curious case of Missouri v. Jenkins: The end of the road for court-ordered desegregation?, The

Journal of Negro Education, The, Winter 1997 by J John Harris III, Charles J Russo, Frank Brown

The Court's ruling in Freeman addressed whether judicial oversight of a desegregation order can be terminated incrementally before full compliance has been achieved. Again, the Court reversed a previous holding. It concluded that a federal court has the authority to incrementally relinquish supervision and control over a school district while retaining jurisdiction as long as it is satisfied that the system has made a good faith commitment to comply with the order. As described below, in Jenkins III, the tide turned even further as Justice Thomas joined the earlier bloc of dissenters in Jenkins II to buttress the Court's atavistic decision in Jenkins III.

Jenkins III: The Facts of the Case

The 37,000 students in the KCMSD are approximately 69% African American, 24% White, 5% Hispanic, and 2% Asian (Jenkins III, 1995; Walsh, 1995). In 1977, the KCMSD, joined by parents and students, charged the state of Missouri, its suburban school districts, and various federal agencies with perpetuating racially segregated school systems in its metropolitan area. Following a lengthy federal trial, the case (Jenkins I) against the suburban districts and federal government was dismissed, but the federal trial court found the state and the KCMSD liable for an intradistrict violation. The court's first order in this case, issued in June 1985, made no specific findings about the extent to which student achievement had been reduced or the part that segregation had played in this decline. Its remedial order called for efforts aimed at reducing class sizes, developing student-centered programs, implementing a capital improvement plan to upgrade KCMSD facilities, and commissioning a study on magnet school programs.

As the case developed and moved to the highest court, two distinct strands of litigation emerged. In Jenkins I (1987), the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal brought by parents of minority students in the KCMSD. However, three years later, the first substantive aspect of the case-that pertaining to the cost of implementing the school desegregation plan and who would foot the bill-culminated in Jenkins II (1990). The second strand, although initially less contentious, addressed issues of implementation and became the subject of Jenkins III.

Though neither the state nor the KCMSD wanted to pay for the school improvement plan, both parties attempted to comply with the trial court order after Jenkins II on remand. They challenged the district court's authority when its 1987 order mandated a salary assistance plan for all but three KCMSD employees. One can only assume that the court based its ruling on the hope that higher salaries would translate into better teaching and ultimately higher levels of student achievement. Echoing the position later adopted in part by the Supreme Court, the state unsuccessfully argued that mandated salary increases exceeded the scope of the trial court's jurisdiction. Further, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in the Freeman case, the state posited that it should have been relieved of the duty to fund quality education programs because its school's had achieved partial unitary status. However, in the Missouri case, the trial court rejected both arguments, holding that the pay raises were necessary to maintain high-quality programs while remedying the vestiges of segregation by improving the attractiveness of working in the Kansas City public schools. The Eighth Circuit court (1993a, 1993b) affirmed this ruling, asserting that the KCMSD pay raise remedy appropriately addressed desegregation, given that it was intended to stem the flight of White students out of the school district by improving the district's potential to provide superior educational opportunities for all students. Thus, this court, albeit divided, denied a petition for a rehearing in Jenkins III. The Supreme Court, however, agreed to hear an appeal in Jenkins III and reversed the Eighth Circuit Court in favor of the state and the KCMSD and against the students and parents of the district. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was joined by justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Justices O'Connor and Thomas authored concurring opinions. Justice Souter's primary dissent was joined by justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg also filed an additional brief dissent.