'Soldiers still count'

Army, Jan 2003 by Smith, Edwin P

During any period of defense relook and reform, it is critical to identify new capabilities that are appropriate and applicable to the threats we anticipate. The decision to move beyond previously developed means to deter and defeat current threats with which we have become familiar and think we understand is almost routine. Much harder, however, is to recognize what means we must retain, those useful against current threats and those that lie in wait ahead. This challenge includes not only reshaping our defense arsenal but in doing so, winning respect and confidence within our own military and civilian ranks, as well as among potential coalition partners, and adversaries, around the world. Given our traditional American emphasis on exploiting technological advantages in defending national interests, this challenge will be all the more critical to our access and influence around the world as potential partners worry about growing interoperability gaps.

The technology interoperability challenge is real and requires more resourcing by others, most of the time, as well as efforts to design interoperability bridges by us. The rest of the challenge has much to do with better human relationship building, often using soldiers here and abroad.

The thesis offered here is that conflict resolution begins and ends on the ground, where people live, and is accomplished by example-setting soldiers executing whatever task is assigned to them to the best of their ability and to the limits of their resources, technological and otherwise. Whether at home or overseas, in war, peace-- support operations, training exercises, military-to-military exchanges or the widening spectrum of conflict resolution tasks assigned to ground forces, soldiers and what they do need to be leveraged at every opportunity. The enduring task of our nation's soldiers is to be dominant at warfighting and equally effective and persuasive at other tasks. These forces, by design and culture must be very adaptive, flexible and agile.

Two simple facts help support this point.

Fact one is that American military capabilities are always of interest to friends and potential foes. We must exploit that natural interest in demonstrating American military capability and values. This can be done by all U.S. armed services properly demonstrating capability and commitment. It is an investment in setting conditions for some commonality in shared security interests and issues around the world. Further, the American military commitment to support a higher civilian authority fascinates many of our uniformed colleagues around the world and can earn us an enduring respect, as well as more access and influence, if we demonstrate this commitment properly.

To do so requires sufficient, highly tailorable and properly resourced military formations that routinely gain attention and send signals that register with all target audiences, messages that invite others to become better than they are-sometimes, like us-as well as suggest to those who would threaten us that they should weigh alternatives carefully.

Sending and maintaining such signals is possible without overextension if we invest carefully in whom and where we want to exert some way-- ahead influence. We already know we cannot be all things to and for all people. We must instead use our formations wisely in high payoff ways that demonstrate to people everywhere who we are, what we represent and what we can do.

The catch is that human behavioral change requires human interaction to stick. It always has and always will. Such change is never guaranteed by operating from a distance. Ground forces remain best suited, whether during some peace time exchange or during combat, to trigger such change. They enable personalized force application, without which behavioral change among people is normally incomplete. Properly trained and mission-ready soldiers are our best ambassadors to the world's mainstream whom we seek to influence most.

Fact two involves the tradition of committing our soldiers to matters of significant national importance as clear demonstrations of national resolve.

The notion of deciding to fight after weighing risks-and then prudently taking some-is not some romantic, anachronistic castaway, even in these modern times. On the contrary, the nation that thinks it can wage its wars risk-free normally guesses wrong and earns only disfavor among neighbors rather than respect. Fighting without risk to those participating, moreover, can become dangerously more attractive than it should, considering the conditioned expectation today among first-world militaries for success without loss and among observers for quick conflict resolution without collateral damage.

Even in a world becoming less civilized, fighting should remain a potentially costly last resort, most agree. Despite all normal efforts by military chains of command and governing civilian officials to reduce participant risks in any conflict, the notion of risk to the fighting human credentials of any nation makes the calculus of the conflict real for decision makers.