Completing the Transformation of U.S. Military Forces

Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 2004 by Deitchman, S J

All of the attempts to evade this reality face difficulties the U.S. has experienced but doesn't always want to recognize. It has been proposed, for example, that new system developments be limited to prototypes that can be put into production if necessary. But there is a long path from designing and building a prototype to putting a fully militarized system into production. The military aspects of the design must be finalized, and the production engineering and production machinery must be designed and built. The final product usually turns out to be quite different from the prototype in many respects. As an example, the F-35 is three years into this evolution and it is not completed yet.

Nor can the United States simply plan to produce but a few of the new systems to keep its hand in, as it were. Because the price of every system unit produced must include a share of the costs of the research, development, testing, and production tooling that brought the system into being, the smaller the production quantity of the system, the higher its unit cost will be. We have seen, with systems such as the B-2 bomber and the F-22 fighter, that the high unit cost itself becomes an economic and political issue that leads to increased calls for system cancellation.

All of the next-generation system acquisition can be viewed as a continuation of the substitution of capital equipment for labor in the evolution of the armed forces. For example, the new Navy destroyer is being designed to operate with a crew about a third the size of the crew on the current DDG-51-class destroyer. The incorporation of advanced stealth and electronic warfare technology in new systems will put them a generation ahead of the Russian-designed antiaircraft and antism'p weapons currently being fielded by potential opponents. Because the United States would not have to reconstitute an atrophied military industrial base when a threat appears on the horizon, it would in the long run be cheaper to stay ahead of the advancing military opposition than to try to catch up should the country allow itself to fall behind it.

If the United States continues the advances in military hardware and the personnel training associated with it, the "existential deterrence" value of the forces (simply the knowledge of U.S. military strength and commitments) will be sustained. This will certainly help the United States and its allies retain confidence in their national security.

After the "regular" war

The second direction in continuing force transformation must be to prepare to meet and defeat the kinds of terrorist and guerrilla opposition that could drain rapid military victories of their political and strategic advantages. Guerrilla warfare is a way for weak forces to take on strong ones; to make their governing and security positions untenable. They do so by attacking at times and in places where the stronger forces' guard is down or where they can be outnumbered locally, and by attacking the infrastructure on which the population they are supporting and protecting depends for its livelihood and welfare.