Strategic ambiguity and the ethic of significant choice in the tabacco industry's crisis communication

Communication Studies, Fall 1997 by Ulmer, Robert R, Sellnow, Timothy L

The case we analyze represents the latest conflict in the third phase between government regulators and the tobacco industry. This altercation was fostered by the FDA's decision to publish their findings, which contend that nicotine is addictive. Dr. David Kessler brought these findings to Congress and an investigation was organized. As a result, presidents or chairmen (all were male) of the seven largest tobacco companies were asked to attend a series of congressional hearings focusing on the addictiveness of nicotine. Kessler's (1994) published findings and testimony invoked a critical response from the tobacco industry leaders. The arguments raised in these hearings are still high on the media's agenda. For example, on Friday, March 21, 1997 The Wall Street Journal announced that the Liggett Group, in a move that sparked controversy within the tobacco industry, accepted a settlement "with 22 state attorneys general and plaintiffs' lawyers that calls for it to label all its cigarette packages with the warning `smoking is addictive'" (Ingersoll & Stout, 1997, p. A3). In short, the debate over nicotine's addictiveness rages on. However, the current arguments can be traced to the tobacco industry leaders' response to Kessler's 1994 report.

In March of 1994, the tobacco industry leaders provided statements to answer questions from members of the congressional subcommittee on Health and the Environment. The industry leaders were united in their defense of tobacco products, despite Kessler's claims. Johnson and Sellnow (1995) explain that, in matters of policy deliberation, organizations often use crisis situations to speak out in favor of their industry as a whole-rather than simply defending their organization's actions. They contend that, in such cases, the organization or organizations take on a deliberative as well as forensic focus. The ultimate goal of such rhetoric is to "nurture issues until they result in favorable policy" (Crable & Vibbert, 1985, p. 4). The testimony of the tobacco industry leaders is exceptionally fitting with these observations. All of the most influential leaders in the tobacco industry were in the same room at the same time, speaking in support of their industry's practices. In short, we have selected this case for analysis, first, because it offers an unusually poignant example of how organizations in crisis can capitalize on competing interpretations of complex scientific evidence to interject ambiguity into a crisis debate. The evidence that was emphasized or ignored by the tobacco industry in this controversy nicely illustrates the framework for analysis presented above. Second, the speeches delivered by the tobacco industry leaders served as a form of public advocacy. Due to the intense media coverage following Kessler's (1994) report, the audience for the testimony delivered by the industry leaders was much larger than the audience present at the committee hearing. These hearings required the tobacco industry leaders to formally and publicly establish their positions on the issues of nicotine addiction and manipulation. As such, the claims made by the tobacco executives in these hearings influenced all subsequent media coverage of the issue.