Andrew Bonar Law and the fall of the Asquith coalition: The December 1916 Cabinet crisis
Canadian Journal of History, Aug 1997 by R J Q Adams
Why did he compromise with his colleagues? Because, he explained: ". . . the action desired by them, though not in my opinion so good as the course I had suggested, would have the same effect of producing a crisis which would put an end to what seemed to me an impossible situation."67 The ministers agreed that Bonar Law should communicate to the premier this resolution:
We share the view expressed to you by Mr. Bonar Law some time ago that the Government cannot continue as it is.
It is evident that a change must be made, and in our opinion, the publicity given to the intention of Mr. Lloyd George makes reconstruction from within no longer possible.
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We therefore urge the Prime Minister to tender the resignation of the Government.
If he feels unable to take that step, we authorise Mr. Bonar Law to tender our resignations.os
Lord Beaverbrook argued with great skill in his version of events that the resolution was meant to strengthen the hand of the prime minister against Lloyd George - an interpretation which now seems to have been thoroughly overturned.69 Certainly the principals never made such a claim and several in later years, most notably Chamberlain and Cecil, categorically denied it.70 Lord Jenkins referred to the motives of the Unionist chieftains as "the greatest mystery of the whole crisis," but there seems to be little mystery afoot." What they wanted was to make something happen - the war was going badly, Carson and his back-bench admirers were restive, their leader was ready to act - and it appeared that Lloyd George might take the burdens from their shoulders: or he might not. They would not know until they acted, so act they did.
When Bonar Law emerged with the resolution and showed it to Beaverbrook, who remained hidden from the Unionist ministers elsewhere in the house, Beaverbrook recalled pleading with his leader to delete the reference to Lloyd George and publicity - the upheaval in the press which he himself had played a part in instigating. Bonar Law brushed the protests aside,72 and took the resolution after lunch to Downing Street where, by his own recollection, he "communicated its contents" orally to Asquith.73 To Lord Jenkins, Bonar Law had clearly "neglected his duty-which was to show Asquith the resolution and let him decide for himself what it meant."74 Beaverbrook, arguing his case that the resolution was meant to uphold Asquith, ignored the failure to hand over the actual paper and claimed that the prime minister became frightened by the idea of resignation.75 Lord Blake leans, understandably, toward Beaverbrook, while Asquith's official biographers suggest that Bonar Law was at the very least guilty of misleading the prime minister and moving him toward a destructive series of events.76
What happened - and why? Bonar Law noted three weeks later: "I did not actually hand him the document," and, before putting his memorandum away in his private files, amended the sentence in his own hand to read "I forgot to hand him the document."77 His partial explanation was this: "The Prime Minister was not only greatly shocked but greatly surprised by our communication, and asked me to treat it as if it had not been made until he had a opportunity of discussing the matter with Lloyd George."78 Lord Crawford noted in his contemporary diary that Bonar Law offered the Tory ministers precisely the same explanation.79 Whatever passed between them, Asquith was well aware after the brief interview that the Tory ministers were set on resignation and a restructuring of the government.80