nature of science: Naturally?, The

School Science and Mathematics, Jan 1997 by Lederman, Norman G, Niess, Margaret L

The National Science Education Standards and Project 2061 have again advocated an instructional emphasis on the nature of science at K-12 levels. We say "again" because students' understanding of the nature of science has been stated as an educational objective for almost a century. The longevity of this educational objective has been surpassed only by the longevity of students' inability to articulate the meaning of the phrase "nature of science," and to delineate the associated characteristics of science. Is there any hope that we will be more successful during the current reforms than we have been in the past? Is there anything we can do to facilitate our efforts that has been previously omitted?

One critical omission we have noted in previous reform efforts we are, unfortunately, noticing again in the current reform efforts. There is not, and there has not been, a concerted professional development effort to clearly communicate what is meant by the "nature of science" and how a functional understanding can be communicated to K-12 students. It could be argued that these are actually two omissions, but the overlap is clearly extensive.

Although philosophers of science, historians of science, and science educators are quick to disagree on a specific definition for the nature of science, the phrase typically has been used to refer to the epistemology of science, science as a way of knowing, or the values and beliefs inherent to the development of scientific knowledge. In short, the nature of science refers to characteristics of science and scientific knowledge such as tentativeness, subjectivity and creativity in the development of knowledge, and the necessity of empirical support. However, all too often, the nature of science is conflated with science method/process (e.g., science is problem solving, science is observing).

Science can arguably be defined as having at least three aspects: body of knowledge, process/method, and a way of constructing reality (i.e., nature of science) that distinguishes it from other disciplines or ways of knowing. At times, the distinction among these three aspects is not totally clear, hence the seeming confusion between the nature of science and science process. For example, the knowledge of science has been derived through a myriad of science processes, the nature of these processes is a direct function of the way science proceeds to construct reality, and the status of the knowledge is a direct result of both the processes and epistemological commitments of science. The overlap of the three aspects of science is easily noted, but the three aspects are appreciably different as well. And, when we attempt to distinguish science from other endeavors, it is the "nature of science" (i.e., the values and assumptions inherent to the knowledge and its development) that clearly establishes science as different from other academic endeavors (e.g., political science, art, history, religion).

Why do we see so much disagreement about the definition or meaning of such a highly prized educational outcome that is so central to the discipline of our concern? From where do these disagreements arise? More importantly, are these disagreements important to science education? It is our view that most of the disagreements are irrelevant to K-12 instruction. That is, K-12 students will never be, nor should they be, miniature philosophers or historians of science. The disagreements that continue to exist among philosophers, historians, and science educators are far too abstract for the K- 12 student to understand and far too esoteric to be of immediate consequence to K-12 students' daily lives. For example, the notion of whether there is an objective reality or only mental constructions is, perhaps, only of importance to the graduate student in philosophy. There is, however, an acceptable level of generality regarding the nature of science that is accessible to K-12 students and also relevant to their daily lives. It is at this level of generality that we can see clear connections between students'/citizens' knowledge about science and decisions made regarding scientific claims. It is also at this level of generality that little disagreement exists among historians, philosophers, and science educators. In short, you would find virtually no disagreement that scientific knowledge is tentative, empirically based, testable, and subjective, nor would you find disagreement that science necessarily involves human creativity and is socially and culturally embedded. These understandings have not been clearly communicated by the written words of the reforms.

Something more than words on pages in a book of recommendations is needed. Far too many science teachers still believe that scientific knowledge is provable in an absolute sense, devoid of creativity and human imagination, and objective. It is just as common for teachers to believe that laws are theories that have been proven and that there exists a single scientific method that characterizes scientific investigations. With such beliefs, how can we expect the current corps of teachers to succeed in the implementation of our current reforms in science education?