City campaigns on the cusp and the Edmonton mayoralty election of 1992

Journal of Canadian Studies, Spring 1997 by Lightbody, James

Recent municipal elections in Canada's major cities have revealed a keen competition for power increasingly rooted in ideological divisions. These competitions have directly challenged the once comfortable but essentially suffocating mythology of growth-focussed boosterism. It is in the selection of the community's most visible spokesperson, the mayor, that divisions may become clearest.

This case study of one such city-wide campaign, that of 1992 in Edmonton, Alberta, focusses on the logistics of shaping competitive ideologies and divergent cultural images to the rough-and-tumble of election politics. The role assumed by the city hall press gallery is assessed. Some explanation is offered as to why contemporary city campaigns are at their most bitter as ideological choice becomes more clearly defined, and as individuals personify issues and ideas rather than alternative brands of boosterism. General municipal elections have historically been run differently from those in the other worlds of Canadian politics. Councillors have fixed terms, so their next rendezvous with electors is known from day one. Electoral lists are usually established well in advance of the actual date of polling. For most local jurisdictions outside Quebec the elections have not traditionally been partisan -- even when the federal and provincial sympathies are well known among the gladiator class, with voting based on principal rather than principle.(f.1) While it has long been my argument that it is both necessary and desirable to professionalize city politics by engaging the partisans above-board,(f.2) by long-standing convention city campaigns have been less formal and not as professionally conducted as federal and provincial campaigns (in even the smallest provinces). Voter turnout is usually very low; in fact, beyond the communities within the Census Metropolitan Areas it has often proven necessary for local establishments to coerce unsuspecting local notables "to serve" the sentence of a term or two. The central case to be made in this essay is that elections in Canada's major cities have changed and it is in the race for the mayor's chair that the evidence of this now appears most clearly. Campaigns have become more professionally run and gladiators once exclusively focussed on the "senior" levels of government have become extensively involved. While this phenomenon has been manifest in Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg and even Montreal over the past few years,(f.3) several reasons for new levels of involvement will be considered in the specific context of the October 1992 mayoralty campaign in Edmonton, Alberta. Essentially, I argue that a combination of factors has caused ideological divisions drawn from the political culture of the city to become sharpened, to represent tangible goals and, in consequence, to cause campaigns to be fought on the cusp of these differences. In examining in considerable detail the functional policy choices made, recent analyses of modern problems in the Canadian metropolis tend to overlook who is in charge of making those choices and how they got there.(f.4) Christopher Leo has stated the situation plainly: "[The] more conventional approach to city politics ... operates on the explicit or implicit assumption that government is a kind of neutral decision-making and implementation machinery that tabulates public opinion and produces policies responsive to the demands it identifies."(f.5) With Leo, I share the perception that politics -- especially in and of the city -- is about ideology actively applied through the electoral pursuit of power. More importantly, it appears that contemporary city politics are themselves evolving in this direction,(f.6) and this essay examines the top level of one such contest. The "non-partisan" labels applied to most major Canadian municipal elections merely disguise the fact that they are anything but apolitical. The suffocating mythology of our urban politics is that they are consensual, boosterish, growth-directed.(f.7) Ideology seldom has plain expression in our civic practices. Rather, the conservative stance in general reflects the dominant position of the status quo in its programmatic forms. Hence politics becomes "administration" and rather important questions can be subtracted from the political realm, questions such as the very nature of the status quo itself.(f.8) This is especially the case where there is little or no significant challenge to dominant interests and the subsequent role of their "common sense." But where, in the city's political culture, might we search for what constitutes a foundation for an ideological, and electoral, challenge to the rule of commonly shared good sense? And second, how would a specific political campaign open this sloppy window to the roots of collective experience? In his examination of the nineteenth-century roots of English Canada's local government culture, Harold Kaplan argues persuasively that three strands were woven into the reformists' skein, with unintended consequences for policy debates well into this century.(f.9) The first reflected the history of courts of quarter sessions even after the democratization of the local government system, the proper role of council being to adjudicate individual grievances on a more or less piecemeal basis. The second, more radical, thread appealed to arguments for an experiment in direct democracy with local government conducive to the test of immediate popular opinion. The third built upon long British roots, with local government as a public corporation subject to evaluation by the normal efficiency criteria. Even with the 1849 Municipal Corporations Act codifying modern municipal practices the differences were not reconciled. Indeed, Kaplan argues that each strand today provides a cornerstone for potential conflict at city hall. In particular, the direct democracy strand justifies populist and progressive policy positions, while business and establishment demands for anything in the name of greater efficiency can be beatified by the genuine history of the public corporation.(f.10) Canada's second municipal reform period, at the turn of the century, emphasized the themes of corporate efficiency and judicial fairness; the third reform period, that of the late 1960s and 1970s, focussed upon direct democracy and an open judicial hearing. The glue that cemented the various reform eras and that is still in evidence today was the strongly held belief in the irrelevance of the institutions at play in senior governments, particularly cabinet government and political parties. Kaplan put it this way: "Municipal government would be a refuge from political conflict and rancour, a haven for unadorned common sense."(f.11) To be so distinct, however, was to disguise the real divisions within. So, city politics was to be different. Nominally, Canadian city elections have been non-partisan even when parties became covertly involved. The general absence of recognizable political parties made it easy to assume that they were also apolitical and non-ideological. In this environment, any idea or public policy could be justified by one individual's direct appeal to one strand or another in the urban culture. Even on occasions in the past where class differences have played an important role in determining voter choice, and especially voter turnout, the campaigns were still intensely fuelled by purported personality conflicts, the very stuff of traditional party division in Canada.(f.12) Yet, because it was not clearly partisan in familiar terms, and largely because it was perceived as being little more than garbage-collection with elaborate bells and whistles, city government has been too generally dismissed as trivial. This view from the corporate strand of municipal culture would justify non-interventionist tendencies and tiny tinkerings with the status quo. In fact, city politics is anything but this limited. In explaining the importance of city politics to women as front-line political gladiators, for instance, Linda Trimble succinctly demolishes this veiled and weak theoretical assumption of non-partisanship.(f.13) Yet it has taken the fiscal austerity pressures of the late-1980s and 1990s for city-wide election campaigns to home in to the reality that city politics are "creative," to usurp John Porter's term. Where we ought to witness the subsequent clash of ideologies most clearly is in the election of the city's chief magistrate (or mayor). Vaison and Aucoin once wisely concluded that, "Usually the only broadly legitimate arm of [municipal] government is the mayor ... elected as he is by a city-wide constituency."