Incoherent Empire

Canadian Journal of History, August, 2005 by Stephen A. Bourque

Incoherent Empire, by Michael Mann. London, Verso, 2003. viii, 278 pp. $25.00 US (cloth).

Michael Mann, who is a sociologist by profession and not a historian, provocatively challenges many of the assumptions of recent American foreign policy in his Incoherent Empire. In this rather short book, the author argues that since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has emerged as the globe's sole imperialist power. Not only does America apparently rule the world militarily, it also dominates culturally, economically, and technologically. Outwardly, the politicians in Washington control an ever-expanding, worldwide empire. As Mann finished his book, American troops were continuing to enlarge this empire by consolidating in Afghanistan and completing their initial attack on Iraq. By 2003, it seemed as if the United States was seeking to impose a Pax Americana in the tradition of the old Roman Empire, but on a larger scale.

The author argues, however, that appearances of omnipotence are deceptive. The United States currently dominates an "incoherent empire," one that is fragile and probably not particularly durable, because American military power is limited. While it is the most technologically sophisticated of the world's armed forces, America lacks conventional forces on the ground. In addition, unlike the nineteenth-century British imperialists or Roman legionnaires, American troops are not ruthless enough to enforce discipline in this far-flung empire. Finally, its high-tech equipment will be only marginally effective in combating insurgents willing to contest American hegemony.

In addition to military might, Mann examines American economic dominance. He argues that the United States has a very powerful economy, because of the consumptive habits of its own citizens rather than its international capitalistic prowess. He calls the United States a "back-seat" driver, since it cannot directly control foreign investors or foreign economies. He argues that the "neo-liberals," those who make up much of the George W. Bush's inner circle, are subordinating principles of free trade to propping up the rich states and corporations at the expense of the remainder of the world. As a result, American financial clout will continue to erode as other economies continue to grow outside of this circle of friends.

Michael Mann's last two arguments concern politics and ideology. Mann argues that America's success in the Cold War has been part of its undoing. None of the major European or Asian powers feel particularly threatened today, and therefore do not need or appreciate American armed intervention. The more it uses force without the support of the United Nations, the less support it receives from the rest of the world. The result is that America's competitors will use more and more of their political capital to oppose American dominance. This problem becomes more acute in relation to the last of Mann's main points, America's ideology. Although national politicians and most citizens style the United States as the home of freedom, this view is not held everywhere. Because of ideology, American soldiers find themselves face to face with nationalist uprisings and challenges around the world. As such, this country's democratic values are contradicted, and seemingly mocked, as it expends military energy to suppress those who strive for self-determination. Even internally, the United States government has adopted a military model of information flow: hierarchical, secretive, and restrictive. This is not what one expects from a nation that prides itself on a free press. Meanwhile the remainder of the world's press, far freer than the American media, challenges this nation's foreign policy at every opportunity.

It should be obvious that Michael Mann is no friend of the current administration. In fact, he confesses to writing this book at "breakneck speed" in order to affect the politics of the United States and Great Britain. It is his flagrant attempt to halt American international adventures by turning the tide of opinion. So obvious are his politics that he concludes his book with the clarion call to, in November 2004, "Throw the new militarists out of office" (p. 267). Of course that did not happen. That he erred in his predictions does not mean his book is without value. Mann is a Professor of Sociology at University of California, Los Angeles and the author of a wide range of books and articles concerning power in the modern world. His general theme, once separated from political enthusiasm, rests on a strong scholarly edifice.

Using the current literature available to the general public, Mann has constructed a strong argument on the limits of American power. His arguments, which need to be developed in a greater historical context for the readers of this journal, are thought-provoking and disturbing. Certainly, they go a long way toward illuminating the difficulties facing the world's last superpower.

Stephen A. Bourque