ACCOUNTING FOR THE STAMP ACT CRISIS

Accounting Historians Journal, The, Dec 2008 by Oats, Lynne, Sadler, Pauline

This paper redresses these omissions by examining the accounts, together with other primary source documents detailing the practicalities of the operation of the imperial Stamp Act. The outcome is a better understanding of accounting, particularly tax accounting, in an imperial context, and an explanation of the conditions under which a tax instrument successful in one setting may fail in another. Accounting historians are well aware of the neglect of accounts and accounting information by historians. As Napier [1991] notes, in the context of aristocratic accounting, historians readily draw on evidence of accounts but rarely provide detailed descriptions of them. An accounting lens can provide valuable, alternative explanations for events and transitions.2 It is not our intention to displace, or even disrupt, established views of the origins of and motivations underpinning the Stamp Act crisis. Rather, by using accounting evidence, we aim to present another factor previously neglected by historians to allow for an additional interpretation of the events. Much attention is given elsewhere to political rationalities in analyses of government, including the ways in which power is exercised and the role and extent of politics. Less attention is generally given to the actual technologies deployed in putting governmental operations into practice [Rose and Miller, 1990, p. 175].

This paper also sheds light on the nature of 18th century taxation in a colonial setting. The dearth of tax history in the accounting history literature has been discussed elsewhere [Lamb, 2003; Oats and Sadler, 2004; Noguchi, 2005]. The Stamp Act crisis represents an important episode in tax history. It highlights the difficulties in imposing an imperial tax across the globe at a time when communication mechanisms meant significant delays in relaying information between the center in Britain and the periphery in the colonies. Any tax is underpinned by accounting techniques and practices, requiring their deployment by both the taxing state and the taxed subject. The design of tax instruments is at one level driven by ideological considerations, but putting a new tax into place and making it work requires careful consideration of the practicalities of its operation and its impact on those actors whose job it is to make the tax work effectively.

This paper adds to the accounting history literature in three main ways. First, it adds to our understanding of accounting, particularly tax accounting, in an imperial context. Unlike Hooper and Kearns [1997], Neu [1999, 2000], Kalpagam [2000], Davie [2003], Bush and Maltby [2004], and Neu and Graham [2006], we are not concerned with the use of accounting to control the indigenous populations of colonies. The object of this investigation is imperial control over mid-18th century settler colonists. Similarly, while work that deals with accounting in colonial America, such as Baxter [2004] and Schultz and Hollister [2004], certainly exists, this paper is concerned with accounting for colonial America. Second, it sheds light on the conditions under which a tax instrument which is successful in one setting fails to achieve that success in another, a failure to achieve action at a distance. Finally, the accounts drawn up by the British government some six years after the abolition of the stamp duty provide an interesting glimpse into the nature of government accounting in mid-18th century Britain. The accounts were not for the purposes of "calculating the loss" on this failed venture, but rather to reflect the stewardship obligations imposed on those responsible for the collection of the tax. This is consistent with the residual feudal mentality still extant in the mid-18th century. While changes were under way in accounting for profit-making ventures, in particular the adoption of double-entry bookkeeping, government accounts continued primarily to use charge and discharge.