(f.14) It is here, in the selection of the community's most continuous visible spokesperson, that the articulation of competitive images should be clearest, most easily framed by the media for vivid transmission to the level of the voter. It is in these campaigns that programme ideology stands on the cusp of culture. This is also as it should be; no other one individual is as institutionally situated in formal terms to accomplish such integrated programme action. This case study of one city-wide campaign focusses on the logistics of putting competitive ideologies into formal political play. The defining stress has typically been financial, forcing deeply rooted civic cleavages into the open over the desired ends for public policy. There is little room left for "common sense" administration when there is no widely shared common end to win. The search for a new urban political culture in the 1990s is not unique to Canada, of course: the global emergence of new patterns of behaviour has been spurred forward by wide-spread conditions of fiscal austerity.(f.15) But in Canada, our new-style campaigns are more cleanly ideological in a distinctly municipal way, partly because the "club membership" partisan luggage of other levels is set aside, a setting aside ironically justified by continuing beliefs in non-partisanship. These contemporary campaigns are also at their most bitter as ideological choice is most clearly defined, where individuals personify issues and ideas rather than different brands of boosters or efficiency touts. Edmonton, 1992 As the incumbent, the victor's acceptance speech was far less than gracious given what was, in reality, a substantial win. The Edmonton Sun editorialized: "Smith was more gracious in defeat than the mayor was in triumph! Many were disturbed by the near-bitter tone taken by Jan Reimer in interviews after her win was in the bag."(f.16) The Edmonton Journal simply added, "Mayor Jan Reimer was not at all gracious in victory." To outsiders, a generation of provincial Conservative rule has made of Alberta an electoral monolith with hugely stacked government majorities. Edmonton, however, entered the 1990s as a city in political opposition to the province. In the provincial election of 1989 it had returned 11 New Democrats, four Liberals and only two Conservatives to the legislature. The actual votes cast revealed a less polarized city: with a 56.2 per cent turnout, the shares were 34.82, 34.25 and 29.19 per cent for the respective parties. In June 1993, all 18 city (and six other metro area) ridings would return Liberals to the legislature. Mayor Reimer was a well-known New Democrat, and the city had overwhelmingly supported a prominent Liberal as mayor (Laurence Decore) throughout the last of the Lougheed years. And so, the 1992 mayoralty campaign turned much on the question of clarifying what partyism, and partisan attachment, actually meant to the supposedly non-partisan municipal world. Civic elections are held every three years, in October, and since 1980 Edmonton's council has been elected from six two-person wards. The city has a surprisingly strong sense of civic insecurity, a mood so much afraid of even being thought second-rate that its portal signs wore the self-accolade "City of Champions," not the city shield and motto adopted in 1949: "Industry, Integrity, Progress." Its population hovers near 700,000 although, for municipal grants purposes, the city is careful to conduct its annual civic census while the University of Alberta is in session. Its natural rival has been Calgary ever since that city lost the bid for provincial capital, the provincial university and the penitentiary through the electoral gerrymander of 1905.(f.17) In 1992 Edmonton's business elite, having evolved from audacious booster beginnings to resemble less an aggressive entrepreneurial class than cautious coupon clippers clucking anxiously about the dealings of arriviste Peter Pocklington, still bemoaned the impact of the federal National Energy Program. This is an elite constantly seeking external factors to account for anything less than their own optimum projections for growth, particularly their concerns over commerce relocating in Calgary. In 1992, this boxcar loadings school of measurement gained civic election ammunition with the July announcement that Beaver Lumber was moving its regional executive to Calgary and that the Ford Motor Company was considering relocating nearly 100 sales and distribution staff there as well. A New Democrat mayor was a handy scapegoat, particularly one who chose to query the environmental record of Alberta's forest industry, told northern municipalities (Edmonton's traditional trade hinterland) not to intervene in the plebiscite over Edmonton's airport location, and in 1989 made it one of her first decisions not to don the city's ceremonial chain of office because it was mounted on a beaver pelt. But Mayor Reimer was not an easy red-baiter's target; she could more accurately have been described as being representative of an aggregation of special interests. In his study of American big city political leaders, Terry Nichols Clark would have labelled her an old-style Democrat as measured across a dozen "general fiscal policy preferences."(f.18) Edmonton is a city of ethnic minorities. The once dominant British majority now stands at about a third (31.08 per cent) of the population, with German, Ukrainian, Chinese, "Canadian" and French ranking, in that order, all at under 12 per cent.(f.19) The city's Heritage Festival, held over the August civic holiday weekend, arguably is now its most celebrated summer event and an honest commitment to multiculturalism is a political imperative for almost all activists. By employment Edmonton remains a bourgeois, civil servant, service-industry-oriented community, albeit more working-class (as objectively defined) than Calgary. Approaching the Campaign A full year before the election Mayor Reimer used a rally by her campaign workers to attack her opponents on council ideologically: "The dinosaurs have come out of the closet to attack not just me, but the vision of Edmonton for which you voted two years ago.... They have a mean bag of tricks, but together we can push outdated, and mean-spirited ideas back in the closet where they belong."(f.20) She saw a clear policy division in council chambers, with her supporters (a minority) consistently outgunned by more senior councillors.(f.21) This approach initiated considerable media speculation (and resultant concern in council chambers) that in the absence of a credible opponent, she could direct her supporters against incumbents opposing her positions. One city hall columnist put it this way: "Reimer urged her troops 'to engage your friends and neighbours in discussions about the kind of city we want to see ... [then] act on those convictions to ensure that city hall reflects your choices and priorities.'"(f.22) Wittingly, she had accepted the conditions for an ideology-based election. The mayor began the public search for her own opponent early, presumably assuming, as did many, that she would have a "cakewalk."(f.23) For both of her two immediate predecessors re-election to a second term had been virtually automatic. In addition, many of the city's political gladiators believed that Ray Martin, the provincial NDP leader who held an inner-city riding, would be vulnerable after his anticipated mediocre performance in the pending provincial election. It was also widely known that the mayor was as easily ambitious as Decore, who had catapulted from his impressive re-election into the provincial Liberal leadership, and there were 11 NDP provincial ridings within city limits. How better to define a 1990s environmental-left radical challenge for the benefit of the party regulars than an impressive win over some caricature opponent who might be portrayed as a surrogate for the provincial administration? This early phase of the 1992 campaign was as transparent as it was facile. In her endeavours to carve a niche in the provincial pantheon, Mayor Reimer necessarily developed a non-traditional and "ideological" platform by crusading against the male-dominant local business establishment and defending the activist agenda she had promoted with limited success at city hall. This stood in striking contrast to the older-style role that Decore, her predecessor, had fashioned in his 1983 municipal campaign, that being simply to manage more effectively and in a "hands-on" fashion the standing municipal works. His most effective means of implementing his initiatives may well have been to fashion a constantly rolling working coalition, on council, through compromise and a blunting of ideological differences. This would be a Canadian mayor's traditional role. Reimer was different. The senior city hall correspondent summed her first term thus: "Smug belief in the righteousness of her cause too often manifested itself as a lethargic failure to even seek backing on important votes.... Reimer must now find a way to overcome the martyr complex that in her first term turned her into a Jan of Arc figure."(f.24) By defining the campaign ideologically, the mayor herself provided the significant window for opposition. Opposition campaigning did not begin until the end of spring, far too late in tactical terms.