A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF MILITARIZATION AND INEQUALITY1

Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Winter 2006 by Kick, Edward L, Davis, Byron, Kentor, Jeffrey

This research empirically examines Stanislav Andreski's (1968) argument that military participation (soldiers/population) reduces inequality within countries. In a cross-national analysis of 66 countries for the period 1970 through 1990, authors find that military participation reduces income inequality, as measured by Gini coefficients. These results support Andreski's argument that military service serves integrative and egalitarian functions. Authors interpret Andreski's arguments from both Weberian and global dependency perspectives.

The end of manifest East-West conflict and emergence of a new sociopolitical "world order" initially raised hopes for a global "peace bonus." World military expenditures in constant dollars declined significantly in the decade up to 2000, as the total armed forces in the world dropped from 28.3 million to 22.3 million soldiers (ACDA 2000, p. 61).2 Yet, world military spending increased to $956 billion in 2003, an 18% increase in just two years fueled in part by U.S. military doctrine and strategy after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (SIPRI 2004). It is arguable that global reductions in military expenditures can promote near-universal improvements in human welfare including inequality, and for many the "guns or butter" choice is an unambiguous one favoring sharp reductions in militarization (Kourvetaris 1991). But others emphasize the complexity of such relationships (Scanlan and Jenkins 2001) and contend that "guns and butter" more aptly describes the empirical association between militarization and well-being, at least with respect to national economic development (Firebaugh and Beck 1994; Benoit 1973).

It is in line with the "guns and butter" thesis that Stanislav Andreski (1968) argued military participation has a leveling effect on social inequalities. Andreski's thesis was that military service serves integrative and egalitarian functions, providing a path of upward mobility for the segment of a country's population that is unskilled, uneducated, and unemployed. Education, income, and social integration with other segments of society generate a common bond or a nationalism in the populous that additionally fosters egalitarianism.

Andreski also argued there is an implicit threat of violence that arises when the lower classes become militarized. The ruling class often must deal with this threat by providing more benefits, whether they are social, economic, or political. Thus, "the height of stratification tends to covary with the MPR" (i.e., the military participation ratio-see Weede 1993: 224).

Andreski's hypotheses were based upon historical comparisons of selected cultures, beginning with the "primitive peoples" of Africa, Mesopotamia, Greece, Iran, and China up to, and including, "modern" Europe and America. The task of this paper is to rigorously examine the validity of these more anecdotal "observations" with an empirical, cross-national analysis of the relationships among military participation and inequality from 1970 to 1990.

Andreski's argument appears to apply to a broad range of societies, but is one of several alternative explanations for military-inequality linkages. These linkages are examined below and include a Weberian framework, related modernizing themes, and a considerably more critical approach forwarded by global dependency writers. After reviewing these alternative expectations, we offer a cross-national examination of military-inequality linkages.

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTORY THEORIZATION

There is a longstanding sociological concern and corresponding debate over the impact of "militarization" on economic and social development. For instance, Herbert Spencer (1896/1897) argued that societies oriented towards war (Germany, Russia) are less egalitarian than those without such orientation (Britain). Max Weber's (1921) contrasting expectation was that militarization and the discipline it instilled helped to promote modernization in general and universalistic treatment in particular, leading to equalization pressures in a number of societal arenas. A number of contemporary studies similarly emphasize the positive aspects of military expansion, which impact national economic and individual well-being (Kick, Davis, Kiefer, and Burns 1998). For instance, militarization tends to enhance a country's physical infrastructure (e.g., the U.S. interstate highway system, the Internet, etc.) across much of the modem world system. Investment in military research and development leads to public sector spin-offs that generate economic growth and human capital growth, reducing inequalities. However, others maintain that military expansion in developing countries in particular deepens their linkages of dependency with the core countries supplying them arms, exacerbating domestic inequalities (Eide 1976; Kentor 2000).

MILITARY, MODERNIZATION, AND EQUALIZATION

Modernists have postulated that especially in Third World countries, militaries represent the most advanced of social institutions and serve a vital role in building modern attitudes, generating social and economic advances, and cultivating necessary foreign investment and aid (Pye 1962; Stockwell and Laidlow 1981). Insofar as militaries in the developing world are modeled after Western market economics, they can embody values of discipline, precision, achievement, motivation, and pride in national citizenship that are the major forces behind modern societal development more generally (Pye 1962; Benoit 1973; Stockwell and Laidlow 1981). This argumentation directly parallels Weber's emphases on the military and modernization in arguing that modern military forces break down old, rigid, and traditional value systems in the developing world that are "irrational" and a major impediment to social change and modernization (Benoit 1973: 88).