WHO SAID WHAT: SUBJECT POSITIONS, RHETORICAL STRATEGIES AND GOOD FAITH

Communication Studies, Winter 2003 by Anton, Corey, Peterson, Valerie V

Subject Positions: Structural and Existential

At its most basic, our notion of subject position implies that a person's "perspective on things" relates to "where that person is coming from." Subject position relates to the place people stand from which to encounter the world. Because humans are embodied beings, their perspectives are situated. From various standpoints, people can see things in different ways. To employ the notion of subject position is to acknowledge, to some extent, the existence of multiple views. In general, two different types of subject position may be employed in argument. As analytical categories, these two types of subject position are distinct, but in practice they may overlap and intertwine. In addition, people may infer or project one subject position for the other. The ability to sort out these practices and to make sense of complex arguments is an advantage of becoming familiar with the two types.

Two different kinds of subject position can be distinguished using Schrag's (1980) review of the development of the human sciences. His account of debates between structuralism and existentialist thought paints a detailed picture of the development of theoretical and methodological issues within the human sciences. His comments also give explicit attention to assumptions regarding human subjects and their social relations.

The first type of subject position can be called a structural subject position. A structural subject position is based upon commonalties with others that are rooted in culturally or institutionally recognized categories, characteristics, or affiliations. In argument, these categories of persons are seen as especially qualified (or disqualified) to know about or speak on an issue. Structural subject positions include people who are grouped by role or relationship status (e.g., mothers, bosses), those who share more apparent characteristics or affiliations (e.g., men, Asians), and those who share less apparent characteristics or affiliations (e.g., gays, Lutherans). The distinction between more and less apparent characteristics or attributes should be understood of as rough generalized distinctions reflecting situated assessments. That is, it is quite possible for apparent characteristics to be falsified (e.g., some men pass as women despite the "obviousness" of sex) and it is also quite possible to make less apparent qualities more readily apparent to others (e.g., wearing a cross pendant to identify one's religion). In addition, structural subject positions may vary across time and cultures so that what a "woman" or a "scholar" or a "professional ice skater" "is" may vary with and would depend upon the social and historical moment. Determinations would also depend upon audiences, specifically those who have the power to determine when and where who "counts" as what.

Structural subject positions based on more apparent characteristics (e.g., race, sex, and age) tend to force a person's location to clearly delimited segments or polar extremes of each category. That is, people are seen as black or white; male or female; of legal age or not of legal age. Because these sorts of subject positions are often obvious or easy to discover, they may be difficult or impossible to deny. Structural subject positions also are used often in argument by total strangers who rely more heavily on what they (think they) know or sense most easily. Structural subject positions based on less apparent qualities are less identifiable, general, and/or all-inclusive (e.g., sexual orientation; ethnicity; trades or professions-plumbers, teachers, auto workers). These sorts of subject position are not different in kind from those just discussed, but because they are often not as obvious, they may be denied (by subjects themselves or those they encounter). They may also need to be verified so that appeals to them can be effective.