(f.25) By then Bill Smith had retained the services of itinerant professional campaigner John Laschinger to poll and to advise. Laschinger's experience with Ontario's Tory dynasty became a career, including working on John Crosbie's leadership effort in 1983, British Columbia's Socreds in 1991 and, later, Edmontonian Jim Edwards's federal Conservative leadership effort in 1993. More importantly, he had been a prominent fixture in June Rowlands's successful 1991 Toronto mayoralty challenge. The introduction of "Lasch" to Smith came through family: although the former Edmonton Eskimos football players had not remained close, their wives had, especially Marlene Smith and Margaret Getty. Laschinger had been, for a time, a principal in Don Getty's 1985 leadership campaign. For the 1990s, the introduction of this level of sophistication provides a test of how important the stakes now are at city hall. An unexpected consequence of this may be a different set of ethical guidelines to be applied to Canadian city politics.(f.26) For example, the new ethics of the 1990s raised an immediate tactical problem for Smith's campaign insofar as certain professionals (lawyers, accountants) were reluctant to support him because of the possibility that he might win and that they could not then transact future business with the city. There is, of course, no party or caucus buffer in city politics to mute the individual linkage between candidate as solicitor and, once elected, as policy-maker: Smith could not coerce a campaign finance chair for some considerable time. This problem eluded the mayor's organization and, as TABLE III (see below) shows, organizations doing major work for the city were somehow able to contribute significantly to her campaign efforts anyway. The Candidates The one-term incumbent mayor, Jan Reimer, had first been elected to council in 1980. A sociology graduate of the University of Alberta, Reimer was very much a social activist product of the 1970s as head of the Calder Action Committee and, subsequently, an employee through NIP largess. She was also the daughter of Neil Reimer, national president of the Energy and Chemical Workers Union in 1980 and the initial leader of Alberta's New Democrats. Reimer's political attentions became focussed with the emergence of the Urban Reform Group of Edmonton (URGE) in the early 1970s, a group which, like TEAM in Vancouver, advocated more open government, "citizen participation," neighbourhood decentralization and more cautious urban development. It was hardly a party of radicals, and even at its zenith (in 1980 when four of 11 candidates were elected) had captured slightly less than a third of the municipal vote. Reimer received the highest vote tally of any councillors in the 1986 election, paving the path to a clear majority in her mayoralty victory of 1989. She was then 37 years old. The challenger, Bill Smith, 57, had never won elective office. Smith, after having played defensive back for an Edmonton Eskimos team that included men named Lougheed and Getty, built a tire company from scratch into an annual $100 million business. By 1992 these associations were no longer unblemished political assets in the Edmonton area. Creditors encouraged the sale of his business interests in 1991. He sought and lost the Edmonton Southwest federal Reform party nomination that year and in the end was persuaded to consider a mayoralty run by a few among the city's tired provincial Tories. Smith quickly became the lightning rod for an appeal to the corporate thread in the civic political culture. The Journal, Edmonton's larger newspaper, quickly provided quarter-page credibility, citing support from a prominent Decore 1983 strategist, in the process answering both Mayor Reimer's spring-time public pleas for a mossback zealot, and the paper's own editorial agenda for a beatable representative from the city's locker rooms.(f.27) Ideologically, then, the policy gloss of Smith's campaign would reflect the overall fiscal populism of Decore's term. In 1992, though, the "social conscience" element in Decore's broadly constructed coalition stuck firmly with Reimer and her progressive, interventionist and generically politically correct programme. This translated directly into street-level poll workers. Smith, who campaigned with once narrowly popular singer Bobby Curtola, drew his ideas from the tire-kicking fiscal conservatives among Edmonton's political cadre. So, the municipally "non-partisan" alignments in 1992 were significantly unlike those of 1983. By finally aligning along lines now common in the other major Canadian cities, they directly emphasized the importance of familiar ideology in a direct appeal to the city's political track record. Defining the "Issues" In major Canadian cities it is the mayoralty race which defines the city-wide issues and determines voter turnout. A competitive mayoralty race that clarifies ideological choice may be expected to increase elector interest by up to 20 per cent (note TABLE I below). So, the focus of the campaign is on the apex and what residents expect of the top they may also ascribe to the council competition. As a part of his contract obligations to Smith prior to his candidacy announcement, and utilizing the Goldfarb polling apparatus, John Laschinger surveyed Edmonton residents in June 1992. This revealed that a window of opportunity did exist for an effective challenge to the incumbent if campaign themes could be set out appropriately. In sum, and within the usual statistical parameters, the Goldfarb results revealed four things.(f.28) First, the council was perceived as indecisive, as "always squabbling and dealing with petty issues" without "holding a clear vision and plan." Second, on the general attributes of the ideal mayor, citizens expected "common sense" of course (92%) but, importantly for Smith, "the ability to create jobs in the city" (82%), "has business management experience" (73%), the willingness "to keep taxes down" (72%) and toughness "at controlling crime and drugs" (79%). Experience "to be mayor" (58%) ranked relatively low. Third, Mayor Reimer's strengths were perceived as being environmental issues, honesty in government, preserving "your" neighbourhood, and "working with racial minorities." Of the top half dozen issues identified as being important by citizens, she was perceived as handling only two satisfactorily. Fourth, Reimer's very public focus on the consultation and participatory components of city culture appeared to leave a policy schism, an opening for a successful appeal to corporate efficiency and management traditions. This was confirmed when Edmontonians were asked who might be the "best person to lead Edmonton." Mayor Reimer received 39 per cent support, while a hypothetical "business person with no political experience" held 40. By contrast, in Calgary at the same time, Mayor Al Duerr held 68 per cent support, the hypothetical opponent only 11. To appeal directly to citizens, and to play upon purported dissatisfaction in the business community with a "socialist" mayor, the Smith campaign was heavily accented with calls for more effective management of city resources. This was encapsulated by the double-entendre of promised employment/civic efficiency in its slogan "Let's Get Edmonton Working!" The central Smith campaign document, in tabloid newspaper form, was not the narrow, red-baiting, class-warfare attack that the mayor's team fully expected, based upon its experience in the 1989 election. It was, rather, a middle manager's revolt against politicized central planning and a city hall game plan perceived as being out of step with realities defined largely in economic terms. The Smith specifics could be reduced to four pivotal themes.(f.29) First, there was a business attraction package modelled upon New Brunswick's (that has approximately Edmonton's population) to promise jobs and to attack the incumbent. Second, there was a pot-hole programme to rebuild city streets, sewers and drainage systems that assumed 800 direct and indirect new jobs. Third, there was a plan to replace costly, "feel-good," blue box recycling with technology-based waste separation (to resolve a long-standing, NIMBY-plagued, sanitary landfill search). Finally there was a central premise of no tax increase in 1993, to be accomplished through the fiscal management alternative of revising the city's short horizon on debt retirement. In short, and despite the candidate's much-repeated commitment to greater police deployment, the appeal was blatantly to the shared folkloric knowledge of cities that the addlepates at city hall could not dispense a child's allowance rightly, a theme popular since Chaucer. This campaign was steeped in the money management roots of corporate culture. For the office-holder, ideology becomes greatly clarified by what has been done while in office. In their appeals to the city's historic roots, the two campaigns became quickly and noticeably divergent in ideological terms. The Jan Reimer reelection campaign was also professionally managed. Her campaign colours muted partisanship symbolism with a softened eco-green in preference to the strident federal orange or the provincial puce. The two publications from her organization, a glossy pamphlet and a tabloid newspaper, also advanced four basic propositions based upon her record, combining them with the new wave motif "A New Kind of Politics."