Understanding Alienation in Western Canada: Is "Western Alienation" the Problem? Is Senate Reform the Cure?

Journal of Canadian Studies, Spring 2005 by Lawson, Robert J

Because the West lacks adequate representation in the federal government and influence in federal politics, the federal government is able to ignore or marginalize Western interests and concerns. Thus, the arrangement is allegedly defective. Neither Gibbins nor the CWF, however, considers it irreparably defective. Gibbins's conceptualization of western alienation anchors its experience in inadequate opportunities for institutionalized representation of regional concerns in the federal government; if western Canadian regional interests were represented equally and effectively in the federal government, then feelings of western alienation would subside (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003; Gibbins 1982). For example, Gibbins's influential comparative study of regionalism in Canada and the United States argues that the United States suffers significantly less from the problem of regional alienation because the federal government represents states equally in the Senate (Gibbins 1982). Thus, the solution to the problem of regional alienation requires a strategy of intrastate federalism. This federal arrangement accommodates territorial representation of regions and regional units of government in the central government (Cairns 1979).

Gibbins and the CWF question the curative benefits of strategies that promote more interstate federalism (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 123-25; Gibbins and Roach 2003, 6; Gibbins 1980, 213-14). This federal arrangement involves greater decentralization of powers to regional units and, therefore, more autonomy for provincial governments (Cairns 1979). Proponents of the western alienation thesis suggest that complaints in western Canada most often have to do with matters falling within the constitutional purview of the federal government, such as trade policy, tariffs, equalization procedures, and various aspects of fiscal arrangements pertaining to federal social program investment and expenditure. The West simply wants a fair say in these matters of federal concern. Consequently, this desire should not be confused with a demand for more extensive provincial powers or jurisdiction.

The most popular measure to promote regional representation in the federal government is Senate reform, although it is not the only measure proposed.6 I focus on it here because it is integral to the intrastate model of federalism and consistently given priority by Gibbins and the CWF, among others. Gibbins and Berdahl, for instance, take care to emphasize that Senate reform is a "staple" of western Canadian political discourse and a necessary remedy for western alienation (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003).7 The CWF lists five central features and benefits of Senate reform: (1) it reduces the patronage powers of the prime minister; (2) it could be a catalyst for experimentation with a new electoral system; (3) it can mitigate against party discipline, especially if senators are not permitted to enter Cabinet and the Senate is not made a confidence chamber; (4) it makes regional concerns and interests and the equal representation of both a central feature of the federal government; and (5) it can legitimize Supreme Court appointments by making them contingent upon Senate, which would be de facto regional, approval (Canada West Foundation 2000, 6-15). These benefits presuppose that the Senate will be a politically effective body with legitimacy to represent regional concerns. In other words, it must be elected.