thunder during the storm--school desegregation in Norfolk, Virginia, 1957-1959: A local history, The

Journal of Negro Education, The, Spring 1998 by Bly, Antonio T

As September 22 approached, and as it became increasingly clear, given the events in Little Rock, that noncompliance with desegregation orders would eventually bring federal and state laws into direct conflict, members of the Norfolk school board began to issue statements favoring and supporting Judge Hoffman's desegregation decree. Speaking on behalf of the board, Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker stated that the board fully intended to enroll the Norfolk 17, despite threats by Governor Almond to close the schools and cut their funding if they did (Holloway,1958). Francis Crenshaw, the attorney representing the Norfolk school board, provided further elaboration on the board's interposition between the state and federal law when he stated, "[I]n the event of such a conflict, the order of the court must be regarded by the school board as paramount" (Carter, 1958a, p. Al). Later, however, bowing to pressures from the governor's office, the board voted to postpone opening the schools just days before the school year was to begin. Subsequently, believing that even the slightest degree of integration was unacceptable and fearing that the Norfolk schools would eventually open under integrated circumstances, Governor Almond ordered Norfolk's six all-White schools to be closed under the pretense that the anticipation of desegregation was reason enough to justify such extreme action (Campbell et al., 1960). As a result, the doors of the six schools were padlocked, and approximately 9,900 White and 17 Black students were turned away from entering school in September 1958.

The reactions to Governor Almond's decree were diverse and far-reaching. For the majority of Norfolk's Black students, with the exception of the Norfolk 17, the closed schools had little to no impact. The governor's school-closing decision did not directly affect the operation of the city's Black schools. Nonetheless, most Black Norfolkians were enraged and affronted by the governor's action and viewed it as further evidence of his and other White southerners' blatant disregard for Black civil rights and Blacks' aspirations for social progress via legal means.

The church served as the principal outlet for Black protests about the school closings. The majority of Black Norfolkians rallied behind their local church leaders, who voiced their concerns by charging that closed schools-indeed, massive resistance, itself-constituted the very worst evils and sins against humanity. Even before Governor Almond closed the city's schools, Black churches throughout Virginia had denounced the state's and the city's massive resistance stance. Earlier that year, the 60th annual session of the Baptist General Association of Virginia, that body which then (and presently) represented the state's Black Baptist congregations, had publicly castigated state officials for their support and involvement in massive resistance ("State Baptists Condemn," 1958). The Black Baptist United Front had also come out as supporting the NAACP's school desegregation efforts, specifically denouncing Governor Almond's position as well as that of other Christian denominations that advocated the policy of separate-but-equal in race relations (Rufus Bly, personal communication, November 25, 1995).