(f.30) Four themes also summarize Reimer's focus through the election period. First, there would be economic opportunities based on learning, "fair wages and good working conditions," and "encouraging every Edmontonian to be an effective Ambassador for our city." Second, Edmonton would have a healthy urban environment, beginning with planning round tables "to bring together people affected by planning decisions," and ending with water conservation, an air quality plan and keeping "waste reduction a top priority." A third endeavour would produce a balanced transportation system essentially premised upon enhanced bus schedules "to make it easier to get around without depending on cars." The fourth promise would improve the general "Quality of Life" by having a focus on safer housing through codes and enforcement, would see "the civic work force reflect the composition of the community," and would provide for the development of an Arts Council for Edmonton, as well as for Parks and Recreation staff relocated into neighbourhoods. What remained imprecise was what "The New Kind of Politics" was, other than the track record of "30 Good Reasons to vote for Jan Reimer." Apart from the clear ideological distinctions, another important peculiarity of this campaign was the reliance of both parties on technical expertise. This point was noted by both daily newspapers. Smith countered the incumbent's monopoly over specialized information -- in finance with the recently retired city auditor-general; in waste and roads with the former general manager of transportation (who had also held responsibility for segments of the piped services, and who parted ways with the city "over philosophical differences"); and in protective services with his first campaign manager, a deputy policy chief who had taken early retirement. The usual liability for political novices is that they do not know their way around city hall. Smith suffered instead from accusations of being a Charlie McCarthy, this from local columnists who compliantly quoted the mayor as saying, "A Mayor's campaign has to be more broadly based than disgruntled former employees and people who stand financially to benefit." In response to Smith's alternative road repair strategy, the other paper's columnist offered that "Reimer called on the help of Schnabblegger's replacement as transportation general manager, Rick Millican, who drew the mayor's attention to a relevant report."(f.31) It is not easy for newcomers to crack into that charmed co-dependency at city hall. Columnist Geiger's conclusion, that "The degree to which bureaucrats set the civic agenda has perhaps never been so apparent," might however be put differently. Rarely at other government levels do citizens themselves have such an opportunity to choose directly between competent but competing bureaucratic options rooted in differing images of their community. This is surely not to be deplored, and the autumn elections in Montreal (1994) and Vancouver (1993) offer reasonable evidence that this may indeed be the future direction of Canadian city elections. This particular Edmonton campaign revealed how much the senior public service themselves had at stake locally in the electoral process, involving themselves far less discretely than their federal and provincial counterparts would have done. Senior managers, prominently including the city manager, police chief and city clerk, directly intervened on the incumbent's behalf to discredit any attack upon existing programs.(f.32) This cozy symbiotic relationship between elected and appointed officials, not tolerated in other realms of Canada's electoral politics but so characteristic of small-town Canada, remains not only as a throwback but also as a limitation on the emerging sophistication of the city electoral process. Visibly uncomfortable in "political" activities, the mayor chose (although less so than many previous incumbents) to campaign by exploiting the natural publicity associated with office-holding, preferring the managed event rather than the walk-about spontaneity of fairs, festivals and exhibitions.(f.33) This approach conservatized her style, moderating her naturally more radical policy preferences. The reasons for this strategy seem threefold. First, she had been on council for 12 years and was associated closely with most of the municipally focussed policy elites, having assuaged and incorporated their demands into the city's policy mix. This status quoism melded nicely with the city hall press gallery's own, which viewed even minor shifts in priorities (usually as reflected by proposed budget cuts) as a dramatic corrosion of the established order, and thus to be heralded with prominent headlines. Finally, by virtue of the job description any mayor must be a minimum consensus builder if anything remotely resembling satisfactory public policy is to emerge. Any challenger, just by contrast, thus appears more radically conservative or progressive than they likely are by personal inclination. His June polling had persuaded Smith that his general concerns were shared widely enough that he should run. His "leadership," such as it became, was not assembled from a shopping basket of voter troubles but reflected reasonably closely the civic agendas of those who saw the city as a public corporation with limited ambitions. Polling reinforced the intuitive policy assessments of those who chose to stand opposed to the mayor. In 1992 Alberta provincial Progressive Conservative gladiators were essentially federal Reformers, and Smith's personal ties brought staff informally into the middle management ranks of his campaign from the office of provincial Culture Minister Douglas Main. Main had been an Edmonton federal Reform candidate in 1988. So much for the role of non-partisanship in city politics when the target is the New Democrat mayor of what is seen to be provincially a New Democrat city! Premier Getty's late-summer resignation and Main's subsequent decision to challenge for the provincial leadership, however, considerably reduced the availability of these resources for the municipal election effort. Smith was left with only hard-core Reformers, disenchanted recent civic employees and a few centrist Liberals, some two dozen people. The only subsequent provincial intervention was the election-eve availability of phone banks from the campaign offices of the city's two Tory leadership hopefuls. Like the modern Canadian army, Smith had the generals but lacked actual field troops. Important compensation emerged however. The city's most widely heard and very conservative "talk radio" host (and station manager) birthed, nourished and milked the Bill Smith candidacy, attended his first fundraising event and broadcast Smith's "waste management" news conference on Labour Day weekend. This incessant barrage gave the Smith agenda, uneasily, its own quite influential Pravda. The Press Gallery The media play an integral role not only in the on-going city policy process but also during elections. In the broadest sense they give cultural salience to the spontaneity of political events, rather like interpreting the place of single frames from a vibrant moving picture. For example, in examining the usual policy role of the media Harold Kaplan observes, "After a long and confusing council meeting, the local press exerts a form of influence by interpreting what was decided and said at the meeting ... influence not due to pressure but to provide[ing] clear guidelines for choice in highly fluid situations."(f.34) The same holds true during mayoralty elections. An effective media separates the significant from the always pressing. In civic campaigns in Canada, where personality may become paramount since redistributive policy questions have not been seriously divisive, the media may place the significant candidates into focus by defining and sharpening the ideological stakes even where the policy distances are really rather slight. But the media are locked into the machinery; the gallery is part and parcel of the on-going game they report. Failed mayoralty candidate Stephen Clarkson (Toronto, 1969) has written perceptively: Newsmen are, in fact, reporting on a system to which they themselves belong.... It became very clear to us as political outsiders how much the municipal press gallery was itself part of the City Hall system. Some reporters had developed very close personal relations with incumbent politicians who provided them with insider information for stories. The closer they identified with particular incumbents, the greater became their stake in preserving the status quo. Some had grown to accept the way the system worked and tended to observe political challengers in the same light as did the incumbents: a threat to the established way of carrying on city business.(f.35) It is not surprising that Canadian municipal incumbents achieve some of the highest re-election rates found in industrial democracies. Elsewhere, Edwin Black has defined four factors in "the tendency for small newspapers to support community notables."(f.36) The same holds true generally for the "small" news of bigger papers. In this sense, the mass media tend to be a strongly conservative force within the overall system; they must still work with the ministry the morning after, after all. With rare exceptions, therefore, the working press is generally among the last to identify a serious electoral challenge "to the established way."