Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority

Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Winter 2007 by Rogers, Tom

Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority by Oded Löwenheim. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. (280 pages; cloth, paper)

Reviewed by Tom Rogers

Independent Scholar

In Predators and Parasites, Oded Löwenheim defines persistent agents of transnational harm (PATHs) as non-state groups, networks or organizations that project harm across borders. The author claims that PATHs are persistent in this harm until stopped by external forces, considerations, or factors. There are no intrinsic factors that will bring about a cessation of this harm.

The real contribution that this excellent work makes to IR theory is the explanation of why great powers (GPs) react as they do to PATHs. Löwenheim maintains that the policies of GPs are not simply due to the harm that the PATHs do. Rather, GPs' reactions to PATHs depend in large measure on the harm or perceived harm that they pose to GPs' authority in the world. PATHs that are perceived by a great power as being a threat to this authority are dealt with most harshly.

Taking the case of the US, Löwenheim contrasts the different American reactions to drug cartels and to al-Qaeda. While Washington or allied governments such as Colombia have used military assets against the drug cartels, it has been mainly in a law enforcement role. As the cartels have not directly challenged the US government as a great power, they are viewed as merely a problem of control requiring a less coercive response. Löwenheim terms such PATHs "parasites of authority." By contrast, al-Qaeda's challenge dictated a strong military response as it posed a direct challenge to American global authority. Therefore, while the US did not find it necessary to occupy Columbia, it did intervene in and occupy Afghanistan. While, militarily speaking, the invasion of countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq might be questionable, the US, as a GP, felt that punishment was necessary against al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein

A similar situation obtained during the 17th century with regard to the Barbary pirates of North Africa. Though they kidnapped, enslaved, and killed tens of thousands of Europeans, the European powers saw the corsairs as merely parasites engaged in crime. They did not pose a fundamental challenge to the international order as it was constituted at that time. In the 19th century, however, these same corsairs were seen by Britain as a direct threat to its authority. The city-state of Algiers openly defied British authority in the midst of its campaign against slavery by not only refusing the British demand that it end slavery, but also by taking the British consul prisoner. The devastating British naval attack of 1816 on Algiers was therefore an act to uphold the new world order brought about by the Congress of Vienna. British honor demanded that its shame be salved. This shame grew not just from the Algerian snub. Rather, it also came from the contradiction between its high moral stand against slavery and the realpolitik of allowing its recently erstwhile Algerian allies to attack British rivals.

In short, Löwenheim's revolutionary work deals with the policy issues that drive GP actions with regard to the issues of the drag trade and tenorism. Remarkably, he is able to do this in a thin, readable volume that explains not just great power policies, but the process of a PATH parasite becoming a PATH predator.

In my view, Löwenheim could extend this research in two major directions that bear upon the study of the military. The first would be to deal with what analysts have termed the "disposal problem"-that is, what great powers do with mercenaries and soldiers once they are no longer allies. Often, such former allies (e.g., Osama bin Laden) transform from mercenary allies into tenorist foes. The former mujahadeen of Afghanistan became the nucleus of al-Qaeda and then used their military skills to make war on US soil. Clearly, the US did not "dispose" of these previous allies very well.

Second, it would be helpful to analyze government corruption and its effects with regard to government policies relating to PATHs. Certainly, some powers, especially regional actors and smaller states, are not immune to bribery. Its effects upon policy decisions would be a subject that Löwenheim's approach could very well illuminate. While his research does not deal directly with this subject, it certainly gives researchers a fine frame of reference to do theirs.

Reviewed by Tom Rogers

Independent Scholar