Strategic ambiguity and the ethic of significant choice in the tabacco industry's crisis communication

Communication Studies, Fall 1997 by Ulmer, Robert R, Sellnow, Timothy L

Previous studies discussing the role of significant choice in crisis communication offer several ways in which organizations have fallen short of these ethical criteria (Renz, 1996; Seeger & Bolz, 1996).

The use of specialized knowledge prior to and during organizational crisis situations is a primary focus for studies of significant choice. For example, in their study of Union Carbide's Bhopal crisis, Seeger and Bolz (1996) found that the technical information disseminated by the corporation was not sufficient to offer the people of Bhopal significant choice. Rather, they contend that for Union Carbide to have satisfied its obligation for significant choice, the company needed to engage the people of Bhopal in a "pluralistic dialogue" where a recognition of the diversity in knowledge and culture was present (p. 262). Renz's (1996) review of crises involving solid waste disposal and breast implants concluded that organizations typically report risk assessments "in statistical, technical terms which have little meaning to the lay public" (p. 170). In reference to significant choice, Renz explains that "risk communicators with a commitment to giving receivers a free, fully informed choice about the risk they face obligate themselves to communicate in such a way as to overcome predictable distortion of risk communication messages" (p. 171). To do so, she advocates that risk communicators offer an explanation of both potential costs and benefits of a decision. Both studies reveal that the organization increased the ambiguity of the situation for their stakeholders through their communication. Since this enhanced ambiguity did not contribute to an opportunity for significant choice, their responses do not meet the ethical standards established above.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Denial and shifting blame are strategies that are commonly employed by individuals and organizations facing crisis situations (Benoit, 1995; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Coombs, 1995; Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995; Ware & Linkugel, 1973). However, individuals and organizations are rarely able to provide unequivocal denial in a crisis situation for which they are blamed. Because organizations typically must accept some degree of responsibility or association with the crisis, their arguments of denial often require additional strategies such as differentiation, minimization, compensation, or others (Benoit, 1995). From their review of the organizational crisis communication literature and a variety of organizational crisis responses, Ulmer and Sellnow ( 1996) observe that, when organizations seek to generate support for their efforts to deny some or all responsibility for a crisis situation, their arguments frequently focus on three rhetorical constructs: evidence, intent, and locus. We further develop these categories and use them to structure our analysis of the tobacco industry's crisis response.

Questions of evidence refer to the scientific and legal debates over facts which occur in the aftermath of a crisis. These altercations usually pit the organization's team of scientists against those from legal or governmental agencies. The resulting altercation leaves the audience with two plausible interpretations, both of which may be too complex for the general public to grasp fully without technical expertise. Hence, the media often plays a decisive role as an interpreter of complex evidence for the general public (Goodnight, 1982; Sellnow, 1993). We include reasoning in this category because, in many cases, competing groups use the same evidence to reason their way to distinct conclusions. Thus, it is often the reasoning process that impacts significant choice.