Optimal design of the online auction channel: Analytical, empirical, and computational insights

Decision Sciences, Fall 2002 by Bapna, Ravi, Goes, Paulo, Gupta, Alok, Karuga, Gilbert

In future work we will focus our attentions to other auction parameters in the design of online auctions that require optimization. These include, but are no limited to, the auction duration and the lot size among others. [Received: October 6, 2001. Accepted: July 3, 2002.]

*Alok Gupta's research is supported by NSF CAREER grant #US-0092780, but does not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF. Partial support for this research was also provided by TECI-the Treibick Electronic Commerce Initiative, OPIM/SBA, University of Connecticut.

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Ravi Bapna and Paulo Goes

Department of Operations and Information Management, U-41 IM, School of Business, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269, e-mails: ravi.bapna @business.uconn.edu, paulo.goes@business.uconnt.edu

Alok Gupta

Information and Decision Sciences Department, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, 321 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, e-mail: gupta037@umn.edu