Think twice before overhauling federal budgeting

Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1996 by Robinson, David Z

Allocating Federal Funds for Science and Technology, the report of a National Research Council panel chaired by Frank Press, calls for substantial change in the way that decisions are made regarding federal research support. The report gives a valuable, concise description of the allocation process and recommends an insightful new way of defining the federal science and technology (FS&T) budget. However, two of the report's major recommendations--presenting this FS&T budget as a single total with trade-offs to be made within that total and using international comparison as the primary criterion for determining the level of support for a field--are wrong in concept and unworkable in practice. I believe that these two recommendations are in conflict with the thrusts of other parts of the report and that carrying them out would be bad for U.S. science and technology.

The Press panel recommends that "The president should present an annual comprehensive FS&T budget, including areas of increased and reduced emphasis," and that "Congress should create a process for examining the total FS&T budget before the federal budget is disaggregated into allocations to appropriations committees and subcommittees."

The report gives a hypothetical example of how the president might present such a comprehensive budget. A budget total would be presented, pointing out where reductions have been made (e.g., by closing certain federal laboratories), and where some of these reductions are traded for increases (e.g., by increasing National Institute of Mental Health research on the cause of violence). Congress would then assess the overall budget, evaluating the proposed levels, trade-offs, reallocations, cuts, and increases across the government. After the budgets are assigned to committees and subcommittees, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) would track the changes that were made to the total pool of FS&T funds and report the status of the pool to the appropriate committee chairs. The committees would use this information in their process of hearings, consultations, and markups.

Considered in the abstract, this approach has some appeal. But when one imagines what is likely to happen if it is implemented, the weaknesses become apparent.

In most cases, trade-offs should not be made between different categories of FS&T investment, but between S&T investment and other expenditures of the agency conducting the S&T. Most FS&T is performed to advance the mission of a government department or agency. That agency determines its S&T budget by making trade-offs with other items in its own budget, examining how its mission will be affected by increases and decreases. For example, the Navy has a long-term need to advance the science of oceanography. The oceanography budget of the Navy should be determined by the appropriate balance between short and long-term Navy goals, and trade-offs should be made between oceanography and other Navy research priorities and between Navy S&T and naval construction and operations. It does not make sense to force a trade-off between oceanographic research in the Navy and the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) health research budget, for example.

It is important, of course, for the Navy to know what oceanographic research is going on in other federal agencies, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and the National Science Foundation (NSF), and what nonfederal research is going on in this country and abroad. It is also important that the Navy avoid unnecessary duplication and take advantage of cooperative research to reduce its costs. That is ordinary good management.

The Press panel underestimates the value of the mechanisms already in place that develop coherence in ST activities in specific areas. The Executive Office of the President, through the president's science adviser and the National Science and Technology Council, has developed mechanisms to review specific areas (such as environment and natural resources, information and communication, or transportation R&D). Where duplication of effort and gaps can be identified, trade-offs can be made. These "crosscuts" are indeed useful and have led to improved efficiency. In contrast to the overly comprehensive process the Press panel proposes, trade-offs are made among compatible activities, and they make sense.

When a congressional committee reduces the budget of an FS&T program that it deems low priority, it is naive to anticipate that another committee will increase an unrelated budget to keep the FS&T total constant. Of course, in certain subprograms, a committee might pay attention to what is happening outside its jurisdiction. For example, if the Navy is told (or decides) that it will no longer provide the logistic support for the NSF program in Antarctica, then clearly NSF and the committee overseeing its expenditures must take this decision into account. And it would be very useful, when the administration has developed crosscuts in a particular area, for the relevant congressional committees to understand the implications of changes they might make in the portion of the crosscut under their jurisdiction. But it is far easier for committees to deal with relatively few specially coordinated programs than to try to deal with a comprehensive budget.