Army Transformation war game: Space, missile defense and information operations

Army,  Feb 2003  by Geraci, Richard V,  Reese, W David

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Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki initiated the most significant change to our Army int he past century on October 12, 1999, when he outlined his vision for Transformation in his speech at the Association of the U.S. Army's 45th Annual Meeting. He described his idea to transform the Army into a "full spectrum force which is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations." He subsequently directed the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commanding general to be the lead agent for the operational force transformation effort. In support of this effort, TRADOC focused the Army's premier war game, now known as the Army Transformation War Game (ATWG), on the examination of capabilities advanced by the Transformation effort.

In April 2002, the third Army Transformation War Game took place at the Army War College. The Army's Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) has participated in all three games and has garnered some valuable insights that demonstrate the increasingly significant roles played by space operations, integrated missile defense (IMD) and information operations (10) across our transforming Army.

TRADOC designed the ATWG to examine future global conflict and to assess the strategic value of landpower in a joint, combined and interagency context. The Army Transformation War Game also looked closely at the strategic role of the Army's post-transformation, or Objective Force, units in a joint context. In the game's strategic setting, U.S. forces were extended across a series of conflicts around the world, including the U.S. homeland.

The game's scenario was set in the 2019-2020 time frame-a period when proliferation of space, missile and computer network operations (CNO) technologies and capabilities among our potential adversaries is inevitable. Accordingly, aspects of these threats-and our ability to counter them-were incorporated into the game's design. While the game examined a broad array of mission areas, our focus was on how the key mission areas of SMDC affect the Objective Force.

We want the Objective Force to be strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable. Attaining these Objective Force qualities will require a thorough examination of technological, doctrinal and organizational changes, as well as their interdependencies and political impacts. In the ATWG, we looked closely at these Objective Force concepts. Our conclusion was that decision superiority, much of it space-enabled, will play a key role in realizing required Objective Force capabilities. Objective Force units will be smaller, lighter and faster than their Legacy Force counterparts.

Further, timely access to key information can multiply the effectiveness of Objective Force units, enabling them to become more lethal and survivable. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) information, for example, helps us to see, understand and act first within the battlespace. Reliable computer networks that process and carry this information will provide Objective Force units with a remote processing and reachback capability that will enable smaller, more versatile forces that we can sustain more easily. Conversely, by denying enemy access to information and sensors, we can significantly reduce his capabilities.

The ATWG made it clear that achieving Objective Force characteristics is highly dependent on capabilities from all three SMDC mission areas.

Space operations provide ISR, missile warning, position, navigation and timing services, as well as communications, weather prediction and space control capabilities to the Objective Force. Space-based ISR is often the primary source of ISR information available during prehostility, early-entry and transition phases of operations. Our missile warning systems rely on space-based sensors to detect launches and provide information necessary for friendly force warning and queuing the radars of our air defense weapon systems. The GPS provides information that enables accurate delivery of precision-guided munitions, tracking of friendly force locations and a variety of other position, navigation and timing-dependent capabilities. Satellite communications enable direct communications to remote areas, wide area or focused broadcast options and a large capacity for message traffic, all without the need for ground relays. Weather satellites provide information critical to operational planning. Finally, space control ensures our unimpeded access to space systems while we simultaneously maintain a capability to selectively deny our adversaries the use of and access to space.

Integrated missile defense operations protect our Objective Forces by the unification of missile defense efforts across services, combatant commander's geographical regions and our allies. They provide for defense against missile attacks in progress (active defense), negation of enemy capabilities via the destruction of missiles not yet fired (attack or preboost phase operations) and an integrated battle management system to conduct both. Space-based ISR, missile warning sensors, and communication networks are integral parts of these missions.