistrust and, in certain cases, tempt the believers affected to forego religious activities they might otherwise pursue. Yet, religious vilification laws themselves may also have that same tendency. The presence of such a law may intimidate and dissuade religious persons exercising their faith in terms of public witness. Barriers of resentment are likely to be created between groups prosecuted for inciting disharmony and the groups complaining of unjust criticism. Corrosion can cut both ways.