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trials & tribulations of Korean War NCOs, The
Army, Feb 2003 by Collins, John M
We was rotten fore we started-we was never disciplined; We made it out a favor if an order was obeyed. Yes, every little drummer 'ad 'is rights an' wrongs to mind, So we 'ad to pay for teachin-an' we paid.
Rudyard Kipling
"That Day"
Noncommissioned officers really are the backbone of the U.S. Army. Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, who whipped Gen. George Washington's rag-tag mob into shape at Valley Forge in 1778, got it right when he wrote Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States: "The choice of noncommissioned officers is the object of greatest importance." Superlative plans and technological superiority indeed confer scant advantage unless competent NCOs ensure smooth performance by every rank and file soldiers in units of every kind.
Personnel policy makers who ignored von Steuben's wise words before the Korean War and shaped the noncommissioned officer corps for more than a decade thereafter did grievous damage when they junked strait-laced Articles of War in favor of a less stringent Uniform Code of Military Justice, sheared unit commanders of promotion and reduction authorities, turned enlisted grade structures inside out, and dulled distinctions between enlisted leaders and their subordinates. Professional standards and combat capabilities predictably slipped. Commanders, who lost faith and trust in confused NCOs, assumed responsibilities and authorities that noncoms rightfully enjoyed, "So we 'ad to pay for teachin'-an' we paid" until shrewder policies righted most wrongs.
Reenlistment rates sank out of sight after citizen soldiers shed military uniforms en masse in the autumn of 1945. Many of those who joined the Regular Army did so reluctantly and picked cushy spots. Well over a quarter of them signed up for one year, half of them for no more than two. Something like 92,000 joined the Army Air Forces, whereas infantry, armor and artillery gained 39,000 combined. Three-fourths were privates and PFCs, which was not surprising because that was where a passel of temporary master sergeants and other senior NCOs landed when they reverted to permanent grades. Those hard core soldiers nevertheless comprised a solid professional base with a wealth of practical experience.
Those who left in a rush were a different ilk. A vocal minority of former enlisted men with real or imagined grievances and distaste for military discipline almost immediately engaged in emotional enemas. Banner headlines and nationwide radio broadcasts blared:
"PUTTING UP WITH OFFICERS WAS THE WORST THING IN THE WAR" "GIs SKIP CHURCH TO AVOID BRASS" "NYLON SALES TO OFFICERS ONLY" "MILITARY CASTE SYSTEM DIVIDES OFFICERS AND GIs EVEN IN DEATH"
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, beset by news media condemnation, congressional complaints, and attacks by other powerful critics, convened two investigative bodies in March 1946. One explored officer-enlisted relationships, while the other examined military justice. Army regulations stripped promotion and reduction authorities from unit commanders before either board completed its tasks. Outcomes inadvertently undermined the ability of noncoms to control troops and the ability of unit commanders to reward or punish their own NCOs.
Retired Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, whose audacious air raid on Tokyo in April 1942 reinvigorated the United States and its allies, chaired the much maligned, yet little understood board that bore his name. Five of its six members had impeccable combat records. Two, including Doolittle himself, wore the Medal of Honor. Four were, or had been, enlisted men.
Doolittle's group interviewed 42 witnesses, studied more than 1,000 letters and published its final report in two months. Most recommendations based on that slender sample were unassailable, like being for motherhood and against sin. The crustiest reactionaries approved steps to "improve leadership in the officer corps." They further agreed that "the higher the rank, the more severe be the punishment," that commissioned officers and enlisted men should receive awards and decorations "on the basis of merit" rather than rank, that official publications should eliminate discriminatory references, such as "officers and their ladies; enlisted men and their wives," and that the U.S. Army should establish and maintain "close contact and association with civilians...since a mutual exchange of information will enhance the military organization." Few foot draggers resisted the right of enlisted personnel to sit on military courts, although GI scoundrels belatedly discovered how pitiless their peers can be.
Traditionalists nevertheless foamed at the mouth over several seemingly innocuous, but explosively controversial recommendations that they believed would unjustifiably lower "old Army" standards:
* Allow all military personnel," when off duty, to pursue social patterns comparable to our democratic way of life."
* Erase "all statutes, regulations, customs and traditions which discourage or forbid social association of soldiers of similar likes and tastes because of military rank."
