Corporatism, neoliberalism, and the failed revolt of big business: Lessons from the case of IEDI

Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Winter 1998 by Kingstone, Peter R

Indeed, it was their experience in FIESP that convinced IEDI members that the federation was incapable of leading the business community. In interviews during 1991-92, IEDI members expressed their frustration in trying to raise and discuss issues important to the business community at large. They found instead that FIESP tended to conform to the role one past president described as a giant broker for smaller, backward firms and sectors (Interview 1991). Business executives from a large number of those sectors only poorly understood the problems facing Brazil's economy; they were more interested in how FIESP could help them secure access to state resources.

In forming IEDI, the members chose to create a distinct organization within Brazil's relatively dense network of business associations. They limited membership to 30 individuals, chosen to reflect certain criteria: they were all relatively young, or at least "modern" in their outlook; they provided a diverse range of sectoral and regional interests; they were all owners or chief executives of very large firms or business groups; they fully financed the organization through their own contributions; and they were all Brazilians, from domestic firms. Although they tried to provide some regional and sectoral diversity, the members joined as individual businessmen, not firm or sector representatives. In this, IEDI differed from most other business associations in the country (the notable exceptions being the PNBE and the Liberal Institutes).

IEDI clearly made no effort to be a truly representative organization. It explicitly excluded small firms and multinationals. It excluded services, finance, and commerce. It also made no claim to speak for large numbers of firms. What IEDI did was to bring together 30 prominent businessmen, each of whom represented a major business group and many of whom on their own could garner as much public and government attention as most business associations.

Some measure of this impact comes from the Gazeta Mercantils annual vote on the ten most influential businesspeople in Brazil. Two IEDI members, Claudio Bardella and Jorge Gerdau Johannpeter, were part of the Gazeta's "permanent council" of the six all-time highest vote getters. Another four had appeared repeatedly on the annual top ten list, while roughly half the remaining members appeared among the top vote getters by region or by sector. Furthermore, some of the members had become well-known public figures by virtue of their frequent public statements. Johannpeter was a cofounder of the Sao Paulo Liberal Institute and a leading figure in later, successful efforts to create a coordinated business stance on economic reforms (Schneider 1997). Ricardo Frank Semler wrote frequent op-ed pieces in the newspapers and was well known for twice surrepticiously recording public officials soliciting bribes. Figures like Abraham Kasinsky, Celso Lafer, Paulo Francini, Jose Ermirio de Moraes, and Paulo Aguiar Cunha also had very visible public profiles.