(f.37) In a curious way the city hall cocoon becomes virtually non-political where, as Nigel Harris puts it in explaining British Conservative party ideology, "administration of a status quo that is taken for granted is all, and controversy over the nature of the status quo is eliminated. In this context, important questions can be taken 'out of politics,' that is, no longer seriously debated from different perspectives."(f.38) So, in the absence of a serious radical challenge rooted in a different perception of the civic culture, and abetted by a quiescent press gallery, by 1992 Edmonton's public policy business had pretty much become little more than incremental machinations within a broadly agreed upon status quo. As Harold Kaplan puts it in another context: "The three Toronto newspapers helped set the overall ideological and intellectual climate of Metro politics. Influence over the politician's frame of reference, unstated assumptions, and picture of the world may be called 'pervasive influence.'"(f.39) Jack Masson's research also demonstrates clearly that the media "tend to follow public tastes and interests rather than lead them."(f.40) The campaign problem for any challenger is to fashion a message that conforms to some fundamental element within the traditional patterns of "public taste." This problem with the divergent message is reinforced by the corporate linkages of the establishment Canadian media, linkages which are well known, and both the standard textbook and more radical assessments devote considerable attention to the agendas this association legitimizes.(f.41) In short, it is the status quo mobilized, expressed. It is not going too far, then, to submit that the establishment press plays to the community's apparent political orthodoxy, however carved. Southam seems singularly susceptible. In Edmonton, just as the Journal pandered shamelessly to William Hawrelak's Citizens' Committee during the 1950s, it again shilled patently for the new age progressivism of the city's brie elites in the 1990s. According to Lorimer, "Given the situation in which the mass media operate, however, it is unlikely that there can be any dramatic change in the way they inform people about city politics."(f.42) With little budget for sustained investigative reportage, and with so little real, long-term news of significance to break, the press gallery appears to fear becoming as marginalized on the news pages as the councils they cover. One remedy has been to transcend "objective" reporting and to editorialize within the guise of covering the story. This seldom works to outsiders' advantage. In practical terms, the consequence for the challenger has been succinctly observed by Clarkson: "We learned that journalists do not go to the news if they can help it; the news generally has [to] go to the media."(f.43) That is, mice do not leave the granary. It is especially important for challengers to define the campaign and their own role in it. But this is difficult because they have not mastered the working shorthand which incumbents and the press gallery both pick up through shared on-the-job experience. Awkward phraseology and an unfamiliarity with technical terms and jargon is used to jeopardize their credibility. One further problem, for the novice, is not to let the media set the agenda. This was especially difficult for new candidate Smith who, after the vote, publicly revealed to reporters his long-held private disappointment with what had, in fact, been reasonably fair coverage.(f.44) Still, a paucity of volunteer workers forced a media-driven strategy upon Smith.(f.45) His strategists chose, after the initial "kick-off" on 23 July, to define their campaign with four issues. First, a program, "Build 2000," would increase employment dramatically through repairing city streets, sewers and water lines. This was announced at a press conference on 25 August complete with graphs, charts and other visual aids following 20 days of intense briefing by the former city manager who had devised this alternate strategy, and the retired auditor-general who legitimized a varied debt retirement strategy to finance the scheme. Second, a carefully prepared response to the city's long-standing landfill dilemma for a 2 September press conference was never fully understood by the candidate despite intensive pre-release briefing. As this press conference was broadcast live on the talk radio station the media were primed and critical for the occasion. In this, David Taras's assessment of the news conference is correct: "For a strong thinker and debater, the news conference is always an opportunity; for a less able politician it can degenerate into a nightmare."(f.46) Smith was not an able politician and to the dismay of the press gallery his media strategy was altered so that he never again faced a live news conference.(f.47) Third, then, Smith's economic development programme, announced on 16 September, became a Chamber of Commerce presentation with no media scrum. From the campaigners' perspective this no longer mattered, for until the last weekend of the process nightly debates among the candidates continued to provide the opportunity to develop a story. Fourth, and finally, four days before the vote Smith, on the advice of his advisers, proposed six million dollars in specific municipal expenditure cuts to make good on his commitment of no tax increase in 1993. On this issue he had been thoroughly and legitimately heckled by the press gallery for two weeks. The context was a speech to the Downtown Rotary Club, after which "Smith left the Ramada Renaissance Hotel quickly and only briefly talked to reporters."(f.48) Interviewed by the press gallery, no potentially affected city manager could conceive how Smith might manage "to shave off their budgets" because they were already "relatively small." In short, together these four presentations defined Smith's core appeal to those elements whose culture believed in the "city as a public corporation." The mayor basically stood on her record (called her "Green Platform") which was released a month before the vote.(f.49) In this there was considerable emphasis on her environmental concerns, direct consultations with designated citizen representatives, constant liaison with the official multicultural communities, the release of a report from her Safer Cities Task Force, expansion of the city's rapid transit system (as provincial funds would permit) and bikepaths in preference to freeways. All this was presaged with the announcement that she practised the political ethics of a "New Style of Politics."(f.50) It was not until 10 days before the vote, and before the two dailies had released polling results confirming their own, that her managers became sufficiently concerned to recommend aggressive personal attacks on her challenger: "She accused Smith of scare tactics, destructive talk and opposition to everything progressive because of a 1950s vision of urban life."(f.51) The contest, then, was not so much based on "new style/old style" political cleavage as it was upon a different mission for the overall operation. Still, no matter how broad the definition of ideological difference, it becomes clearest when reduced to the issue-specific platform planks which sustain the media campaign. In Edmonton, in 1992, two very different appeals to electors were presented. The Results The Edmonton Sun released its survey of voter intent the week before the vote and predicted that "Another Janslide will hit Edmonton when voters cast their ballots."(f.52) The Edmonton Journal revealed Angus Reid's finding of a 24-point spread between challenger and mayor, and also predicted a landslide win for the incumbent, given a 64 per cent approval rating of her performance in office.(f.53) Both dailies endorsed the incumbent, as did all print columnists and the CBC. It would be remarkable if anything other had occurred and, observed objectively, Mayor Reimer was easily re-elected. But there was no "Janslide." Only one incumbent councillor lost, while one other chose to be beaten in the mayoralty contest.(f.54) The marked definition of ideological division between the two major mayoralty candidates produced voter turnout that was the highest for Edmonton in a generation (since Hawrelak's 1966 defeat). This can partly be attributed to the parallel plebiscite campaign on the proposed closure of the city-owned downtown airport, and partly to the politically charged atmosphere surrounding the national constitutional (Charlottetown Accord) referendum that followed in one week. But as they affected civic turnout directly, these factors were unimportant except for sensitizing citizens to public events: the two principal candidates had defined the stakes. Results of the 1992 vote count are in TABLE I above. The Smith campaign, although the most successful establishment/business effort in a seriously contested vote since Hawrelak (1974), solidified but did little to advance beyond the base, revealed by polling in June, of the hypothetical "business person with no political experience." But Mayor Reimer, despite winning an absolute majority by 10 per cent, and all but 18 of 160 polls, was unexpectedly denied the smashing re-election victory margins of first-term incumbents. The victory was also seated heavily in gender. In a survey completed the week prior to voting, commissioned by Smith, and intended only for private use, Edmonton's TeleResearch Inc. concluded that elector preference held Smith over Reimer by 12 points among men, but Reimer 25 per cent ahead among women.