"'Tis pity that when laws are faulty they should not be mended or abolisht": Authority, legitimations, and honor in Aphra Behn's The Widdow Ranter

Papers on Language and Literature, Spring 2002 by Velissariou, Aspasia

This delicate balance, suspended in the end, is temporarily retained on the basis of self-defense as a contradictory notion: on the one hand, it is dictated by the need for personal security and, on the other, it involves self-activation that often borders dangerously on unauthorized action. In Bacon's words "self-- defense," not only as the subject's right, but also as obligation, authorizes his resistance to the Indian aggression insofar as the absence of authority suggests the subject's release from obligation. In this context, the shift attempted by Downright from the issue of the right to (self) defense to sedition (II.iv.103) is politically wise. In line with the Tory perception of self-defense as instrumental in the resistance theory, both Downright and Wellman interpret self-defense as rebellion: "a specious device to resist legitimate authority, a cover for ambition and greed" (Zwicker 143).22 More importantly, Behn's decisive move in clearing her hero of all suspicion that he may be somewhat inspired by the notion of consensual government is his individualist attitude to authority. If Bacon's revolutionary politics were consistent then the next step would be the dissolution of government and the reversion of power to the people. But that would be tantamount to admitting the people as the origin of power and, consequently, their right to rebellion, a politically unacceptable position not only for Behn but, significantly also, for the overwhelming majority of the Whigs.23 Because the people cannot operate as the origin of power they simply serve to set off the inherent nobility of the hero and underscore his essential isolationism.

Even so, Bacon's position is vulnerable to a legitimate objection. The King's deputy may be absent, but there is a lawful authority represented by the Council, however degraded. Therefore, to the question of whether or not it is lawful to punish one's enemy is added another crucial one: Is the equation of an inept authority with the lack of authority truly valid? The real issue here is not so much what legitimates political action-in the civil war both parties (Bacon and Downright) claim that they fulfil the proper end of government-but who decides what constitutes a lawful political authority. The answer given by the Councilors is tautological: they are the lawful authority because the law has defined them as such. So they provide a definition of lawfulness in its strictest, legalistic sense. To their logic, therefore, acting with or without commission is of primary importance. The act of authorizing a subject to perform an action constitutes in itself the essence of their authority and, at the same time, it both consolidates and reproduces it:

WELLMAN But all knew what we must expect from Bacon if that by Lawfull Authority he had Arriv'd to so great a Command as Generall, nor would we be huft out of our Commissions. (I.ii.16-18)

Commission as an engine of power through manipulation is also evident in Dunce's ploy to offer Bacon a commission for General in order to entrap him. At the same time, it is offered as an important means for the distribution of power amongst the subjects and, therefore, for the allocation of positions of power in the colony; hence Friendly's proposal to the newcomer, Hazard, to present him to the Council "for a Commission" (I.i. 137). "Commission" functions as an empty signifier that acquires meaning in accordance with the interested politics of the authorities. In Wellman's equation of Bacon's unauthorized action, with the murder attempted by Whiff and Whimsey, lack of commission serves as the letter of the law. According to their logic, Bacon's demand of a commission is suspect because, as Downright says, it is a cover for ambition (I.ii.19-20).