(f.55) The results were reasonably consistent across all six city wards but the nature of this polling makes further cross-tabulation impossible. Ultimately, Smith's strength as an inexperienced politician lay in the legitimacy of his appeal to the corporate strand in Canadian municipal culture. Still, the mayor retained her position even though the TeleResearch poll found that nearly three-quarters of residents (72 per cent) agreed with the proposition that "Edmonton was worse off" under her administration.(f.56) Smith's electoral support was most heavily concentrated among the traditional working-class areas of north-central Edmonton, where he won seven of his 18 polling station victories, and a further 14 where he was only five per cent behind the victor. Here, his corporate-view campaign was articulated in the "pot-hole and policing" approach that appealed to the short-term, concrete, parochial concerns characteristic of lower social class groups in Canadian city politics.(f.57) His second area of strength (another third of his poll victories) came in the upper-class new suburban southwest. It was here that Decore's 1983 campaign against "managers managing managers" in the municipal corporation had also found its most solid appeal. On the other hand, he marginally exceeded his city-wide average in but two of 24 central city polls (regardless of income differentials) and but two of 18 university community and public service managerial residential areas. These areas were, coincidentally, those most accurately characterized as "neighbourhood-protective" in the 1960s' reform period sense of the term, and this of course, was one of Reimer's lifetime policy strengths. The final word should go to the matter of campaign finance, a not well-documented area municipally. Edmonton now requires all candidates to file, by election year end, a statement indicating all contributions of $300 or more and an itemized listing of all campaign expenses (the penalty to be between $500 and $1,000).(f.58) In the obligatory audience with the Journal editorial board on 14 September, Smith made a neophyte's error by stipulating, "I will disclose down to $5 donations.... I don't see any reason not to disclose that. I just hope the list I have is a lot longer than I have right now." While this yielded a supportive editorial three days later, his fundraisers reacted with dismay. The Reimer co-chair presented a more appropriate response: "The only problem with going further than the bylaw is that money given so far to the campaign -- about $70,000 -- has been donated on the understanding that the disclosure limit is $300."(f.59) Especially for the Smith side many people had written cheques for $299 and his "dinner" tickets were priced at $250 (the mayor's at $125). For those who had to conduct business with the city, even the "new style of politics" carried with it fears of retribution. TABLE II is self-explanatory, the major difference in the two campaigns being Smith's need to turn to television to counteract an incumbent's constant high profile. Over and above the candidates' private requests for assistance, a great deal of cash had to be found. In their September 1992 financial appeal to previous donors, Reimer's campaign co-chairs wrote of the usual spectres: "In the coming days, Jan Reimer's election campaign needs financial help from thousands of individual Edmontonians. The election could be much closer than people expect, especially because other candidates will have big-money backers and a lot to spend." Smith's fundraisers had begun by silently phoning the Edmonton region provincial PC list of donors, and the subsequent party leadership campaign quickly became a serious financial barrier. Perceptions in politics quickly become realities. Echoing her solicitation letter, the mayor attacked her opponent for his willingness "to expedite the approval process for land development," which she had previously promised to do on 10 August 1992. She put it this way: "My opponent has gone so far as to say he would plan the city at home, at midnight, over a phone call with a developer friend."(f.60) The city's more prominent municipal columnist summed up the situation thus: "The picture of pious rectitude and self-proclaimed embodiment of a 'new kind of politics' otherwise known as Mayor Jan Reimer is campaigning as a politician not beholden to a mean gang of special interest pleaders, cackling over their ill-gotten gains."(f.61) Reimer's own direct dependence on the development industry (21 per cent of total contributions over $300), those who had undertaken significant past business with city hall (27 per cent) and trade unions (14 per cent), as indicated in TABLE III, suggest a less than ingenuous approach to the matter of material campaign support. The only post-election reporting of campaign finance declarations was the Journal's weekend front-page coverage of the services in kind provided to Smith companies owned by Peter Pocklington.(f.62) Mayor Reimer's developer support, that derived from others who did substantial work for the city (including the controversial exhibition association Edmonton Northlands) and that from the unions somehow eluded any Southam, or Sun, scrutiny. Conclusions It wasn't scripted to turn out this way by media or mayor. What Jan Reimer would not possess was the large-scale mandate that is normally accorded first term mayors in their "confirmation" election (Note TABLE I, years 1971, 1980, 1986). Nor did she preside over a more compliant council, as Smith's affective appeal legitimated the campaigns of other riscally conservative candidates. In ideological terms, a special-interests politician speaking to the direct democracy element in urban culture narrowly defeated Smith's appeal to competing elites in the public corporation tradition. More importantly, from the perspective of mandate, candidates sharing the mayor's agenda would constitute a distinct minority of four on the 12-person council. Although Smith lost, his general position remained powerful, and conflict was now locked into every city council debate.(f.63) Most of the projections made by Smith's advisers, based on their expertise and announced by the candidate to frequent ridicule, became city policy before the next fiscal year end. Among the city's political gladiators the most voiced post-election refrain became, "It could have been done, if only it weren't Bill!" The Journal's Geiger agreed, blaming Smith's loss on Smith himself: "His campaign team has unveiled a credible platform, on waste, road and sewer repairs, and economic development. It's not that Smith's campaign has been without interesting ideas, it's that the candidate has been unable to articulate them."(f.64) But like Bill Clinton in 1992, Smith was the accidental candidate due to the perceived invulnerability of the incumbent. In Edmonton, the year 1992 was not a significant one in the sense of a realigning election, for the change to active (and more partisan) expression of ideology had come in 1983. Laurence Decore's personal victory had been translated into individual Liberal victories provincially in May 1986 and a more solid provincial party vote across Edmonton in March 1989 and June 1993. Mayor Reimer's poor showing against an ill-organized, often-bumbling novice, but one with a clearly defined civic policy position, presaged the elimination of NDP seats in 1993, while her own attitude in victory foreshadowed this event. Of course for many cities of the west, especially Winnipeg since 1919 and Vancouver from 1933-35, the residue from past bitter contests has continued to colour many aspects of modern campaigns. What is different about the contemporary period is the more widely spread sense of tough partisan professionalism that has begun to colour electioneering. There are many possible explanations for this increased interest by gladiators across Canada's larger cities. Among these may be: (1) mayoral candidates have had to become more sophisticated in a programme sense (social development versus fiscal management) coincident with a more knowledgeable and demanding local electorate; (2) the mayor's chair has become a surrogate for holding power in other realms, especially for gladiators associated with parties unpopular at other levels; (3) gender remains a factor, as competent women for a combination of reasons are still denied a seat commensurate with their abilities in other legislatures; (4) persons with specific programme agendas (always the case with developers) may look to seize the podium, as partisan affiliation opens the window to organizational and financial backing; (5) gladiators in other realms may be seeking an outlet, as city elections at fixed intervals are a means to sustain electoral organization and political contacts, all under the socially acceptable veneer of "civic boosterism"; (6) J.S. Mill may have been right in that the mayor's chair has become the first rung on the ladder of political promotion. All of these factors have a role to play of course -- some being more important in Toronto than Vancouver, others more so to Montreal than Calgary. The important common thread, though, is the direct tie to the municipal culture and a new outlook in which appeals to conventional partisan positions devised for debates of national relevance have become less salient. In our cities, specific interest appeasers of multiple stripes (and their latent call to Canadian direct democracy roots) will confront major players representing more traditional "fertile city" and public corporation concepts. Occasionally, immortality may be achieved through electors' spectacular miscalculation (recalling the likes of Stephen Juba, Charlotte Whitton, William Hawrelak), but the norm is more likely to pivot on the nature of the challenge to whichever of the two local ideologies is dominant at the time. These will be the campaigns on the cusp. Postscript Bill Smith did become Edmonton's 33rd mayor on 16 October 1995. He defeated incumbent Jan Reimer by 1,415 votes; 218,843 of those eligible voted. The turnout, at 49.7 per cent, was down marginally from 1992. What was different in 1995 was the more crowded and identifiably partisan field. Mayor Reimer's New Democrat credentials were well known and a second challenger, Lance White, was a sitting Liberal member of the legislative assembly, a past city councillor and continuing crony of former Mayor Decore. Knowledge of Smith's Reform-cum-provincial-Conservative policy inclinations was widespread by this time. The fourth prominent candidate, local businessman John Ramsey, was closely linked to the city's traditional Tory establishment in whose private clubs the appropriate vintage for his victory party had been determined well in advance of the actual voting day. Campaign expenditures, as reported by the candidates, were cumulatively much higher than three years earlier. The dominant personality in the 1995 civic election was not on the ballot. Premier Ralph Klein's policies retrenching government had had direct, measurable, immediate and negative impacts on Edmonton. Still, Premier Klein's personal and party popularity hovered over 60 per cent in the city in every significant survey of public opinion for the preceding 10 months. Unabashedly, Smith adopted Klein's style and, as well as he was able to master it, substance. After coyly toying with the media and interested public for six months about her intentions, the mayor opted to campaign for a third term on (provincial) health care issues and her own record. Her strategists worked in easy alliance with federal Energy Minister Anne McLellan (Edmonton Northwest), orchestrating, for example, a $75 million tripartite Development Initiative the week before her campaign entry. But many of her key organizers were in Ottawa the weekend before the vote, attending the federal NDP leadership convention. Others had been advised that her re-election was assured by the vote-splitting among the crowded field of less progressive men and thus that traditional campaigning was not required. It is not to be overlooked that even the best grand tacticians seldom take voters to the polls. Jan Reimer received 20,000 fewer votes than in 1992. Whatever the many details, the groundwork for the multi-partisan mayoralty campaign of October 1995 had been set three years previously in the campaign on the cusp. NOTES An earlier draft of this essay was first presented to the British Association for Canadian Studies, 20th Anniversary Conference, Hull, U.K., March 1995. f.1. R. Vaison and Peter Aucoin, "Class and Voting in Recent Halifax Mayoralty Elections," Politics and Government of Urban Canada, eds. L. Feldman and M.D. Goldrick (Toronto: Methuen, 1976) 200-19. f.2. See James Lightbody, "The Rise of Party Politics in Canadian Local Elections," Journal of Canadian Studies 6.1 (February, 1971): 39-44. f.3. See the recent discussion by Tim Thomas, "When 'They' is 'We': Movements, Municipal Parties and Participatory Politics," Canadian Metropolitics: Governing Our Cities, ed. James Lightbody (Toronto: Copp, Clark, 1995) 115-36. Note also the occasional "newsettes" in New City Magazine, most recently, XVI. 3&4 (Fall/Winter, 1995): 5-10. f.4. For example, consider the generally very fine work in Frances Frisken, ed., The Changing Canadian Metropolis: A Public Policy Perspective, Vols. I, II (Toronto: The Canadian Urban Institute, 1994) or the earlier work in Trudi Bunting and Pierre Filion eds., Canadian Cities in Transition (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991). f.5. Christopher Leo, "The State in the City: A Political-Economy Perspective on Growth and Decay," in Canadian Metropolitics, 30. f.6. On this important note, consult Warren Magnusson's excellent discussion of ideological conflict inter-mixed with inter-governmental political conflict in "Regeneration and Quality of Life in Vancouver," Leadership and Urban Regeneration: Cities in North America and Europe, eds. Dennis Judd and Michael Parkinson (Sage: Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, 1990) 37, 171-87. f.7. John C. Weaver well dissects the roots of this comforting mythology in Shaping the Canadian City: Essays on Urban Politics and Policy, 1890-1920 (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1977). f.8. See this discussion in James Lightbody, "Electoral Reform in Local Government: The Case of Winnipeg," Canadian Journal of Political Science 9.2 (June 1978): 313. f.9. Harold Kaplan, Reform, Planning and City Politics: Montreal, Winnipeg, Toronto (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) 60-2. f.10. See my "Surviving City Politics," in Canadian Metropolitics, 290-312. f.11. Kaplan 64. f.12. Donald J.H. Higgins, Local and Urban Politics in Canada (Toronto: Gage, 1986) esp. 313-14. f.13. "Politics Where We Live: Women and Cities," in Canadian Metropolitics esp. 103-4. f.14. Vaison and Aucoin 200. f.15. The comparative work has been spurred by political sociologist Terry Nichols Clark. See his anthology Urban Innovation: Creative Strategies for Turbulent Times (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 1994) esp. his essay, "Race and Class Versus the New Political Culture," 21-78. f.16. "Class act in defeat," 21 October 1992. f.17. This stands in much the same way as anglophone Ontario has traditionally stood as the litmus test for Quebec's francophone achievements. For Edmontonians, the measure of unemployment, income, business attraction is always that attained by Calgary. For instance, statistics are reported in these terms: "The growth of household incomes in Edmonton lagged behind Calgary and the rest of the country in the five years ending in 1990, a city analysis shows ... Calgary also has a larger percentage of high-income households than Edmonton ... 9.3 per cent of households there earn $100,000 or more, compared with 6.2 per cent in Edmonton." Edmonton Journal, 26 June 1993. f.18. "Choose Austerity Strategies that Work for You," Research in Urban Policy, Volume 1: Coping with Fiscal Austerity, ed. Terry Nichols Clark (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press Inc, 1985) 71-88. f.19. Statistics Canada, Bulletin, February 1993. f.20. Edmonton Sun, 30 October 1991. f.21. Edmonton Journal, 31 October 1991. "I don't think it [her comments] will make much of a difference," he [Alderman White] said. "There hasn't been a lot of consultation anyway, except for a couple of aldermen." f.22. Neil Waugh, "Civic 'dinosaurs' in danger?" Edmonton Sun, 30 October 1991. f.23. Both dailies' city hall columnists predicted this outcome as early as December 1991. The mayor was specifically reported as laying out the welcome mat on 31 January, 23 June and 22 July. f.24. John Geiger, "For Reimer, second victory is bitter-sweeter," Edmonton Journal, 20 October 1992. f.25. For a discussion of optimum time lines in civic campaigns, see James Lightbody, "The First Hurrah: Edmonton Elects a Mayor, 1983," Urban History Review XIII.1 (June 1984) 35-41. f.26. See James Lightbody, "Cities: dilemmas on our doorsteps," Corruption, Character & Conduct: Essays on Canadian Government Ethics, eds. Allan Tupper and John Langford (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993) 197-216. f.27. Edmonton Journal, 19 July 1992. f.28. The data were presented in a private briefing by Laschinger on 16 July 1992. f.29. "Bill Smith for Mayor: Let's Get Edmonton Working!" Campaign tabloid (August 1992). f.30. "Jan Reimer: Building a Better Edmonton," pamphlet (July 1992); "Yes, A Better City: A New Kind of Politics," campaign tabloid (September 1992). f.31. Neil Waugh, "Policy problems hurting Bill Smith," Edmonton Sun, 6 September 1992; John Geiger, "Candidate borrows bureaucrat's ideas," Edmonton Journal, 25 August 1992. f.32. The police chief twice critiqued Smith's proposals for inner-city crime control in the media. One such headline, "Chief slams hooker solution," Edmonton Sun, 6 October 1992, in which Chief McNally discussed the sociological dimensions of prostitutes as victims and the legitimately limited powers of the mayor's position, convinced Smith's senior strategists that a scripted response to a public servant, the risk of voter resentment notwithstanding, was absolutely required. The story, as reported, read "But Smith fired back at the mayor and at Police Chief Doug McNally, saying 'you can't fight crime by committee' ... Smith said the police chief's 'pious platitudes are no pinch-hitting for proper policing' and he urged McNally to stay out of politics or 'quit his day job.'" Edmonton Journal, 7 October 1992. f.33. This did not always work out well. The last Friday in August the mayor presided over the opening of the new city hall, in the process closing several major downtown through-ways during the rush hour. At that evening's football game some 30,000 fans spontaneously booed her scoreboard message that said that she was sorry they could not all have been with her at the downtown ceremonies. Many clearly felt they had been. f.34. Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 179-80. f.35. Stephen Clarkson, City Lib (Toronto: Hakkert, 1972) 147. See esp. chapter 7: "The Mangled Message." f.36. Edwin Black, Politics and the News (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982) 202. f.37. In Edmonton's 1995 election, for instance, when Bill Smith did defeat Mayor Reimer, of 46 Edmonton Journal reporters and editorial board members surveyed by columnist David Staples after the vote, 44 had thought Mayor Reimer would be returned. 22 October 1995. f.38. Nigel Harris, Beliefs in Society: The Problem of Ideology (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971) 99. f.39. Urban Political Systems 178. f.40. Jack Masson, Alberta's Local Governments and Their Politics (Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1985) 193. Emphasis is in the original. f.41. Higgins, Local and Urban Politics, 299-307. James Lorimer, A Citizen's Guide to City Politics (Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1972) 142-61. f.42. A Citizen's Guide 161. f.43. City Lib 129. f.44. Edmonton Journal, 21 October 1992. While generally lauding Smith's behaviour on election night in its editorial, the Sun did observe of his campaign that "He even went so far as to suggest some kind of conspiracy of female editors on the city's two daily newspapers against a male candidate." f.45. As one indication of this shortcoming, approximately 10 per cent of the city's households would not even receive the principal campaign brochure intended to be hand-dropped city-wide to 160 polls. f.46. David Taras, "Prime Ministers and the Media," Prime Ministers and Premiers, eds. L.A. Pal and David Taras (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1988) 40. f.47. The media were not amused. On 17 September, veteran Edmonton Journal city hall columnist John Geiger wrote, "The candidacy of Bill Smith is like a Frankenstein monster created by political mechanics. His speeches and public remarks in his bid for mayor are at best superficial and at worst glib, but purposely so, as if constructed from the bones of strategy gathered in political science charnel-houses ... Bill Smith [doesn't] bother to stick around and talk to reporters ... his speeches are built on radio and TV sound bites.... It isn't Boris Karloff, but in political terms, it's alive." f.48. Edmonton Journal, 16 October 1992. f.49. "'Out here we can breathe clean air -- at least most of the time,' Reimer told reporters at a news conference at Government House Park in the river valley." Edmonton Journal, 25 September 1992. This occasion marked the formal release of her platform. f.50. This essentially boiled down to a stronger commitment to political ethics, based upon the public listing of lobbyists at city hall. Edmonton Journal, 8 September 1992. Campaign finance disclosure documents filed by the mayor two months after the campaign indicated that most of the city's major developers (and unions) had found it appropriate to donate to her campaign. "Election Statement Declaration Form -- Jan Reimer," City Clerk's Office, 23 December 1992. f.51. Edmonton Journal, 9 October 1992. f.52. Edmonton Sun, 11 October 1992. This Sun/Yerxa poll predicted Mayor Reimer at 49 per cent, Smith at 26, with eight per cent "refused comment" and five undecided. f.53. Edmonton Journal, 10 October 1992. Jan Reimer stood at 59 per cent, Smith 35, margin of error with the sample of 400 was five per cent, 19 times out of 20. f.54. Councillor C. Chichak had created a major controversy and was very nearly disqualified after her 1989 victory when it was revealed that she had not disclosed $8,400 in business tax arrears when signing her nomination papers (violating provincial elections legislation). Councillor K. Kozak, who ran for mayor, was nearly removed from council following his 1991 guilty plea to criminal assault on his estranged spouse. f.55. TeleResearch, Inc. "Preliminary Report on the Completion of Phase Two Survey for Mayoralty Candidate Bill Smith." Sample size was 467, results considered accurate within plus or minus four percentage points, 19 times out of 20. The final projected vote tally for 19 October was Reimer at 34 per cent, Smith at 27 and undecided at 35. f.56. The veteran business columnist of the Journal may have hit the mark with this assessment: "Some voters quickly spotted that Smith couldn't read his own road map, or made promises which made it sound as if he was holding his road map upside down. But the important thing here is that, despite this, a very large chunk of Edmonton's electorate was eager to overlook such peccadilloes and vote against Reimer." Rod Ziegler, "Anti-business mayor can learn from post-election analysis," 27 October 1992. f.57. For example, on 22 September, Smith announced that he would add another 150 officers to the police force as quickly as they could be trained. f.58. Bylaw #9938, "A Bylaw to Require Disclosure by Candidates and Council Members," 14 January 1992. f.59. Edmonton Journal, 15 September 1992. f.60. Edmonton Sun, 30 September 1992. f.61. John Geiger, "Reimer, Smith in battle over developers," Edmonton Journal, 3 October 1992. He continues, "Reimer's concept of a 'positive campaign' is apparently broad enough to allow her to make the link between challenger Bill Smith and the things that go bump in the night in search of special favours and influence." f.62. "Pocklington firms helped Smith campaign: $20,000 in 'service contributions,'" 2 January 1993. The story included this observation about the $21,284.44, "Throughout the campaign, Smith countered rumours he was being backed by Pocklington by saying the controversial businessman hadn't given any money to his campaign." f.63. For instance, newly elected councillor and retired police chief L. Chahley assessed his victory: "As he draws on a cigarette, Chahley says the 13 members of council must get back to basics: road repairs over bike paths. But that philosophy could put him on a collision course with council's social democrats." Edmonton Journal, 26 October 1992. f.64. 10 October 1992. TABLE I: Edmonton's Recent Mayoralty Elections Legend for Chart: A - Year B - Turnout C - Major Candidate Populist/Progressive D - Major Candidate Business/Establishment E - Other Major A B C D E 1992 53% Reimer(f.*) 52.8% Smith 42.6% -- -- 1989 36% Reimer 53.0% Cavanagh 24.3% Hamilton 22.7% 1986 32% Decore(f.*) 67.8% Olsen 31.2% -- -- 1983 45% Decore 61.2% Purves(f.*) 26.4% Wiebe 9.6% 1980 21% Purves(f.*) 76.5% -- -- -- -- 1977 38% Decore 26.0% Purves 33.9% Den 12.1% -- -- -- -- Cavanagh 25.4% -- -- 1974 48% Dent(f.*) 20.6% Hawrelak 49.2% Purves 23.7% 1971 37% Dent(f.*) 62.0% -- -- Kinisky 27.7% Note: f.* Incumbent through election. Marginal candidates are excluded. Source: City of Edmonton Election Office. TABLE II: Expenditures, Edmonton Mayoralty Campaign, 1992 Type Jan Reimer Bill Smith 1. Office Operations $14,279 $9,217 2. Telephones 5,289 3,652 3. Salaries, Fees 25,349 18,241 4. Advert, Signs, etc. 67,910 45,325 5. Other Promotion 33,634 15,665 6. Television 0 31,728 TOTAL $146,461 $123,828 TOTAL Declared (f.*)183,485 -- Sources: "Election Statement Declaration Forms," City Clerk's Office, December, 1992. f.* After fund raising event costs. TABLE III: Sources of Donations in Excess of $300, Edmonton Mayoralty Campaign, October, 1992 Type Jan Reimer Bill Smith 1. Development Ind'y $10,149 $3,250 2. Professions 4,350 1,250 3. Individuals and Organizations which do major work for the city: a. Contractors 2,675 1,800 b. Professionals 8,899 500 c. Suppliers 1,450 0 4. Unions 6,625 0 5. Other Business 5,500 10,735 6. Family & Friends 7,750 1,500 7. Others 1,350 2,500 TOTAL $48,748 $21,535 8. Fundraising Events 57,072 26,251 9. Service in kind 6,810 27,884 TOTAL $112,630 $75,670 Sources: "Election Statement Declaration Forms," City Clerk's Office, December, 1992. Note: The Mayor's campaign was able to carry over $19,464 in her "Friends of Jan Reimer Fund." TABLE IV: Edmonton Mayoralty Votes, 1995 Candidate Vote Per cent Expenses Bill Smith 79,831 36.48 $205,885 Jan Reimer 78,514 35.88 84,742 John Ramsey 42,043 19.21 292,971 Lance White 7,080 3.24 72,000 Others 11,375 5.20 n.a. Total votes 218,843 -- -- Total electors 440,044 -- -- Voter Turnout 49.73% -- -- Sources: City of Edmonton Election Office, 1995. Election expenses are as reported by the Edmonton Journal and Edmonton Sun, 10 January 1995.